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Abstract
Numerous theories have attempted to overcome the anti-essentialist scepticism about
the possibility of deﬁning art. While signiﬁcant advances have been made in this ﬁeld,
it seems that most modern deﬁnitions fail to successfully address the issue of the ever-
changing nature of art raised by Morris Weitz, and rarely even attempt to provide an
account which would be valid in more than just the modern Western context. This thesis
looks at the most successful deﬁnitions currently defended, determines their strengths and
weaknesses, and oﬀers a new, cultural deﬁnition which can preserve the good elements of
other theories, solve or avoid their problems, and have a scope wide enough to account
for art of diﬀerent times and cultures. The resulting theory is a synthetic one in that it
preserves the essential institutionalism of Dickie's institutional views, is inspired by the
historical and functional determination of artistic phenomena present in Levinson's histor-
icism and Beardsley's functionalism, and presents the reasons for something becoming art
in a disjunctive form of Gaut's cluster account. Its strengths lie in the ability to account
for the changing art-status of objects in various cultures and at various times, provid-
ing an explanation of not only what is or was art, but also how and why the concept
`art' changes historically and diﬀers between cultures, and successfully balancing between
the over-generalisations of ahistorical and universalist views, and the uninformativeness of
relativism. More broadly, the cultural theory stresses the importance of treating art as
a historical phenomenon embedded in particular social and cultural settings, and encour-
ages cooperation with other disciplines such as anthropology and history of art.
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Introduction
It is tempting to think that in modern times deﬁning `art' is quite impossible. Indeed,
artists have been doing everything they can to reach beyond every single deﬁnition for some
time now, and successfully so. But there is nothing that can attract analytic philosophers
to a concept more than saying that it cannot be deﬁned, and saying that something is
relative or `in the eye of the beholder' is bound to give them a headache.
The paper which inspired the majority of the modern classiﬁcatory deﬁnitions, must
be Morris Weitz's `The Role of Theory in Aesthetics' (1956). The claim presented by
Weitz was very strong  not only did he criticise existing theories of art, but argued that
`art' cannot be deﬁned, due to its ever-expansive and adventurous nature. Although such
anti-essentialism seems quite paradoxical (is it essential to art that it has no essence?), it
was soon seconded by other authors (e.g. Kennick 1958). Weitz was criticised on numerous
fronts, but while little might be left from his bold anti-essentialist claims, he managed to
point out three hugely inﬂuential issues: (1) `art' has not yet been successfully deﬁned,
largely because (2) art keeps changing all the time and pushes its own boundaries, and
thus (3) any deﬁnition which focuses on art's exhibited or intrinsic properties is doomed
to soon be out of date.
Some philosophers agreed with Weitz to a certain extent and argued that regardless of
whether deﬁning `art' is actually possible or not, it is in fact unnecessary and quite useless,
and that it is more than enough if we simply have some heuristic means of recognising
artworks (Bartel 1979: 49; and more recently Carroll 1994). Some went as far as stating
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that anti-essentialism is in fact a distinctive feature of analytic aesthetics (Shusterman
1989: 6; cf. Shusterman 1994: 390). However, many authors opposed such approach and
argued that a deﬁnition is not only possible, but also much needed (e.g. Tatarkiewicz 1971:
147; Dickie 1974: 21ﬀ. Walton 1977: 99).
The classiﬁcatory attempts which followed considered the lesson of anti-essentialism
and tried to analyse `being art' as a contextual property, or a relation works have to their
context, history, function, etc. However, as I will try to show in this thesis, they did not
improve enough and remain unsatisfactory. Speciﬁcally, neither of them did full justice to
Weitz's claim about the ever-changing nature of art. To a large extent they keep pretending
that both art and the concept `art' do not change that much over time and between diﬀerent
cultural contexts, and they operate within a kind of Enlightenment universalism bubble in
which they either talk about all art as if it were the same and was always treated the same
as it is in the modern Western world, or at least as if all the other arts and treatments
of art did not matter particularly much. And as much as I understand the legitimacy
of restricting the concept to be deﬁned to the modern Western understanding of `art', I
believe that (1) the fact that `art' was and is understood diﬀerently in other contexts tells
us something about the nature of the concept itself, also as it is understood in the modern
Western world; and (2) it is simply a shame that such theories refrain from providing
a more comprehensive account  it is good to have a limited view sometimes, but why
not expand it if it is possible (see: Bourdieu 1987; Shusterman 1994; Ahlberg 1995)? The
cultural theory I will propose follows from those considerations: I try to deﬁne `art' in a
way which will take into account the fact that the content of the concept can and does
change relative to various historical and cultural contexts.
One could ask bluntly: do we really need another deﬁnition of art? What does the
cultural theory oﬀer to make it worth our attention?
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There are several reasons why I think a new theory  and speciﬁcally the cultural theory
I oﬀer  is needed and is likely to be more successful than other views.
1. A new deﬁnition is needed simply because all others fail. They not only fall into
conceptual problems, but also simply fail to include everything that is actually con-
sidered art and/or exclude everything that is not. Assuming, pace Weitz, that a
deﬁnition is possible, this is enough of a reason to continue the search. And as I will
show, the cultural theory does the job better than any of its competitors.
2. None of the most developed deﬁnitions enquire into the origins of our concept of
art, they simply take it for granted, as if it sprung up from nowhere just before the
Great Avantgarde. In the course of my argument I will show that tracing a concept's
history can be most instructive in determining its meaning.
3. None of the deﬁnitions are capable of accounting for both modern Western art and
understanding of the concept, as well as the 17th Century European and 10th Century
Chinese one. While they are not exactly required to have such a broad scope, it seems
that a theory which would successfully cover all that ground would be worth some
attention.
4. There are no theories which successfully balance between the over-generalisations
of ahistorical universalism and the uninformativeness of complete relativism. The
cultural theory does exactly that  while holding that the meaning of `art' is context-
relative, it succeeds in determining the characteristics of the relata in enough detail
to remain informative.
With all this, I hope that the cultural theory will be able to much better account for
the actual practice of art. Many deﬁnitions present something akin to what Carroll called
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a `philosophical dream such that, ideally, all the relevant answers . . . should ﬁt into a tidy
theoretical package' (Carroll 1994: 7). They keep pushing a square peg into a round hole,
because for some reason they care for the elegance of the hole more than for its adequacy to
the content. Other aestheticians have voiced concerns over this issue (e.g. S. Davies 1991:
21; Carroll 2009: 3; Kamber 1993: 313) and with them I hold what should be quite obvious
 that one should treat a theory's compliance with the evidence and actual practice as the
main criterion of its success. Thus accounting for actual artistic practice will be the main
goal of the cultural theory.
There is a related issue worth mentioning here, which provides another reason why
`ﬁtting the world' is so important. Some theories do not take the actual artistic practice
for granted, denying arthood to, e.g., readymades or conceptual art. They are quick to
say that if people think that such works are art, they are simply wrong, or have been
misguided, and treat their discriminative approach as an asset, as `normative bite'. My
general worry here concerns the vagueness and diﬃculty of determining a clear borderline
between treating some works as non-art mistakenly taken for art, or as art that is wrongly
counted by the theory as non-art, i.e. a counterexample to the theory. If this line is
blurred, it seems that a theory can become unfalsiﬁable  at which point does one say
that the theorists are no longer allowed to shrug oﬀ counterexamples by saying `sure x
might seem like a counterexample, but that is because people are mistaken about x's
arthood'? Tolstoy's and Collingwood's theories can perhaps serve as examples here. In
consequence, such `discriminative' theories might ﬁnd themselves providing a very good
normative account for `art', but certainly not a descriptive one. And while I agree that a
deﬁnition should have a normative bite to it (and the cultural theory does provide that),
it cannot change into a deﬁnition not of `art', but of `whatthe-author-thinks-art-should-
be-like'.
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In the following pages I will ﬁrst focus on discussing the currently most inﬂuential and
successful deﬁnitions of art - the institutional theory (section 1.1), historicism (1.2), func-
tionalism (1.3) and the cluster account (1.4). I will explain them in turn and try to bring
out their main advantages, yet ultimately I will argue that none of them are successful in
covering all and only the things which are as a matter of fact considered art in our world,
and that each of them suﬀers from rather serious conceptual diﬃculties. Learning from
their mistakes, I will then oﬀer my own theory which centres around what I call the cultural
deﬁnition of art. To do this, I will ﬁrst explain my methodological assumptions (2.1), and
then develop the deﬁnition step by step, explaining it on the way (2.2 and 2.3). I hope
that by then end of this exposition it will become apparent why the cultural theory can
be so theoretically and practically attractive (2.4). In the following chapters I will show
that the cultural deﬁnition is not only intuitively appealing, but has multiple important
advantages which make it more successful than its competitors. First, I focus on showing
how it can resolve practically every single problem which plagued the other theories, while
at the same time retaining most of their advantages (3.13.4), after which I present an
additional set of advantages characteristic of the cultural deﬁnition only (3.5). In Chapter
4 I turn to addressing some possible problems a cultural theorist may face and argue that
they are not as diﬃcult as it might seem, and in the Conclusion (5.1-5.3) I explore some
of the wider implications and consequences of my arguments for other ﬁelds in aesthetics.

Chapter 1
Reconstruction of selected modern
theories of classiﬁcation of art
Four diverse approaches shape modern thinking about art: (1) procedural or institutional
theories; (2) historical deﬁnitions; (3) functional theories; and (4) disjunctive, or cluster
theories. While many other types of deﬁnitions are defended, these four seem to be the
frontrunners in the present discussion. This chapter introduces the most developed and
popular versions of those deﬁnitions and identiﬁes their strengths and weaknesses. In
pointing out the problems they face, I will focus on those issues that have proven most
problematic and have not yet been satisfactorily answered, which will help me in estab-
lishing my own view later.
1.1 The Institutional Theory
The ﬁrst of the series of controversial articles on philosophy of art published by Arthur
Danto, `The Artworld', began the discussion about the possibility of contextual deﬁnitions
of art, and speciﬁcally about the relation between art and the institution he called the
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(a) Andy Warhol, Brillo Box, 1964, Silkscreen ink
on painted wood, The Andy Warhol Museum, Pitt-
sburgh
(b) A real box of brillo soap pads, produced by
Brillo Manufacturing Company since 1913
Figure 1.1: Brillo Boxes, art and `mere thing'
`artworld'. The main thesis is that it is not any speciﬁc physical or contextual properties
which make certain objects art, but the fact that they are presented in the context of the
artworld.
Danto is led to this conclusion by his argument from indistinguishable objects (Danto
1964; cf. Dickie 1974: 29). He discusses Andy Warhol's Brillo Box  an artwork composed
of what looks exactly like a mass-produced Brillo soap pad box (Fig. 1.1). Although
considered an artwork, a piece of sculpture even, it looks exactly the same as any other
Brillo box, lying in a warehouse  it has all the same perceptual properties.1 Moreover,
the box which is art is in no way more interesting, beautiful, thrilling or emotionally
involving than the boxes in the warehouse. The only thing that distinguishes Brillo Box
from other Brillo boxes is the fact that the former has been selected and displayed in a
1From the philosophical point of view, the choice of this example is rather puzzling  Warhol's boxes
were made from diﬀerent material than the factory boxes, and thus are in fact perfectly perceptually
distinguishable after closer examination. Neither do they share the same history of production or contextual
properties with the factory boxes, and in fact they seem to be simply sculptures representing brillo boxes.
However, since the example is established in the literature, I will follow it here.
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gallery as an artwork by Andy Warhol, an artist. Danto concludes that the only feature
which distinguishes art from non-art is being presented by an artist in an artistic context.
This context, together with all the works presented in it, Danto christened the `artworld'.
Several institutional classiﬁcatory deﬁnitions of art have been formed on the basis of
Danto's argument (eg. Diﬀey 1969; Bourdieu 1987; Becker 2008: etc.). Danto himself never
formulated a complete theory, and soon began to advocate a diﬀerent approach (Danto
1973, 1974, 1998). The most fully developed and certainly the most inﬂuential view has
been presented by George Dickie.
Before I proceed to its reconstruction, it is important to note that Dickie signiﬁcantly
limits the understanding of the term `art' he is going to deﬁne. He explicitly says that
his theory is mainly to be applicable to the concept of art as we (`present-day Americans,
. . . present day Westerners, . . .Westerners since the organization of the system of the arts
in or about the 18th century  I am not sure of the exact limits of the "we"') understand
it (Dickie 1969: 254). This is not, however, to say that his deﬁnition cannot account for
works created before the 17th Century  it merely means that it is not concerned with
what the people of the 17th Century considered art and why, focusing only on what we
consider art.
Dickie's early theory
While the institutional deﬁnition has been already presented in only slightly diﬀerent form
in (Dickie 1969, 1971), the most complete formulation of the theory is found in Art and
the Aesthetic (Dickie 1974).
A work of art in the classiﬁcatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects
of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by
some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the
artworld) (ibid.: 34).
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Firstly, Dickie argues that an artwork has to be an artifact rather than a natural
object, or perhaps a universal. This requirement is intended to exclude from the domain
of artworks things such as Robert Barry's conceptual piece All the things I know but of
which I am not at the moment thinking - 1:36 PM; June 15, 1969, or natural objects which
have not been displayed in an artworld context.2 While most people would not question
the artifactuality requirement, at this point it is unclear why art could not evolve into
something that would challenge it. Dickie adds further intuitive support for believing that
artworks must be artifacts: `artifactuality is a necessary condition of creativity' (Dickie
1974: 49), i.e. that artistic creativity can only be displayed through working in a medium,
resulting in an artifact. While all this is intuitively true, there seems to be no reason
to believe that this requirement must hold in every possible situation and that even if a
great majority of artworks are artifacts, there cannot be some artworks which are not.
Nevertheless, both here and in his later discussion Dickie takes the artifactuality of art for
granted, and most other authors tend to agree with this claim (Yanal 1998: 2).
Secondly, it is only some aspects of the artifact in virtue of which it can acquire the
status of a candidate for appreciation. Dickie explains that he is `using the expression
"aesthetic aspects of a work of art" to mean "aspects of a work of art which belong to
the aesthetic object of the work" which in turn is equivalent in meaning to "the aspects of
a work of art which belong to the object of criticism and/or appreciation"' (Dickie 1974:
156).3 Examples of such aspects are: the shade of blue used by an artist in depicting the
sky, the meaning of a poetic line, or the concealed (invisible) wires used to `ﬂy' Peter Pan
above the theatrical stage. Examples of aspects of a work of art which do not belong to the
aesthetic object of this work are: the colour of the back of the painting, the type of font
2It partially follows from Dickie's discussion of the classiﬁcatory and evaluative meanings of `artwork'.
While the term can be used in a evaluative or derivative sense to describe natural objects just as well as
artifacts, the primary sense of the term, which is the sense deﬁned by the IT, can only be sensibly applied
to man-made objects, i.e. artifacts (Dickie 1974: 25-6).
3It is somewhat unclear to me why Dickie talks about aesthetic aspects, since his theory speciﬁcally
stresses that art need not be aesthetic. I mention this here to provide a full account of Dickie's views.
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used to print a poetic line, or the actions of the property man in traditional Chinese theatre.
Examples show that the perceptibility of those aspects is irrelevant to them belonging to
the object of appreciation. Knowledgeable members of the artworld realise which of the
aspects are to be object of their appreciation or criticism, however, there are no explicit
rules governing discriminating relevant and irrelevant aspects. Deciding which aspects are
to be appreciated is instead a matter of convention.
(Omitting this point is perhaps the reason why the indistinguishable objects argument
seemed suspicious to Wieand (1994), who argued that it is in fact impossible to make
sense of what it means to be indistinguishable, which in turn calls the whole argument
into question. While it might indeed be diﬃcult to establish the indistinguishability of two
soup cans one of which is selected by an artist, it is less diﬃcult if those cans are to be
indistinguishable only with respect to all those aspects which are relevant to appreciation.
Moreover, Wieand does not take into account Dickie's reﬂections on artifactuality of found
art  it is not the soup can that has been chosen by an artist that is to be distinguished
from other soup cans, or the gesture of presenting it  what matters is the complex artefact
soup-can-as-used-by-an-artist, which is perceptually indistinguishable with respects to all
its relevant aspects from a mere soup can. Thus while it might be the case that one cannot
make sense of the argument if `indistinguishable' is understood in terms of Leibniz's Law,
or what Wieand calls strong or weak undistinguishability, the institutionalist may simply
say that this is not what is required.)
Thirdly, artifacts become artworks because a certain status is conferred onto them.
Dickie argues that the conferral of status in art is similar to that of other social institutions
 just as the king's conferring of knighthood on a man, or a priest's conferring the status of
a married couple onto two persons, it does not involve any physical or perceptible changes
being inﬂicted on the object(s) (ibid.: 34). Importantly, the conferring of the status of
art need not involve any formal ceremonies or oﬃcial societies  instead it can be done
informally, being similar to e.g. acquiring a status of a wise man or a village idiot (ibid.:
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35). Although there are customary, formalised and perceptible ways of conferring the art-
status, if even just giving a title to one's creation, they are not strictly required (Dickie
1974: 39). Further, the status can be conferred on natural objects, thus changing them
into artifacts (ibid.: 45) (in fact the act of conferring the status is the minimum the artist
has to do to make an object his artwork, according to Dickie), and lastly, the status can
be conferred wrongly  while one cannot make a mistake in conferring it, one can err by
conferring it, e.g. were the object to ﬁnd no appreciation in a wider public (i.e. be found
unworthy), the person conferring the status would lose face. (ibid.: 50)
Fourthly, the status conferred is that of being a candidate for appreciation. This prob-
ably is the most important element of Dickie's deﬁnition  what makes an object an artwork
is not any speciﬁc qualities of this object, or even its history or function, but purely the
fact that some people found it to be an adequate object of appreciation. The notion is
surprisingly nonrestrictive  practically anything can become an object of appreciation4,
and, importantly, no special kind of aesthetic appreciation needs to be involved. In fact,
the notion of appreciation is used according to a most commonplace meaning  it is just
the same as ﬁnding something worthy or valuable (ibid.: 40-1), or perhaps fully under-
standing it (Dickie 1974: 108; cf. Bartel 1979: 48-50).5 While some other theories assume
the existence of a special aesthetic appreciation, Dickie explicitly states that it is `the insti-
tutional structure in which the art object is embedded, not diﬀerent kinds of appreciation,
[that] makes the diﬀerence between the appreciation of art and the appreciation of nonart'
(Dickie 1974: 41). Further, as can be inferred from the above discussion of status conferral,
possessing the status can often be independent from any visible characteristics  while one
4Some authors disagree with Dickie on this point and think that some things, even commonly thought
to be artworks, cannot in fact be appreciated (see: T. Cohen 1973: 78; Dickie 1974: 42)  I agree with
Dickie that most such criticisms follow from a misunderstanding of his views and will not discuss them
(Dickie 1997: 89ﬀ).
5An argument which indirectly establishes this claim is found in (Dickie 1964)  although it is aesthetic
attitude which is discussed there, it leads to a conclusion that approaching artworks does not need any
special kind of attitude, attention, and thus also appreciation.
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usually knows that the object which hangs on a gallery wall is presented as a candidate
for appreciation, not all artworks need to be hanged on gallery walls.6
Finally, the people who confer the status of a candidate for appreciation, as well as
those who do the appreciating, are acting on behalf of a social institution, the artworld.
Dickie's understanding of the artworld diﬀers somewhat from Danto's. Most importantly,
the artworld is not composed of the people who do art, or those who present it, or artworks,
or galleries, or any physical objects, etc. Instead it is a certain established social practice,
a way in which these people act by assuming the roles and taking part in art-making, art-
presenting, etc. (ibid.: 31). Moreover, it is an informal practice and it has an only loosely
organised `core personnel', called the `presentation group', of people who assume the roles
without which the artworld could not exist  the roles of artists who create artifacts-to-be-
appreciated, presenters who make them available for appreciation, and `goers' who do the
appreciating (note that many roles can easily be performed by the same person). While
there are many other members of the artworld, like critics, historians, philosophers, etc.,
their roles are merely derivative and unessential to the artworld's existence. (ibid.: 35-6)
All the people who participate in the artworld are self-appointed, i.e. if they wish to be a
part of the artistic practice, they thereby become a part of it  which means that anyone
can do and evaluate art (Dickie 1997: 14).
Although Dickie does not stress it as explicitly in Art and the Aesthetic as he does in
his later theory, already here he speaks of the artworld as divided into several artworld
systems, such as painting, theatre, literature, music, etc., as well as new subsystems which
can be added within a system, and then develop into full-blown systems (Dickie 1974: 33).
This division is introduced to account for the fact that the social practices the artworld
members are involved in are very diﬀerent in cases of diﬀerent arts  e.g. there are diﬀerent
conventions related to creating and appreciating theatre and paintings. However, they are
6In fact, Dickie writes that for that reason one can sometimes not know whether an object one is
presented with is an artwork or not (Dickie 1974: 37).
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still similar in one main respect  the `central feature all of the [artworld] systems have in
common is that each is a framework for the presenting of particular works of art.' (Dickie
1974: 31)
Two other elements of Dickie's early theory are worth mentioning here. One is the
explicitly admitted historicity of the artworld  the institution has its origins in ancient
religion and other institutions, and continued to exist (perhaps with some breaks) since
then (ibid.: 30). This allows for avoiding the problem of where did art (and the artworld)
come from, or what was there when there was still no artworld, as it is acceptable that
the artworld evolved from other social institutions and as such is not required to have a
clearly marked beginning. Additionally, it provides us with reasons to account for why in
certain periods of time some objects were treated as art while in others they were not 
because the artworld changes historically, so does art. However, as Stephen Davies pointed
out (1991: 94), the treatment of art history in IT is surprisingly limited  these issues will
be discussed in the next chapter, and while it is not obvious that Dickie himself would like
to follow my view, his early theory is at least compatible with the part of it which involves
the artworld's historicity.
The second element worth mentioning here is Dickie's requirement for the artist (or
whoever presents an artifact to the artworld) to intend to create an artwork (or an object
of appreciation).7 This qualiﬁcation is supposed to exclude the possibility of creating an
artwork `by accident', or unintentionally. I ﬁnd this requirement rather odd, considering
that artist's intentions are completely irrelevant to her creation's status, according to the
deﬁnition. A more extended discussion will follow in section 2.2.2.
7This is best spelt out in The Art Circle: A Theory of Art : `It may be wise at this juncture to point out
the obvious fact that creating art is an intentional activity; accidents, fruitous or not, may occur within
the creative process, but the overall activity is not accidental' (Dickie 1997: 71).
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Dickie's later theory
Criticism of the early theory, especially by Danto (1974) and Beardsley (1982), invited
some substantial changes in the Institutional Theory. Most of the changes, however, are
made to the partially misleading way in which the old IT was formulated, thus making it
immune to some obvious objections without changing its essence.
Danto pointed out that even though Dickie explicitly denies that his deﬁnition requires
any speciﬁcally aesthetic appreciation, he implicitly assumes some sort of special kind of
appreciation in his explanation of the theory and examples, by talking about appreciating
`the qualities of the thing'. Thus the later version of IT avoids calling for appreciation at
all, speaking instead only about presentation, in this way removing the seemingly aesthetic
approach.
The objection presented by Beardsley exposed the fact that while on one hand Dickie
holds that the artworld is a very loosely and informally arranged institution, on the other
he speaks about practices which seem very formal  conferring status and acting on behalf
of. Additionally, other authors charged the same notions with being too vague to be
informative (Bartel 1979: 49). To avoid these problems, the new IT abandons the quasi-
formal notions, instead calling upon less legal-sounding `creating an artifact of a kind to
be presented', etc.
The new Institutional Theory provides us with the following ﬁve-step deﬁnition:
I) An artist is a person who participates with understanding in the making of
a work of art.
II) A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld
public.
III) A public is a set of persons the members of which are prepared in some
degree to understand an object which is presented to them.
IV) The artworld is the totality of all artworld systems.
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V) An artworld system is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by
an artist to an artworld public. (Dickie 1997: 80-2)
Let me brieﬂy review elements of this deﬁnition. Firstly, artworks are made by artists.
While this already may seem tautological, Dickie claims that in the context of the artworld
anyone can be an artist  and thus it is not the artist who deﬁnes what is art, but the
fact that one created something considered art makes one an artist (ibid.: 14). There are
certain limitations to this democratic category. The artist has to participate in the creation
of an artwork with understanding  this clause seems to successfully replace the assumed
intentionality of the early deﬁnition. Rather than talking about the artist's intentions,
Dickie excludes the possibility of creating artworks `by accident' or outside the context of
the artworld by noting that the creator of the work has to realise what he is doing. While it
may be equally diﬃcult to tell whether one realises what one is doing as it is to determine
one's intentions, in this situation the problem is at least limited, because we can simply
say that artworks created `with understanding' are those created by a person who has an
appropriate cultural competence (I will expand on this in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.5). Thus
it is easy to exclude such `creators' as chimpanzees (who can paint, but since they cannot
understand the concept of painting, they do not create art) or the producers of paint and
canvass, cleaners in the theatre, etc. (who participate in the creation of an artwork, but
do it from the outside of the artworld).
Secondly, artworks are artifacts. While in the early theory Dickie claimed that arti-
factuality is conferred on objects, the late theory drops this notion, speaking instead of
artifacts as things which need to be made in some way (ibid.: 44-46). While the case is
obvious with traditional art, the diﬃculty arises with the examples of ready-mades and
found art. Here the making is limited to using as an artistic medium, e.g. a driftwood can
become an artwork if it is `picked up by someone who is familiar with the world of art and
taken home and hung on a wall, unaltered, with the intention to display its characteristics
as the characteristics of a painting are displayed' (ibid.: 45). In this way the found object
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becomes a more complex object  the-driftwood-used-as-an-artistic-medium  and as such
is no longer a natural object, but an artifact. (Quite similarly a child can pick up a stick
and use it to hit other children, thereby without altering the stick making it into a weapon.)
This is, however, a minimal requirement without which an object cannot become an ar-
tifact, and thereby cannot be art. Still, other than quoting the tradition of art involving
artisanship and working in a medium, and the general consensus on this point, Dickie gives
no knockdown argument to support the artifactuality requirement (ibid.: 60-62).
Thirdly, artworks are artifacts of the kind to be presented to an artworld public. It is
hardly a very deﬁned kind, yet what is marked here is the important character of artworks
which are normally created to be displayed, shown or presented, and not just to anybody,
but to an artworld public. It is not at the same time necessary that a particular object
actually is presented, it is enough that it is of the same kind as other objects which normally
are. There is an important shift made here in comparison with the earlier deﬁnition  it
is no longer important that an artwork is a candidate for appreciation, and it is not the
conferral of status that places the object in the institutional context, but its presentation.
Fourthly, the public is a set of persons who possess certain cultural or artistic compet-
ence needed to understand a work presented to them. What follows is that being an object
of the kind to be presented to the public means being an object of the kind which a set of
persons possessing a given cultural or artistic competence can understand.
Finally, the deﬁnitions of the artworld and artworld systems are similar to those used by
the early theory. Artworld systems are further characterised as `frameworks' for present-
ation  it seems that this makes them refer less to particular disciplines of art (music,
sculpture, performance etc.) and more to speciﬁc cultural practices or perhaps elements
of the cultural competence concerning those practices (e.g. the practice of painting and
common convictions about what painting is or should be like, what is typical in painting,
what is desirable, or even that paintings are normally displayed on walls not ceilings). It is
hard, however, to say whether the understanding of this term indeed changed  it simply
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seems that only in the late theory has it been deﬁned in enough detail; yet the early theory
might have implicitly accepted its late version as well.
1.1.1 Advantages of the institutional theory
I believe that the main advantage of the institutional theory (IT) is so simple that it
is often overlooked by the commentators. Even Dickie never really spends enough time
stressing just how important this element is, often only mentioning it in discussion with
other deﬁnitions. In one place he says: `What the traditional theories of art and their
deﬁnitions tell us about art qua art is false. What the institutional theory tells us about
art qua art is something that we already know and have known from an early age, although
actually formulating this knowledge is not easy'. (Dickie 2000: 103) Similar remarks can be
found in other places, e.g. in the discussion of the Weitz and Ziﬀ conception: `why should
we think that the new conception of art has given an accurate account of our conception of
art?' (Dickie 1997: 35, my emphasis); other authors share the intuition that whoever asks
`what is art?' actually already implicitly knows what it is (e.g. Kennick 1958: 320; Diﬀey
1973: 109). The two presuppositions of the late theory also point to it, though not entirely
directly: `. . . a philosopher of art ought to take account of developments in the artworld'
and `the traditional theorists of art were right in the way they conceived of the domain of
objects which they theorised about [. . . i.e.] right in thinking that paintings, poems, plays,
and the like are the things with which they should be concerned.' (Dickie 1997: 13)
The institutional theory has the immense advantage of explaining how we actually
commonly do recognise objects as artworks, it strives to build a deﬁnition from an actual
artistic practice by making explicit what is implicitly obvious for all members of the modern
artworld, in this way respecting David Davies' pragmatic constraint (D. Davies 2004).8 It
8It seems that actually caring about what happens in the world is ﬁnally becoming more popular
among philosophers, see e.g. (Carroll 2009: 3), and the recent development of experimental aesthetics
seems to conﬁrm this trend.
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formulates the common pre-scientiﬁc convictions in theoretical language. In a way, IT is
just a complex explication of the famous quotes from Andy Warhol and Kurt Schwitters
 `Art is anything you can get away with' and `everything the artist spits out is art', and
indeed the universal: `art is whatever the artist says it is'.9 In fact, it expands the last claim
by pointing out that art often is what curators or art gallery owners say. While one can
mourn over the fact that after dadaism `anything goes' in art, it is a fact that it does. Thus
IT perfectly fulﬁls what is required of a good theory of social phenomena: it reconstructs
actual practices and formulates in scientiﬁc language what is pre-scientiﬁcally commonly
known (in philosophy the idea can be traced at least to Carnap, who said that the point of
science is formulating in theoretical language what is known in object-language; or more
recently, Putnam who saw himself `as describing, and, to a certain extent, reconstructing,
the [linguistic] practices', (Putnam 1992: 349)). Given that Dickie explicitly states that
he did not attempt a `real deﬁnition', seeking rather for `relational characteristics of art
that situate it within human culture' (Dickie 2000: 103), I believe it is justiﬁed to relate
his theory to those found in social sciences and judge it by the same criteria.
Another similarly important advantage of IT lies in the fact that it realises and can
account for the impressive arbitrariness of the artistic practice. It deﬁnes the `artworld' as
`the totality of all artworld systems', a collection which `has been drawn together over time
in a somewhat arbitrary way' (ibid.: 100). Dickie asks why are such systems as literature,
painting and music included in the artworld, while e.g. dog shows are not? While it might
be that a particular dog show has all properties required of an artwork according to other
(traditional) theories, it is not art, and there is no better explanation of this fact than:
because our history and culture are such and not diﬀerent; basically because `it has turned
out that way' (ibid.: 100). It is just natural that cultural constructions and social practices
are somewhat arbitrary, and because people who are subject to these are part of the IT
9Dickie himself writes: `The institutional theory of art may sound like saying, "A work of art is an
object of which someone has said, `I christen this object a work of art.'" And it is rather like that, although
this does not mean that the conferring of the status of art is a simple matter' (Dickie 1974: 49).
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deﬁnition of art, what is art is deﬁned in a somewhat arbitrary way. Again, while one
might regret such relativism, it is just a fact that many social practices which exhibit all
the virtues and characteristics of art (e.g. jewelry making, furniture crafting, computer
game design) are often not treated as art.
On the other hand, it happens sometimes that members of the artworld do confer status
on objects in a similarly arbitrary way  while most artworks have been placed in the gal-
leries because they have some art-relevant properties, it is perfectly possible that an object
may gain the status of art in a rather accidental way. As Dickie wrote, the status may be
conferred wrongly, i.e. for reasons or with a result which will ﬁnd no acceptance with a
wider public, but while the person conferring the status may in such a case lose face, the
object does become an artwork nevertheless (Dickie 1974: 50). For example, the immediate
reason why sketches of a famous painter gain the status of art (rather than just an exercise)
may not be their artistic value, but the fact that the artist's widow ran out of money and
decided to earn some by presenting them to the artworld. A piece may gain art-status
because its author's uncle is a renowned critic who, as a favour, wrote a positive review;
one may receive a role in a movie (and thereby become an artist and co-author an artwork)
because one bribes the director; a random object may be placed in a gallery by someone
who merely wants to mock the permissiveness of modern art, and yet be treated as an
artwork (Duchamp's Fountain could actually be one), etc. In short, there is a myriad of
ways in which something can become an artwork which can be seen as completely arbitrary
and unjustiﬁed, yet they still do in fact work.10
10I will review the importance of arbitrary decisions for a theory in section 2.3.
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1.1.2 Objections to the institutional theory
There are no institutions
One misguided yet recurring argument against IT is that the institutions it assumes are
nowhere to be seen. Wollheim in his Painting as art (1987: 15) ridicules Dickie's theory,
asking where are the representatives of the artworld nominated, what records are kept of
their conferrals of the status of candidate for appreciation, etc. It seems thus that IT can
be easily falsiﬁed  the things it assumes just do not exist.
In reply, Dickie simply states that this is a misinterpretation of his view, which never
assumed the existence of any formal institutions. Such a `robust view' is obviously false
(Dickie 1993, 2000: 95). Instead, IT requires only informal institutions to exist  there are
no art-oﬃcers needed to conﬁrm that a certain artifact is an artwork, as similarly there are
no fashion-oﬃcers needed to settle whether someone is well-dressed. The only people who
need to be included in an informal institution are the creators of the artifacts presented
to the public, and the public (this fact is better elucidated by the later formulation of
IT). Dickie describes his idea of the artworld not as `a formally organised body, perhaps
of a kind which has meetings and requires a quorum to do business . . . [but as] the broad,
informal cultural practice' (Dickie 1997: 9; cf. Dickie 1969: 254). In fact, not only does the
artworld not have to be organised  it does not even have to be particularly uniﬁed when
it comes to deciding what is art and what is not. It is not the `artworld acting as a whole
which makes art . . . [but] individual persons who typically make works of art or . . . groups
of persons who make art' (Dickie 1997: 9).
A follow-up objection might be that the informality of the artworld introduces an
unbearable vagueness to the deﬁnition  it is simply very hard to tell whether any given
person is entitled to present artifacts to the artworld public (cf. S. Davies 1991: 84-90).
While Dickie seems happy to admit that anybody who consciously thinks he is an artworld
member indeed is one and thereby has the power to present his works in any institutionally
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accepted way (Dickie 1974: 36), this issue does call for more discussion, which will follow
in section 2.3. For now, however, let me note that there are a number of institutions
which have no formal structure whatsoever, and yet do not seem to invite similar critique
 determining what is fashionable, for instance.
History and the artworld
Some authors have claimed that with all its reliance on social institutions which unavoid-
ably change over time, IT is surprisingly ahistorical. Dickie never discusses the time-
relativity of the artworld  and it seems more than likely that who can be an artist, what
types of actions count as conferring status, who is authorised to confer the status, etc., can
vary depending on temporal context (S. Davies 1991: 94). Speciﬁcally, the issue of who is
authorised to confer the status of a candidate for appreciation (or present the work) can
and does change over time  e.g. it was once impossible for a person who had not yet
established their name as an artist by creating conservative works to confer the status on
a very innovative one, while now it might well be.11
It is again slightly unfair to charge Dickie with this objection, as he speciﬁcally stated
that his theory is applicable to modern Western understanding of art only (Dickie 1969:
254)  thus his view on the artworld is actually time-relative, but only to our times. Still,
I agree with Davies that in this way IT is actually more narrow a theory than it could
be and that with little eﬀort an appropriate temporal indexing could make it capable of
deﬁning art at other times and perhaps in other contexts as well. In the context of my
own synthesis based on IT this seems like a worthy aim and I will expand on it in section
2.2.3.
11This is largely related to the problem of authority and democracy vs. elitism discussed by Davies 
I will not follow it here, as I essentially agree with the possible solution he mentions which is based on
Danto's end-of-art claims: while it is a contingent fact that anyone has the authority to confer art status,
it is true of our times. I will expand on this issue in sections 2.2.4 and 4.7.
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Private art
A more complex objection, brought forward by Jerrold Levinson, is that IT does not allow
for the existence of so called `private art'  artworks created by people who have no relation
to any institution of the artworld.12 He imagines a person who lives in a remote place,
living `in perfect mutual oblivion' with the artworld. However, even though the artworld
is not present, it seems possible that this person could create an artwork. Levinson claims
that IT could not account for such a case, and further that `the institutional theory comes
close to conﬂating art and self-conscious art, art and socially situated art, art and declared
art' (Levinson 1979: 233).
There are two important elements of this criticism. First, it could be held that IT
does not allow for an artifact to become an artwork if it is known only to the creator, i.e.
without the acceptance of the artworld (a larger amount of people). Dickie claims that this
objection is just completely misguided. Indeed, it is hard not to agree with his complaints
about his texts not being read carefully enough (see his 2000: 93ﬀ), for even the earlier
forms of his ﬁrst deﬁnition already mentioned and accepted such a possibility  because
`artist', `presenter' and `public' are merely social roles, it is perfectly possible that all those
roles are assumed by the same person, i.e. it is enough that one person, the author, acting
on behalf of the artworld, declares his creation an artwork, for it to have this status:
A number of persons are required to make up the social institution of the
artworld, but only one person is required to act on behalf of or as agent of the
artworld and confer the status of candidate for appreciation. Many works of
art are never seen by anyone but the persons who create them, but they are
still works of art (Dickie 1971: 103).13
12A very similar objection has been raised by Beardsley (Beardsley 1982a).
13Dickie mentioned this already in `Deﬁning art': `many works of art never reach museum walls and
some are never seen by anyone but the artist himself' (Dickie 1969: 254), and conﬁrmed this point later:
`many works of art are seen only by one person  the one who creates them  but they are still art. The
status in question may be acquired by a single person's acting on behalf of the artworld and treating an
artifact as a candidate for appreciation' (Dickie 1974: 38); another mention is found in the above mentioned
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It would seem thus that Levinson's objection simply misinterprets the theory. However,
there is a second element to it which may be more successful  what the example shows
is not only that artworks can be made without the acceptance of a wider public of the
artworld, but also that the artist himself does not need to be aware of the very existence
of the artworld, or other people who are its members. If this is so, then it seems quite
implausible that he can act on its behalf or as its agent (however informally those notions
are understood), and thus that he could create anything of the type to be presented to
the artworld public, or confer the status of a candidate for appreciation. Levinson notes
that the only solution from this impasse is to admit that one person can constitute the
institution, or that the creator can constitute a whole artworld  which would make the
deﬁnition of `the artworld' `trivial and otiose' (Levinson 1979: 233).
It is worth enquiring if this would really be so. The simplest softening-up answer
available to Dickie would be: tu quoque (see: Oppy 1992: 155 for a similar argument).
It indeed seems odd to accept that one person only can constitute an artworld and as a
representative of himself present his own creation to himself  and through this make it
art. However, is it not equally odd to accept with Levinson's historical deﬁnition that an
object can acquire the status because one person intends that he himself would regard it
in the same way as he or others regard previous works of art (see p. 47)?14 It is true that
the case of private art makes IT seem trivial, because just about anybody can constitute
an artworld and make just about anything art  but on Levinson's account just about
anybody can make just about anything into art by intending it to be perceived in the
relevant art-historical context. It could be argued on behalf of Levinson that a lone artist,
discussion with Wollheim, cf. (Dickie 2000: 95); later in the same article Dickie explicitly writes that his
new deﬁnition also `leaves open the possibility that artworks can be created that are never presented to
anyone, for the deﬁnition requires only that an artwork be a kind of thing to be presented. I have phrased
the deﬁnition in this way to allow for the untold artworks that have been created but which for one reason
or another have not reached any artworld public' (ibid.: 99).
14Note that even though it seems that being regarded implies acceptance of more than one person,
Levinson himself is at pains to show that it is enough for an item to be intended for a certain regard, even
if it is not actually so regarded.
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even though his work will never be seen by anyone, can nevertheless intend it to be treated
as former artworks by everybody, thus assuming a kind of potential audience. However, the
same can be said in defense of IT: the lone artist can ﬁrmly believe that even though at the
moment he is the only member of his artworld, were he to meet other people and present
his work to them, they would deﬁnitely bestow their appreciation upon it  i.e. there is
potential appreciation by potential other members of his artworld, even if none are actually
there to appreciate it.15 The later theory can account for this possibility even better 
it does not require the artist to actually present anything to the artworld public, just to
create something of a kind to be presented (Dickie 1997: 65).
However, it still seems that Dickie's problem is of a diﬀerent kind from Levinson's. The
artworld is a certain social construct which requires the artist to know social views on what
the kinds of things to be presented actually are. But on Levinson's view an artist can be
perfectly oblivious to the social context in which other art is done; he can create art purely
by (accidentally) intending his work to be regarded in a way in which (unknown to him)
other people regarded previous art. Thus it seems that on Dickie's view the lone artist
can be detached from society, but not completely  he can withdraw from contact with the
institution, but he needs to `carry [the institution] with him as Robinson Crusoe carried
his Englishness' (ibid.: 50).
While the objection stands, it needs to be accurately evaluated. Is it at all important or
even appropriate to allow for such completely detached private art? In places Dickie quite
explicitly states that he is completely happy admitting that without at least a minimal
social context there cannot be art, i.e. that the artist must have at least some basic grasp
of what are the kinds of things to be presented (or what people regard as art, or what
they appreciate, etc.) (ibid.: 54-55). Moreover, he plainly states that there are basically no
completely detached artists, i.e. that his view is simply empirically correct. I tend to agree
15Dickie points towards this solution directly, see: (Dickie 1974: 43). It is naturally worth asking now
on what basis can the author think that, which would lead us to Wollheim's objection discussed below. I
will expand on this issue in section 2.2.6.
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with this opinion and will discuss it in more detail in chapter 2. For now I shall merely
mention that Levinson's insistence on his theory being able to account for such detached
art actually invited some rather serious criticism (Currie 1993), and might in fact cause
more trouble than it avoids.16
To sum up, the problem of private art shows Dickie's theory to entail that objects
created in complete detachment from the artworld cannot be artworks. Whether this is
really a drawback is, however, questionable  every theory excludes some objects from
being art, and it is not obvious that private art should not be excluded. This issue will be
examined in greater detail in section 3.1.
Ignoring the artist
Another problem brought up by Levinson concerns the fact that on Dickie's view it is
not important what the maker of the artwork-to-be intended, that is, whether she wanted
it to be art or not  it is only the institution that decides on its status (Levinson 1979:
233). Perhaps because of such criticisms, in the later deﬁnition Dickie speciﬁcally states
that what makes an artwork is primarily the artist's act of presenting it to the artworld,
presumably with the very intention that it be treated as an artwork (or a candidate for
appreciation). However, because my own theory will follow Levinson's interpretation (be it
misguided about what Dickie really meant or not), I will discuss it from a slightly diﬀerent
angle.
The simplest and yet most successful thing an institutional theorist can do is to bite the
bullet. It is simply true, one could say, that in some cases the artworld does not take artists'
will or intentions into account when deciding whether the artifacts they produced are art or
not. I wish to turn this objection into an advantage of IT, very much in relation to the fact
16It is indeed worth asking whether the whole venture does not steer the classiﬁcation too close to the
traditional ontological or metaphysical solutions. `I know no one will ever see it and it has no connection to
anything else, but is it actually art?' for some is just an embarrassingly silly question (Cf. Csikszentmihalyi
1999: 321). I tend to agree with such views and will continue to deal with real issues, not imagined problems
of modern scholasticism.
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that it can account for the arbitrariness of the artistic social practice. It just is the case that
sometimes the artworld misinterprets or takes leave to liberally interpret the intentions of
authors  an example might be the treatment of anti-art, which was intended to challenge
the institution, but was eventually made part of it. Similarly, sketches and notebooks
of various artists, neither intended for presentation nor presented by their authors, have
started appearing in galleries since the artworld members decided they should. Moreover,
in other cases the institution ignores what the artist explicitly desired  most famously
Kafka wanted all his works to be burned unpublished and never wished to present them to
anyone (see section 1.2.2). The history of art is full of authors who did not want certain of
their works, especially early ones, to be released or treated as art, or who, as with Tolstoy,
at some point changed their mind and insisted that most of their oeuvre is not art at all.
Despite this, such works are in fact treated as artworks, regardless of their creators' will
or intentions. Some even explicitly protest against the artworld's disregard for what the
artists want; Milan Kundera, for instance, devoted his Testaments Betrayed to this issue.
Ultimately, I think that there is simply an overwhelming amount of evidence in the history
of art to show that stressing the decisions of the artworld above the artist's intentions is
not a problem for the theory, but an accurate description of actual social practices.
Circularity and inclusiveness
Another recurring objection concerns IT's circularity. Especially the later formulation
makes it obvious that the terms used in the deﬁnition are inter-deﬁned, i.e. the ﬁfth step
of the ﬁve-step deﬁnition refers back to notions deﬁned in the preceding steps. Similar
circularities are virtually always taken as a logical fault in a theory and constitute a good
reason to discard it as uninformative.
However, Dickie claims that the circularity of his deﬁnition is not vicious, because the
circle is wide enough to ensure informativeness. To defend this position he gives examples
of other `inﬂected concepts', as he calls them, which do not raise objections and prove
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that some circular deﬁnitions not only can be informative, but actually are widely and
successfully used  as in the cases of the terms law, legislative, executive and judiciary
(Dickie 1997: 84). Indeed, all dictionaries are closed systems of interdeﬁned terms. The
main point of defence, however, lies in explaining how the art-relevant terms are acquired.
We never actually, Dickie claims, learn about art from theories or deﬁnitions  instead we
learn about it implicitly in childhood. We understand art similarly to how we understand
how to address our superiors, how to behave in a church, how to tell a word from a
random sound, etc. That is, we acquire a certain cultural competence in the area of
artistic practice, similarly to how we acquire competence in religious or linguistic practice,
or simple courtesy. Now, because we `grow up in art' (the general idea seems akin to social-
interactionist theories of language acquisition) we learn the (pre-theoretical) meanings of all
the terms of the deﬁnition simultaneously, `and this is no accident for the various artworld
elements do not exist independently of one another' (ibid.: 83).
While I am inclined to agree with Dickie that circularity in the case of his deﬁnition
is not fatal, I believe that it invites certain other problems. In particular, it seems that
the lack of external references can lead to the deﬁnition being too inclusive, i.e. unable to
tell art from clear cases of non-art. Consider this example: an artist invites guests to his
gallery, and after the exposition he oﬀers them a dinner he prepared himself, mentioning
how good it is and then asking how they liked it or what they thought of it?17 While IT
copes perfectly in establishing that the artist's paintings are thereby artworks, it seems
unable to explain why the dinner is not. It is also made by an artist, it is certainly a
thing to be presented, it is presented to an artworld public in an artworld context, and
indeed presented as a candidate for appreciation. Deﬁning some of the terms in a way that
would break the circle could solve the problem (e.g. some of the artist's activities could
not lead to art-making, or certain ways of presentation could not be the right ways, or the
17A similar objection has been raised by Scholz (1994: 314).
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appreciation could be of a wrong kind, etc.), but this would require introducing additional
elements to the deﬁnition.
Dickie brieﬂy discusses this issue, implying that it does not pose a serious threat to
his theory, but even so his solution seems inadequate. He argues that such dinners (or
in his example, playbills) are not art because they are `parasitic or secondary to works
of art' (ibid.: 81)  they are dependent on artworks. The solution is simple  `the word
"artifact" in the deﬁnition should be understood to be referring to artifacts of the primary
kind' (Dickie 1997: 81; Cf. Dickie 2000: 99). However, such a stipulation seems simply
too crude, and while it solves the problem of over-inclusiveness it takes the theory to the
opposite pole, making it too exclusive. Would such a stipulation not mean that Picasso's
Ménines d'après Vélasquez is not an artwork? Clearly it is parasitic on Velasquez's les
Ménines  it is a cubist `remake' that could not exist (at least not with all its contextual
properties) if the original did not exist (Fig. 1.2). Dickie's stipulation, then, would require
some qualiﬁcation determining what kind of secondary artifacts are to count as art, and
this once again seems to require breaking the circle of `inﬂected concepts'.
An easier solution to this problem is available to Dickie, and using it would make the
notions of primary and secondary kinds of artifacts obsolete. It can be simply stipulated
that while painting and theatre are artworld systems, dinners and playbills are not, and
thus should not be taken into account when discussing art. Note that no one has to
actually stipulate this  it simply, to paraphrase Dickie, historically `turned out' that in
our culture dinners and playbills are not artworld systems, while painting is. There is
no further explanation needed here  it is just a crude and arbitrary fact, and because
the artworld is just a cultural construction such things simply `come about as a result of
people's behaviour over time' (Dickie 2000: 100; though some authors are, naturally, quite
unhappy with such arbitrary solutions, e.g. Walton 1977: 98). Thus the correct answer to
`why dinners (or, using Dickie's example, dog shows) are not art even though they involve
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(a) Diego Rodríguez de Silva y Velézquez, Las Meni-
nas, 1656, Oil on canvas, Museo del Prado, Madrid
(b) Pablo Picasso, Las Meninas, 1957, Oil on can-
vas, Museu Picasso, Barcelona
Figure 1.2: Las Meninas  Velézquez and Picasso
artifacts, presentation, public, etc.' is `because our culture does not treat dinners and dog
shows as artworld systems'.
There are some obvious objections to this solution. Firstly, it seems that the cases of
dinners or dog shows are still diﬀerent from the playbills  while dining and dog shows
are separate social practices, the bills are given to the same public at the same time as
theatre performances and thus are not really a separate (non-artworld) system. However,
even though playbills tend to be a part of theatre-going practice, they are not an essential
element of it, separate in a way in that paintings which are `remakes' of other paintings are
not. Bills are not normally presented to the audience for appreciation, and even if in some
cases they are, they are presented and are supposed to be appreciated in a diﬀerent way (e.g.
an artistic Art Nouveau bill can be appreciated, but not in the same way as the play itself
 possibly they can belong to the same artworld system as prints or posters, but deﬁnitely
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not theatrical plays). Remakes of paintings, on the other hand, are to be appreciated in
exactly the same way as any other paintings. Moreover, it seems that there can be theatre
with no bills and bills with no theatre, while there cannot be remakes of paintings without
the paintings which they remake. Whereas the theatre-bill connection is a contingent one,
the original-remake is necessary, and this seems to be a good enough reason to treat the
latter and not the former as elements of the same social practice. To make this point even
more convincing, let me pose the following dilemma: either we treat the plays and the
playbills as separate systems, or we agree that we cannot distinguish between painting and
sculpture just because both kinds of artifacts tend to stand in the same galleries, or that
we cannot tell a work of architecture from music just because sometimes we listen to music
while looking at architecture.
It is the second objection which will require me to abandon defending IT and move
towards transforming it. In modern art it seems that such divisions are quite artiﬁcial 
an artist can easily perform the same action of inviting the public to a dinner, and claim
that the dinner indeed is an artwork, in which case it would not be true that dining is
not an artworld system. It seems that Dickie's deﬁnition cannot capture the diﬀerence
between a simple dinner and the same dinner presented to the same people as a work of
art. In solving this problem it is tempting to simply refer to the notion of intentionality 
what seems to make the dinner an artwork in one case and not the other is the fact that
only in one case does the artist intend for it to be an artwork. However, note that in both
cases the artist can present the dinner as a candidate for appreciation (he even asks how
the guests liked it!), and by the deﬁnition this alone should make them both art. I believe
that this objection might well be unsolvable within Dickie's theory, and in the view that I
develop in the next chapter I shall attempt to answer it by modifying the deﬁnition (the
issue will be further discussed in section 4.2).
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Wollheim's dilemma
Finally, there are two main objections to IT which prompted me to develop the synthetic
view I present below. The ﬁrst is an objection raised by Richard Wollheim in his Painting as
art and Art and its Objects. Wollheim poses a dilemma for the institutional theory: either
the representatives of the artworld have reasons for deciding whether a certain artifact
is an artwork, or they do not (1980: 157-166; 1987: 13-16). If they do, a correct theory
of art should include them and explain arthood in terms of those reasons. But were the
reasons which justify arthood conferral made salient, they by themselves would constitute
a deﬁnition of art, and no institutional backing would be required to establish the status
of particular artefacts. On the other hand, if the decisions of the artworld representatives
are not guided by reasons, we would be justiﬁed in doubting their judgement and their
authority to tell people what is art  and so, in denying that the artefacts they pick are
actually art. `Roughly,' Wollheim says, `if the theory takes one alternative, it forfeits its
claim to be an Institutional theory of art: if it takes the other, it is hard to see how it is
an Institutional theory of art ' (Wollheim 1980: 164).
There has been some controversy over the meaning of the second horn of the dilemma,
and Dickie may be right in saying that it is rather unclear (Dickie 1998: 128). It is perhaps
better stated not in Wollheim's catchphrase, but some paragraphs before: 'if works of art
derive their status from conferment, and the status may be conferred for no good reason,
the importance of the status is placed in serious doubt' (Wollheim 1980: 163164). Below,
I will treat the second horn of the dilemma according to this other formulation, thus making
the alternatives presented to Dickie those of making the institutional theory either obsolete
or untrustworthy.
Dickie claimed later that this and multiple other problems had been resolved with
his second institutional deﬁnition, which states that `a work of art is an artefact of a
kind created to be presented to an artworld public' (Dickie 1997: 80, 2000: 94-6). However,
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although it is hard not to agree that his earlier views have been substantially misinterpreted,
it is not at all obvious that the deﬁnition from The Art Circle: A Theory of Art really
resolves Wollheim's dilemma. Although it does away with the notion of status conferral
and speciﬁes that it is the artist(s) who make(s) artworks, it seems that the dilemma
could be re-run as follows: either the artists have reasons to present their work to the
artworld public, or they do not. On the ﬁrst horn the institutional theory is still redundant,
because were the reasons properly recognised, the work would be art in virtue of satisfying
those reasons regardless of whether it as presented or not. On the second horn, while the
legitimacy of artists as persons authorised to make art may be more justiﬁed than in the
case of mere artworld members, it is still unclear why one should trust them in choosing
e.g. their novels rather than their shopping lists for presentation.
Although Dickie seemed unperturbed by this objection, most treat it as fatal. The
line of argument I adopt in answering it will involve some substantial changes to the
Institutional Theory, discussed in detail in section 2.2.6. I agree that the members of the
institution do indeed base their decisions on the features and context of the objects they
judge, and I further agree that these features should be mentioned by the theory. However,
I do not agree that this means mentioning or determining what those features are can render
the institutional theory redundant. To sketch the argument to come, I think that although
the artworld members have conventional or culturally determined reasons to confer the
status, and so that those reasons may explain their decisions, the fact that it is those
and not other reasons which are considered when conferring the status is itself dependant
on the artworld, because the particular sets of reasons used in particular contexts develop
within, and are informed by, artworlds. Additionally, I believe that Wollheim was too quick
in removing the requirement for the actual act of conferral  I will argue that dropping
it means stepping back into the problem raised by artworks indistinguishable from mere
things, which stimulated the development of institutional theories in the ﬁrst place.
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Ultimately, this problem is the main reason for developing the cultural deﬁnition presen-
ted in the next chapter, and a solution to Wollheim's dilemma, presented in section 2.2.6
is one of the main proposals of this thesis.
Carroll's objection
The other pressing objection was presented by Noël Carroll (1994: 12), who claims that the
institutional theory fails to meet the open concept challenge  instead of telling us what a
work of art is it merely says that, whatever a work of art is, it ﬁts into a social context.
Thereby, Carroll claims, IT is not a deﬁnition at all.
I follow other authors in claiming that it is simply not true that characterising art in
terms of its context is insuﬃcient to deﬁne it (Cf. Yanal 1998: 4). What is interesting about
this objection, however, is that it tries to again turn the discussion back to metaphysics 
it assumes that a deﬁnition of art should be given in metaphysical rather than contextual
terms. I believe that this is a fundamentally misguided approach. Asking: `I know that we
all think it's art and treat it as art, but is it really art?' seems to make about as much sense
as asking: `I know that we all think that in chess the rook can only move in straight lines,
and we play the game as if it does, but how can a rook really move?' It seems obvious that
there is no such thing as the correct rook move outside the social setting in which chess
developed, and yet we have no problems deﬁning `rook'  why should it be a problem for
`art'? Thus my answer to Carroll is: of course, IT (as well as my view) does not provide an
answer to the metaphysical question of what art really is, independently of social context,
because that would be a silly question to ask.
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1.2 Historicism
Jerrold Levinson, who formulated the most widely discussed historical theory of art, speaks
of deﬁning art as follows:
[A]rtworkhood is not an intrinsic exhibited property of a thing, but rather a
matter of being related in the right way to human activity and thought. . . . I
propose to construe this relation solely in terms of the intention of an independ-
ent individual (or individuals) [. . . which] makes reference (either transparently
or opaquely) to the history of art (what art has been) (Levinson 1979: 232).18
The terms italicised by Levinson are crucial to his view  it is the intention of the author of
the work, to somehow link it with the works history of art is already familiar with, which
makes his creation an artwork. This intention is for the work to be regarded-as-a-work-of-
art. The deﬁnition of art Levinson arrives at is the following:19
(I
′
t) x is an art work at t
def
= x is an object of which it is true at t that some person
or persons, having the appropriate proprietary right over x, non-passingly [or:
seriously] intend(s) (or intended) x for regard-as-a-work-of-art, i.e. regard in
any way (or ways) in which objects in the extension of `art work' prior to t are
or were correctly (or standardly) regarded (ibid.: 240).20
18Cf. `for a prospective object to count as art must be for it to be related in some way to those objects
that have already been decided or determined. For a thing to be art it must be linked by its creator to the
repository of art existing at the time, as opposed to being aligned by him with some abstracted template
of required characteristics' (Levinson 1979: 234).
19Levinson's is by no means the only historical account on art - other theories have been oﬀered e.g. by
James Carney (1991, 1994) and Noël Carroll (1988, 1994). However, Carroll's historical narrative view is
not a real deﬁnition, but merely a way of identifying art which at best provides necessary but not suﬃcient
conditions. Carney's external historicism, on the other hand, seems to be plagued with multiple problems
some of which have been pointed out by Levinson (1989, 1993). The defences against charges of circularity
and regress oﬀered by Carney seem rather unconvincing, and might in fact lead his account to losing the
status of a real deﬁnition.
20In (Levinson 1989: fn 8) the term `seriously' is used in place of `non-passingly', and I will follow this
modiﬁcation below.
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Levinson sums up the characteristic features of his view as: intentionalism, historicism,
indexicality and non-institutionality (Levinson 1989: 21-22). Let me follow him in a brief
explanation of his deﬁnition. Firstly, the core of this approach, which gives it the essential
historicity (Levinson 1979: 232), is the claim that an artwork is an object which is intended
for regard-as-a-work-of-art. The use of this term in the deﬁnition already explains that
to regard-x-as-a-work-of-art is to regard or treat x in the same way(s) in which objects
previously agreed to be artworks were regarded or treated. Importantly, the deﬁnition does
not specify a single manner of regard, but admits that the way art is regarded changes over
time. The apparent circularity of this deﬁnition is avoided by emphasising the historical or
temporal element of it  an artwork at t is not deﬁned by the treatment of other artworks
of the same time, but by how objects regarded as artworks were treated prior to t, and thus
even though the term `artwork' appears both in the explanans and the explanandum, its
meaning is diﬀerent (ibid.: 240). Since justifying the status of artworks by their ancestors
cannot go back forever, a historicist stipulates the existence of at least one ur -art, or the
ﬁrst art, from which all art developed (ibid.: fn 11 and 13).
Levinson distinguishes several ways in which an artwork can be intended for regard-as-
a-work-of-art, to exclude the possibility that the author's ignorance of the history of art
disables him from producing artworks (ibid.: 237-8). Thus the ﬁrst and most common way
(already mentioned above) in which intending for regard-as-a-work-of-art can be under-
stood is that the author of the work intends it to be regarded and treated in the same way
in which the past artworks of which he is aware were regarded and treated. However, even
if the author turned out to be ignorant of the whole of history of art, it is possible that he
intends that the object he has created is regarded in a certain way φ such that (unknown
to him) φ is actually the way in which artworks created prior to his work were regarded.
The second most important point of the deﬁnition is that it is the author's intention
which makes an object an artwork. This is the main element of Levinson's deﬁnition which
diﬀerentiates it from the institutional theory  it is not the artworld, but the artist himself
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who decides whether a given object should be regarded as an artwork or not. By this
Levinson claims to have captured the common intuitions about so called private art (ibid.:
233)  it seems possible that someone could create an artwork without having shown it
to anybody, or even knowing about the very existence of artists, artworks and artworlds
anywhere in the world. While an institutionalist would have to claim that the object
created is not an artwork (as it has no connection to the artworld), a historicist can easily
allow for such cases, as all that is needed to make an artwork is the author's intention that
the work should be regarded in a way φ.
While the notion of the author's intentions seems quite vague, Levinson says that there
are plausible analyses of it and that the fact that he needs intending-as-a-work-of-art does
not `make arthood an occult thing' (Levinson 1989: 23). I strongly disagree with this claim,
and will discuss it in section 1.2.2.
The other terms in the deﬁnition simply qualify it to exclude certain implausible cases.
Thus thirdly, the author is required to be serious in his intent, i.e. he needs to really
and decisively mean his creation to be regarded as an artwork.21 This requirement is
designed to exclude the possibility that something might be an artwork just in virtue of
some transient or momentary whims the author might have, or mistaken judgements he
later corrects (e.g. intending something to be regarded-as-a-work-of-art while creating it,
but ﬁnding out that it is not good enough after it is ﬁnished and resolving otherwise).
Fourthly, Levinson qualiﬁes his deﬁnition by speaking about standard or correct ways
of regarding-as-a-work-of-art. It might be the case that artworks are held in high esteem
for reasons not commonly regarded as related to their `arthood'  to use his example,
paintings might become highly valued for the thermal insulation they can provide. Were
this the case, the only thing which prevents one from having to, subsequently, admit that a
21'The idea I want to insist on is not sobriety of character, but rather ﬁrmness, stability of intent 
i.e., actually meaning it. It is no part of my proposal to exclude joking, whimsical, sardonic, or irreverent
works of art  or acts of artmaking' (Levinson 1989: fn 8).
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sheet of ﬁberglass is an artwork (as it will also be valued for what artworks will have been
historically valued for) is the fact that the paintings were valued as insulation incorrectly.
Additionally, the ways of regarding should be `relatively complete or total' (Levinson
1989: 24). It is not enough that a given object is intended to be regarded in the same
way past artworks have been regarded in just one minute detail (as e.g. traﬃc lights
are intended to be treated `with attention to colour', similarly to impressionist art) - the
similarity in manner of regard should be greater.
Fifthly, the intention for regarding-as-a-work-of-art is only legitimate if expressed by a
person having appropriate proprietary right over the object which is to be so regarded. As
Levinson writes, `you cannot `artify' what you do not own . . . , because the other person's
intention, that of the owner, has priority over yours' (Levinson 1979: 237). This proviso
sharply distinguishes Levinson's view from the institutional theory on which people other
than the author or owner of the object do decide whether it should be regarded-as-a-work-
of-art or not. This is claimed to be conﬁrmed by our artistic practice  Levinson constructs
a hypothetical case in which an ancient Mexican item of unknown purpose is displayed for
regard-as-a-work-of-art in a museum, yet when a `well-documented descendant of the tribe,
armed with full knowledge of its customs and practices' (and thus presumably holding more
appropriate proprietary right over the object than anybody else) appears and claims that
the object is not in fact intended for regard-as-a-work-of-art, it is removed from public view
(ibid.: 237). In this case the object never actually was an artwork, because the institution
in which it was displayed had no proprietary right over it and thus no right to intend it
for regard-as-a-work-of-art.
If any of those conditions is not met, a given work cannot be classiﬁed as an artwork.
More importantly, what is really needed is the reference to past artworks present in the
author's creation and intentions: `if [the artist] does not do this  if his activity involves
no reference whatsoever to the body of art works preceding him  then I think we fail to
understand in what sense he is consciously or knowingly producing art' (ibid.: 235).
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1.2.1 Advantages of historicism
I take the main advantage of the historical view to be, again, slightly underestimated.
While Levinson points it out numerous times, it needs to be emphasised with greater force
that historicism uncovers what people actually do ﬁnd important in art, what is virtually
universally accepted by all artists and the public  the fact that art has a history.22 Artists
study past art and often make references to it in their works, the public interprets art
in the context of past works, and almost all philosophers of art agree that the context in
which a given work was produced (which includes all artworks produced up to that point,
or at least those known to the artist) is essential in determining the work's properties and
thus interpreting it, evaluating it, classifying it according to a genre, etc. Thus historicism
basically captures that, as a matter of fact, art is a historical phenomenon. While I will
argue later that the link to history is not as essential as Levinson would like it to be, I still
agree that it is of utmost importance and should play a prominent role in any valid theory
of art classiﬁcation.
Another signiﬁcant and related advantage lies in the fact that historicism implicitly
allows for change  present art does not have to be the same as past art, and the criteria
for what counts as art change over time, together with what are thought to be the correct
ways of regarding art. Once again, this perfectly captures what is actually going on in
the world, as artmaking has been changing over the centuries. While virtually all theories
which take Weitz's criticism into account share this virtue, historicism is especially explicit
about it.
Historicism also allows for the works of lone artists be classiﬁed as art. Levinson takes
this to be an advantage over the institutional view, and stresses that it is quite essential
for a valid theory of art to allow for such private art to exist.
Finally, in what seems to be an important motive for some, historicism is a form of
procedural deﬁnition which is not institutional (this is mentioned in Levinson 1989: 22;
22This is emphasised even more in Carroll's historical narrative theory (1994).
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and Levinson 1993: 411). While it is clear that traditional deﬁnitions cannot cope with
modern art, those who do not agree that art essentially has a certain function or do not
want to embrace a disjunctive deﬁnition are likely to turn to procedural deﬁnitions. At the
same time, many are repulsed by the idea of embracing an institutional analysis, because
it is thought to be either very weak, or uninformative, or simply not philosophical enough.
Historicism oﬀers a good alternative  it explains art in a procedural way without referring
to the institution, and thus may be preferred for negative reasons.
1.2.2 Objections to historicism
Correct regard problem
Beardsley criticises Levinson's theory for the vague notion of `correct regard'  an object
is an artwork only if it is intended to be regarded in a way that past artworks have been
correctly regarded. He claims that the only plausible readings of this notion are quite
unacceptable for a proceduralist. `I am inclined to fear a dilemma here' he writes. `Either
we give a general account of "correctly" in terms of some version of taking an aesthetic
interest in x or else we make an open-ended list of speciﬁc "ways of regarding" that have
been permitted in the past and that will among them probably permit just about anything
in the future' (Beardsley 1982b: 302). If the ﬁrst is true, a historical analysis is unnecessary
and should be substituted with a functional account which explains how objects become
art in virtue of being aesthetically interesting to us. If the second is true, the theory drifts
suspiciously close to a cluster-theory type view, in which case it faces problems related to
its disjunctivism  it is diﬃcult to tell why a certain way of regarding should be correct and
not the other, or whether indeed there is any way which can be shown to be incorrect (ibid.:
301). Either way, Beardsley argues, little is left of the purely historical account Levinson
defends.
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Levinson oﬀers a solution (Levinson 1989: 24-27) by suggesting that the correct regard
is a relatively complete or total one, i.e. encompassing structured complexes of ways of
regarding. Additionally, contrary to Beardsley, such ways of regarding do not have to
remain the same over time - they also change historically. Levinson points out that his
account does not require us to know what exactly are the correct ways of regarding at a
given time, but only that there actually are such ways. Present art is intentionally and
relatively completely related to those ways of regard, and this is all we need to know to
classify it as art. Thus historicists can accept the second horn of Beardsley's dilemma,
but ignore its consequences  the need to deﬁne the correct manner of regard and the
over-inclusiveness when appreciating future art.
There are, however, problems with this reply. As Graham Oppy pointed out, it is
simply hard to tell what `relatively complete' actually means  how many similar ways
of regarding is enough (Oppy 1992: 157)? It is also hard to tell which complete way is
complete in a sense of capturing the important, rather than many unimportant ways of
regard  if there are any important ones in treating modern art. Moreover, it is hard to
defend the thesis that such relatively complete ways should be structured, because what
most modern art does is precisely to challenge our structured ways of regarding past art.
What is more, lack of any independent criteria for correctness in this context may easily
force a historical theorist to accept a form of institutional theory. Since Levinson denies
that the `correct' regard is the one which oﬀers most rewarding or enjoyable experiences,
and cannot (at pains of rather tight circularity) claim that it is the one which allows for
best understanding of a given object qua artwork, it seems that he would need to agree that
the standards of correctness are socially determined (S. Davies 1991: 173). Levinson brieﬂy
considers this issue, claiming that he is happy to accept that `what have been accepted as
artworks and as correct ways of engaging with them [is explained in part by] a history
of social determinations', but this `doesn't mean there are social rules for making art'
(Levinson 1993: 417). I think that he underestimates the weight of the objection. Firstly,
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given Davies' analysis of conventions in art and their relations to artists' intentions, it
seems more than appropriate to say: if what is essential to making art is intentions, and
intentions run according to conventions, and conventions are socially determined, then
making art is socially determined. Secondly, it seems that if the correct ways of regarding
are socially determined, so is the content of the artist's intention (i.e. `x should be regarded
in a way which is socially determined'), and if intentions are so determined, then social
determination starts bearing a great deal of explanatory weight. Ultimately, I agree with
Davies that accepting this introduces a vital institutional element to the theory. It seems
that historicists need to admit that some things about art are in fact determined by the
institution, and I will show that this ultimately leads to a reduction of the historical into
an institutional theory (see section 2.2.3).
Alien art
Gregory Currie in his `Aliens, Too' (1993) presents a thought experiment in which he
challenges historicism by exposing problems in the idea of ur -art and the relations later
art bears to it. Were relics of a lost alien civilisation found which closely resembled our
modern art and which were regarded by the aliens in the same way that we regard our
modern art, it seems that they should be regarded as art (Currie 1993: 116). Oppy suggests
that we need no aliens for the argument to work, because Levinson himself provides perfect
examples. If a lone artist producing private art similar to our modern art lived before the
era of modern art, or perhaps before the time of ur -art time, the same situation would
obtain (Oppy 1992: 155).
However, on what Currie calls `pure' historical theory (ur -art is deﬁned by `identifying
a set of historically given instances' present in our civilisation), such artefacts would not
count as art as they bear no historical relation to ur -art. Moreover, alien art would not
bear any relation to our ur -art even though it was intended to be regarded in the same
way in which our modern art is regarded, because it could have been created long before
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modern, or even ur -art on Earth  and it is implausible to assume that the application
of the concept `art' to artifacts made by alien races should depend on contingent facts
about human development, and perhaps the aliens' knowledge of them. `Impure' historical
theories (ur -art is deﬁned non-historically, but because of certain qualities it possesses)
could defend themselves by claiming that alien art may not be related to our, but to the
alien ur -art, which as it happens has similar qualities as our ur -art. However, this is just
an optimistic assumption  modern alien and human arts, although similar, could have
developed from completely diﬀerent ur -arts, and yet we would still call the alien artefacts
art. Yet a historicist would need to exclude them on the basis of lacking a connection to
anything that has qualities characteristic of ur -art.
Ultimately, Currie concludes, standing in a historical relation to past art is not an
essential feature of art, because, as the example shows, there can be art which does not
stand in such a relation  i.e. the historical deﬁnition is too exclusive. As of now no good
response to this objection has been given, and I believe that until one is found, historicism
remains seriously ﬂawed.
Intentions are cheap
The main problem with Levinson's deﬁnition lies in his reliance on the intentions of the
artist, as numerous authors have remarked (see: Stecker 1990: 267-9; S. Davies 1991: 172).
Let me now abstract from the problems related to what an object is supposed to be
intended for in order to count as an artwork, and focus on the sole fact that art making
requires intentions. Graham Oppy in his `on Deﬁning Art Historically' stresses the fact
that intending something to be a work of art cannot possibly be suﬃcient to actually
make an artwork, because it would just make art implausibly easy to produce (Oppy 1992:
154). `Intentions are too cheap', Oppy says, giving an example of him intending his broken
crockery to be art, `surely it can't be this easy to make a work of art!' Thus it seems the
historical deﬁnition entails that pretty much anyone can make pretty much anything into
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art merely by forming an intention for it to be art. Unsurprisingly, many people would like
to disagree with such a conclusion, and certainly Levinson should be considered one, since
he ridicules the triviality of art-making in `private artworlds' (see section 1.1.2).
Levinson could try to save his deﬁnition by pointing out that a person is required to
intend an object for the appropriate regard seriously or nonpassigly. However (especially
given the current state of art), it does not sound particularly implausible that one could
very seriously intend the broken crockery,23 or pretty much any object, to be regarded
in a way in which past art has been regarded. If Levinson would like to simply claim
that such intentions cannot possibly be serious, it seems fair to ask him how exactly
he determines seriousness, for I and undoubtedly many other people do not share his
certainty in professing such judgements. Without a valid means of determining `legitimate
seriousness' the whole thing becomes rather vague, and were Oppy to start breaking his
crockery while really seriously intending it to be art, one would have no way to challenge
the seriousness of his intention, and following this, to deny arthood to crockery. But to
return to the initial point, surely it can't be that easy to make art!24
23And do so in a rational (not insane or pointless) way, as well as deeply believe that `an experience
of some value [would] be thereby obtained', to allow for Levinson's later provisos (Levinson 1989: 29; cf.
Levinson 1993: 414).
24A counterexample to historicism presented by Crispin Sartwell can be thought as a special case of
this objection (Sartwell 1990). Imagine that someone creates a forgery of a Rembrandt self-portrait and
succeeds in replacing it for the original in the Metropolitan Museum. It seems that in this case the very
success of the forger's action requires him to rather seriously intend that the fake is treated in exactly the
same way as the original has been treated  a successful forgery is one that is not recognised as such, or at
least not easily recognised. But this implies that the author of the fake intends his work for regard-as-a-
work-of-art, which, by Levinson's deﬁnition, together with the fact that the author is aware of the relevant
historical context, has proprietary rights over his own creation and is serious in his intent, is enough to
make the forgery an artwork. However, it seems that what distinguishes a fake from an original artwork
is precisely the fact that the former is not an artwork. Sartwell further claims that the problem lies in the
fact that too much importance is given to the intentions of the creator. `Levinson's deﬁnition' he writes
`may rely too heavily on the motion of "intention for regard." Something can be "intended for regard"
as a work of art and fail to be a work of art' (ibid.: 158). A similar argument can be made with regards
to kitsch  is that art just because the creator wanted it to be and it resembles past artworks in some
respects?
However, it seems that this objection can easily be challenged. For why should we not accept that
forgeries are art too? It may be derivative art, yet still art (Oppy 1992: 159-160). It seems that Levinson
could easily accept such a solution.
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Intentions are even cheaper
However, there are more important reasons to reject intentions  they are not only insuﬃ-
cient to make something an artwork, they are also in many cases not even necessary (this
issue is pointed out in: Oppy 1992: 155; Stecker 1990: 267-8; Carroll 1994: 33-5). In this
sense they can be even cheaper, in fact utterly worthless, for it turns out that quite often
the artist's intentions are just completely disregarded when deciding whether his creation
is an artwork or not.
It seems simply historically true that there are many cases in which an artist either
never gave any reason to think that he did, or even explicitly stated that he did not intend
some of the objects he created to be regarded in the same way past artworks have been
regarded, and yet they are quite universally treated as art  Beethoven's early works,
Leonardo's sketchbooks, possibly even the published private correspondence of artists.
Besides, there are many examples of objects created for religious use clearly not intended
to be artworks, and yet treated as such  ancient votive ﬁgurines, fetishes, quite plausibly
a large amount of early Christian art. Not only are they treated as artworks even though
we are aware that they were probably not made with a relevant intent, it also sounds
implausible to suggest that we would give up this treatment were the lack of such intent to
become explicit.25 Thus the main problem of relying on intentions is not only in the fact
that not all objects that are intended to be artworks are artworks (as in Oppy's crockery
example), but that there are actually quite a few objects which are artworks even though
they were, speciﬁcally or otherwise, not intended as such.
One case in particular seems very obvious  Franz Kafka gave explicit written in-
structions to his friend Max Brod to, upon Kafka's death, destroy all his works without
publishing. Quite clearly this expresses an intention to treat his works in a way which past
25I believe that Levinson's example of a descendant of a Mexican tribe coming to the museum and
successfully claiming back an object displayed as tribal art but in fact intended for religious purposes
(Levinson 1979: 237) is just hopelessly naive  the Australian Aborigines have claimed objects from the
British Museum for years and never saw them removed from the display.
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artworks have not been normally (and deﬁnitely not correctly) treated, and as such should,
according to the historical deﬁnition, disqualify them from being art. However, Brod did
not obey his friend's wishes and published the novels, which are now regarded as some of
the best artworks of the 20th century.26 Thus the historical theory seems to be falsiﬁed by
nothing else but history.
Levinson addresses this problem and tries to resolve it in several ways. (Levinson
1989: 29-30). I believe, however, that his attempts not only fail to deal with the issue
satisfactorily, they actually expose vital weaknesses in intentionalism.
Firstly, Levinson argues that Kafka must in fact have had the relevant intention at
another time, and this is suﬃcient for justifying his novels being artworks, or he did have
the relevant intention all the time, but being internally conﬂicted he never expressed it
properly.27 To show the absurdity of this solution let me refer to the `seriously' of the
historical deﬁnition (cf. Levinson 1979: 236). Clearly he could only have passingly or non-
seriously intended his creation as a work of art (in which case it is not actually a work
of art). It seems that even if at some point Kafka did, as Levinson presumes, intend his
work to be regarded-as-an-artwork, ultimately he resolved (rather seriously, if he asked for
it to be burned) that it should not. Of the two options possible, only the latter has been
explicitly expressed by the author (we only have evidence for the latter), and expressed
in writing, which usually is a sign of, as per Levinson's formulation, `actually meaning
it'  and moreover, in the months between giving such instructions and his death Kafka
did not change his will (or at least did not express it in a similarly `serious' way). So why
should we not take his (assumed) intention to treat his works as artworks as the passing and
non-serious one? With all this, Levinson's argument that Kafka `undoubtedly [had an] art-
intent at many points prior to, during, and perhaps even after the period of composition'
26Note that Kafka did not pass his ownership rights to Brod, in which case Brod's intention for the
works to be regarded in the same way as past art was regarded would be legitimate and thus suﬃcient 
he merely instructed him to execute his will.
27For another treatment of an analogous case see: (Oppy 1992: 159).
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(Levinson 1989: 29) which could `override' the intent to destroy the manuscripts, seems
purely ad hoc. While providing very poor support for his thesis, this actually exhibits its
most important ﬂaw  the fact that intentions can be interpreted in many ways and various
(seemingly similarly justiﬁed) interpretations can lead to contradictive outcomes.
Levinson's other solutions are even worse. `Thirdly', he writes `we might choose to
view the case as one of those anomalous ones where, owing to the exceptional potential
literary value at stake, we recognise that the community of readers and critics can in eﬀect
justiﬁably appropriate certain texts and project them for literary regard, thus overrulling,
unusually, a creator's considered intent' (ibid.: 30). Apart of the fact that history teaches
us it is not such an unusual and anomalous case, this solution is just begging the question
against Wollheim's objection, which Levinson considered on the previous page of the same
article (if there are some properties of the object which make people decide that it should
be regarded as art, than the deﬁnition of art should mention those properties), as well as
dangerously slipping towards institutionalism. As I will later argue, the second of these
troubles is inevitable for historicism.
The last solution is equally problematic. Here Levinson admits that Kafka's example
shows `experiencers, spectators, audiences are a sine qua non for art'. But this is just the
same as to admit that there cannot be private art  one of the main reasons why historicism
was to be superior to IT! Moreover, this once again comes dangerously close to admitting
that those audiences do in fact have more to say than the artist's intentions, which again
is to assert IT.
There is one possible way in which Levinson's account could be saved here. He could
claim that Kafka was indeed unhappy with his novels, but that this does not mean that he
thought they were not artworks  he just thought they were bad ones. If so, his treatment
of them was very appropriate (to give a historical example, Brahms was meticulous in
destroying all compositions he was unhappy with, to make sure his name was not associated
with things he found unsatisfactory), and he might have just been wrong about the value
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of his creation  however this point would be beyond the scope of a classiﬁcatory theory
of art.
I see three problems with this reply. Firstly, it seems that while this might be true in
Kafka's case, there are other examples to be given. Leonardo created hundreds of sketches
which are displayed in galleries today, although they were almost certainly not intended
as art  instead they were mere exercises or anatomic and botanical studies, and Leonardo
treated them more as science than art (Chastel 1974). They were not bad art, similarly as
architectural blueprints are not bad buildings, or treatises on painting bad paintings. If
they are treated as art today, it is not in virtue of what the artist intended.
Secondly, it seems that even if such an answer would be possible, it would not be
available to a historicist. What matters for a historicist is not whether something was
intended to be art, but whether it was intended for a certain kind of regard. It is irrelevant
if Kafka thought his novels were art, good or bad, since all that matters is that he intended
them to be burnt, and burning was not a standard way of regarding artworks at the time.
Finally, it seems that the decision as to whether Kafka had this or that intention is
simply quite arbitrary; it is very hard to ﬁnd compelling reasons to hold either side of the
argument. This point applies equally to the whole of the above discussion  I believe that
the main problem exposed here is the fact that artist's intentions are a hopelessly vague
matter, and any theory which would rely on them must inherit the diﬃculties arising from
that fact. Because human intentions are simply externally inaccessible, and because it is
virtually impossible to tell whether a given intention is a stable and serious one or merely
a whim, employing them to do explanatory work in a theory is sadly an example of very
poor metaphysics of the type criticised already by Kant  attempting to answer questions
about the nature of an object the nature of which cannot be known. (It is possible to
interpret the notion of intentions in a way which would make them more reliable, however
I believe that such a solution is unavailable to a historicist  this issue will be discussed in
section 2.2.5.)
1.3 Functionalism 53
Some may treat this as a mere epistemological trouble and insist that intentions do
ﬁx the status of an object even if we will never know them  a theory can be true even
though in many cases it is completely impractical. But just how seriously should we treat
a theory which claims to deﬁne art, and yet for half the possible x's its reply to `is x
art?' will be: `it is either art or not, depending on the author's intention, which we will
probably never know?' While this might be a valid answer, I think that we should work
towards a deﬁnition which can be eﬀective both in theory and in practice, and it seems
that preserving the dependance on artistic intentions can only make things harder.
1.3 Functionalism
Unlike the proceduralist deﬁnitions discussed above, functionalists believe that objects do
not become art thanks to certain procedures which are followed in their creation (or later
treatment), but due to the distinctive function they fulﬁl in the society. If this is so, the
deﬁnition of `art' should be akin to the deﬁnitions of `weapon' or `poison'  a thing can
be classiﬁed as a poison regardless of any physical, historical or contextual properties it
might have, as long as it can perform the function of poisoning somebody. In this section
I will discuss some of the most prominent functionalist deﬁnitions of art, focusing mainly
on the original version oﬀered by Monroe Beardsley, and brieﬂy reviewing oﬀers by Gary
Iseminger and Nick Zangwill. These deﬁnitions share the general idea described above,
however they diﬀer signiﬁcantly in details.
In what follows I will consider functional deﬁnitions in their classiﬁcatory sense only,
even though they derive this sense from evaluative treatment of artifacts (i.e. something
is classiﬁed as art if it performs the aesthetic function well enough, or attains a threshold
of merit (S. Davies 1991: 42)).
To begin with the ﬁrst of those deﬁnitions, Beardsley claims that
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(. . . ) an artwork is either an arrangement of conditions intended to be capable
of aﬀording an experience with marked aesthetic character or (incidentally)
an arrangement belonging to a class or type of arrangements that is typically
intended to have this capacity (Beardsley 1982b: 299)
Once again I shall brieﬂy focus on the elements of the deﬁnition. Firstly, an artwork
is an arrangement of conditions  Beardsley writes that what he means by this term is
somewhat similar to what Dickie understands by `an artifact', but uses a diﬀerent term
to emphasise that some artworks are not physical objects (ibid.: 311-312). The diﬀerence
seems to be purely terminological, however, and the terms are in fact coextensive, so in
the discussion to come I shall use them interchangeably, or simply use the term `artifact'
to avoid confusion.
Secondly, an artwork is an arrangement intended to be capable of aﬀording an experience
with marked aesthetic character. This is the crux of the theory, and the main diﬀerence
between functionalism and other views  Dickie plainly denied that there is any special
kind of aesthetic experience, or that anything aesthetic is relevant to classifying art (Dickie
1965, 1964), and Levinson seems to agree that giving rise to aesthetic experience might
be an important and even frequent feature of artworks, but it is by no means essential to
them. Similarly Gaut (see 1.4) believes that it is merely one of the features which can
aﬀord an artifact the name `artwork'.
There are two things worth noting here. Firstly, the requirement placed on the artworks
is not that they actually do aﬀord one aesthetic experiences, but merely that they are
intended to do so. I shall discuss the intentionalism of Beardsley's view below, but for
now it is only worth noting that such a clause ensures that the fact some people may
not be moved by a given object does not mean that the object cannot be an artwork 
the author's intention is what counts. Secondly, even if this intentionalist element were
dropped, the same result can be had from the `capable of' clause  this move ensures that,
say, Beethoven's 9th is still an artwork even if ignorant pop-music fans derive no aesthetic
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pleasure from listening to it, or indeed even if there is no one left to appreciate it. As long
as the object is capable of providing aesthetic experiences, then, it does not matter that
there are no people capable of receiving them.
Thirdly, an artwork is an arrangement that is intended to perform a certain aesthetic
function. The artist can have a number of intentions related to his works, but `what makes
them art, on this deﬁnition, is that the aesthetic intention . . . is present and operative'
(Beardsley 1982b: 299). Unsurprisingly, unlike in Levinson, the intention is not for an
object to be treated a certain way, but for it to `provide a possible source of aesthetically
qualiﬁed experience' (S. Davies 1991: 52). However, Beardsley realises that sometimes it
is impossible to tell what the author's intentions were, and in these cases he claims the
alternative version of his deﬁnition should be used (Beardsley 1982b: 305-6).
Thus fourthly, an artwork can be an arrangement which belongs to a class or type of
arrangements which are typically intended to have a capacity to elicit aesthetic experiences.
If an archeologist ﬁnds an ancient sculpture, he does not need to wonder what were the
intentions of its creator, because clearly being a sculpture places the artifact in a class of
objects (sculptures) which were typically intended to provide aesthetic experiences, and
thus it is an artwork. Beardsley proceeds to discuss what exactly makes an art kind, or
class or type, but it seems that his views on this are similar to what Dickie deﬁned as an
`artworld system', and I shall assume that these terms can be again be used interchangeably.
Iseminger's deﬁnition
Iseminger improves on the above deﬁnition by making links to the artworld and the prac-
tice of art more important, as well as removing the talk about necessary and suﬃcient
conditions. He claims that:
The function of the artworld and practice of art is to promote aesthetic com-
munication (Iseminger 2004: 23).
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And supplements it by a valuational thesis which is remarkably similar to Beardsley's own:
A work of art is a good work of art to the extent that it has the capacity to
aﬀord appreciation (Iseminger 2004: 23).
Iseminger assumes a slightly more naturalistic deﬁnition of a `function', and ties his
deﬁnition together with the idea of the artworld, however he claims that it is still the
function some objects have in our society, rather than the society itself, that makes them
artworks. His understanding of the artworld is similar to Dickie's, or possibly even more
permissive  a person can become a member of the artworld simply because he wants to,
but also because others generally view him as one. However, while artistic communication
does presuppose the existence of the artworld, aesthetic communication can do without it.
Because the deﬁnition is given in terms of aesthetic communication, it is not essentially
institutional.
Aesthetic communication, the most important element of the deﬁnition, typically oc-
curs when a person creates something while intending it to be aesthetically appreciated by
someone else and is met with success. However, art is not required for aesthetic commu-
nication to occur, as one can appreciate non-art artifacts for their aesthetic properties.
I will generally argue in favour of many points in Iseminger's deﬁnition, however, I do
not agree with his ultimate conclusion  I will try to show that while it is true that the
function of art as it is described by Iseminger is indeed very important, possibly even one
of the most important reasons for certain objects to possess the status of art, the decisive
role in them acquiring this status is played by the artworld. It seems that in his more
recent research Iseminger has also started to see the institutional element of the deﬁnition
as more important, and he prefers now to talk about `institutionalism aestheticised'.28
28A symposium organised by Iseminger at the 2012 Americal Society for Aesthetics Eastern Division
Meeting, had exactly this title.
1.3 Functionalism 57
Because, as Iseminger claims, his theory shares all the advantages of Beardsley's view
while escaping its problems, I will review them jointly, pointing out where the reﬁned
theory should be treated diﬀerently from the original view.
Zangwill's deﬁnition
The most recent (and by far the most puzzling) of the functional deﬁnitions is Zangwill's.
He ﬁrst presents the following formulation:
(1) Being a work of art is having an aesthetic function; and (2) each work of art
has some speciﬁc aesthetic function that is essential to its being the particular
work of art it is (Zangwill 2007: 99).
Following a discussion concerning aesthetic function being dependant on the aesthetic
properties of an object, this deﬁnition is transformed into a normative one:
(1) Being a work of art is being such that there are some aesthetic properties
that it should have; and (2) it is essential to being each particular work that
there are some speciﬁc aesthetic properties that it should have (ibid.: 104).
The deﬁnition is somewhat puzzling because it is remarkably similar to Beardsley's,
and seems to fall into exactly the same problems as the twenty-ﬁve years older original.29.
Moreover, Zangwill presents a normative account suspiciously close to traditional deﬁni-
tions of art, which were criticised precisely for the fact that through trying to deﬁne what
art should be they fail to provide an account of what art actually is.
In the following discussion I will not distinguish Zangwill's deﬁnition from Beardsley's
as, save for some minor details, both can be criticised in the same way.30
29Interestingly, while Iseminger tried to speciﬁcally address issues which were problematic for the ori-
ginal functionalism and oﬀer a deﬁnition which would not fall in the same traps, Zangwill does not even
mention Beardsley's name, in fact `Redeﬁning Art' is not even included in his bibliography.
30When discussing artistic failure, Zangwill writes: `Fortunately, there is usually considerable conver-
gence between the artist's intentions and the work itself, so that the work has many of the aesthetic
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1.3.1 Advantages of functionalism
There are several meta-aesthetic aims which functionalism tries to achieve. Firstly, Beard-
sley claims that a valid deﬁnition of art `should mark a distinction that is theoretically
signiﬁcant' (Beardsley 1982b: 299). Following the charges against IT he claims that his
view has the advantage of clearly stating what is art and what is not, and how people
can err by calling an object an artwork  virtues which the IT can be said to lack, as it
provides at most very vague answers. Beardsley admits that it is perfectly possible to `get
along' without any proper deﬁnition of art, and indeed that there are some extra-artistic
interests in ascribing objects the status of art, but argues that such ordinary use of the
term `art' should not be a matter of philosophical enquiry. Thus while the proceduralists
are happy to admit that there is no diﬀerence between what is called `art' and what is art,
functionalism is said to be able to capture the diﬀerence and show how these two sorts of
things can fail to coincide.
I completely agree with Beardsley that our ordinary use of the term `art' in its classiﬁc-
atory sense is of less interest to philosophy than is generally thought, but the conclusion I
draw from this is not that a theory of art should be created which uses the term in a more
deﬁned way, but that philosophers should keep working on the concept as it is actually used
and accept that what is art is largely determined by culture and society, not philosophical
reﬂection. While we can continue to produce deﬁnitions which have all the virtues of a
good philosophical theory, but little reference to reality, it might be a better idea to focus
on what actually exists in the world and admit that art is a context-relative and rather
messy phenomenon.
Secondly, Beardsley wants his deﬁnition to `capture reasonably well a use [of the term
`art'] that has been prominent for some centuries and still persists quite widely today'
properties it was intended to have. In practice, we do not have to worry too much about cases of artistic
failure' (Zangwill 2007: 106). Indeed, this passage describes his own view quite accurately  it may seem
plausible thanks to some `fortunate convergences' of some facts about some artworks, and if one does not
`worry too much' about the details.
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(ibid.: 300). I believe that this is one of the greatest advantages any theory concerning
social phenomena can have  capturing and explaining theoretically the wide pre-theoretical
beliefs shared in the society. And arguably functionalism does that really well: while it
is true that within the artworld anything goes, and that it might be diﬃcult to defend
the thesis that all modern audiences expect of artworks is an aesthetic experience, it is
also true that a substantial part, or even the majority of the society has serious doubts
about whether works such as Fountain or 4'33" are in fact art. It is indeed very common
for the public to shake their heads and decline them the status of artworks, and indeed
there are examples, with Duchamp being probably the most prominent one, of artists who
themselves claimed that their creation is not art but a joke played on those who believe in
anything artists tell them (Camﬁeld 1989).
I believe that such a judgemental approach, as opposed to the more promiscuous pro-
ceduralist views, is most appropriate, and worth developing. However, as my discussion
of functionalism's over-exclusiveness below shows, it has to be taken cautiously. I hope
that the cultural deﬁnition I develop in chapter 2 succeeds in accounting for both the fact
that in modern art anything goes and the fact that most people might have good reasons,
within certain contexts, to think that some works are not in fact art, without falling into
the trap of being overly exclusive.
Thirdly, functionalism is said to provide a deﬁnition which is useful to other disciplines
besides aesthetics, notably art history and anthropology. It is at the same time claimed that
IT does not capture the phenomenon in all its variety, because if there is no artworld in some
culture there should be no art either. I agree that providing good theoretical background for
other disciplines is an important role of philosophy, however I doubt whether functionalism
does actually achieve that better than IT. I will discuss this issue in the next chapter.
Finally, Beardsley lists some features of his theory which he believes to be virtues, which
nonetheless I would describe as inaccuracies or ﬂaws. Functionalism is said to expose and
depend on the link that art has with the aesthetic, as well as providing an account which
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would explain why things cannot become art in `midlife'. Below I will show that these are
in fact very problematic claims, which the functionalist should defend rather than boast of.
1.3.2 Objections to functionalism
There is no special aesthetic experience
The simplest way to challenge functionalism is to deny that art actually has the function it
is ascribed. Some people want to deny that there is any special kind of aesthetic experience,
or a speciﬁcally aesthetic way of attending to or appreciating things (S. Davies 1991: 62;
Dickie 1964, 1965, 1997: 85). If this were the case, the experiencing of artworks would not
be qualitatively diﬀerent from the experiencing of other things, and thus no distinctions
could be made on the basis of it. I will not discuss this issue in much detail here, as
although I am inclined to agree with Davies and Dickie, it seems to me that there are
easier ways of showing functionalism to be false and so it is safer to disprove it on other
grounds.
Correctness
It is interesting that Beardsley, who criticised the vague notion of `correct' regard in Lev-
inson's theory, is susceptible to an objection regarding the same term. Although here it is
the correct experience that is questioned, the basis of the objection remains the same  how
is Beardsley able to account for whether the person experiencing something aesthetically
does that correctly, or completely? We should certainly rule out aesthetic experiences un-
der the inﬂuence of drugs, but how can we tell the borderline at which we decide whether
a person experiences objects correctly? To quote Davies, how many gins is a theatre-goer
allowed in the interval (S. Davies 1991: 63)?
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One solution might be to claim that the borderline is at the point at which the receiver
is able to correctly recognise the work's non-aesthetic properties. It seems quite intuitive
to say that a person who is not able to recognise the colours on a given painting will not
be able to correctly experience it, or judge whether it is aesthetically pleasing or not.
But is this really so? Famously, Claude Monet suﬀered from cataracts in his later life,
and the paintings he created in that time were aﬀected by his incorrect experience of the
world, his inability to distinguish more vivid colours. Since his paintings from this period
have a noticeable reddish tone, present in the vision of people suﬀering from cataracts, it
seems more than probable that they have been aﬀected by his deteriorated sight, and the
fact that Monet destroyed most of his works from that time after his cataracts were removed
in 1923 suggests that even the author realised they were a result of impaired perception.31
Thus if Monet himself was unable to correctly recognise the non-aesthetic properties of his
Japanese Bridges (Fig. 1.3), how could he experience them aesthetically, or intend them
to be experienced aesthetically by others? He was unaware that he was seeing the world
diﬀerently from other people, so he must have intended his works to be seen as he saw
them. Should a functionalist deny a famous painter the ability to aesthetically experience
his own works? Or should he suggest that either we all see these paintings incorrectly, or
we should all develop cataracts before we can truly aesthetically experience them?
However, even if this puzzle can be answered, a more diﬃcult one needs to be faced.
It seems quite commonly accepted that an aesthetic experience of a given object is not
based on its physical or even contextual properties, but (mainly) on its aesthetic properties.
But while it is easy to check whether a given person is correctly ascribing non-aesthetic
properties to the work, it is a quite diﬀerent thing to give criteria of correctness for the
ascription of aesthetic properties. And even omitting the discussion of whether aesthetic
properties can be properly ascribed to objects, it needs to be pointed out that one huge,
31A recent simulation study suggests that the distinctive character of Monet's late works did not result
as much from his impressionistic imagination  it was just the way he saw the world (Marmor 2006).
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(a) 1899, oil on canvas,
National Gallery, London;
painted before any symptoms
of the cataracts developed.
(b) 1918-24, oil on canvas, The Min-
neapolis Institute of Arts; painted
about the time of most severe disab-
ility
(c) 1918-24, oil on canvas, Musée
Marmottan, Paris; painted after
the cataracts were removed
Figure 1.3: Claude Monet, The Japanese Bridge at Giverny
implicit and completely unjustiﬁed leap is made here  it is assumed that correct recognition
of non-aesthetic properties of works is similar to the correct recognition of their aesthetic
properties. This issue is far from being resolved (the discussion about it being present in
analytic philosophy at least since Frank Sibley's famous `Aesthetic Concepts', 1959) and if
there is any consensus among philosophers, it is rather leaning towards admitting the lack
of any necessary or universal connections between non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties.
It is perhaps more obvious as one realises that, while it might be clear that a person unable
to tell the colours of a painting could not correctly judge and experience its aesthetic value,
it is a diﬀerent thing to say that a person who can tell colours can thereby give correct
aesthetic judgements or have the correct experience  deriving the latter from the former
would be to make a basic mistake in modus ponens. Ultimately it seems that to follow the
proposed path of defence would mean basing the solution to the problem of correctness on
very shaky ground.
In fact, it seems that a borderline between correct and incorrect experience would have
to be drawn arbitrarily, and I agree with Davies that functionalism does not provide a
convincing account of how such an arbitrary decision should be informed by `attending to
aspects of the individual's experience and attentiveness' (S. Davies 1991: 63). On the other
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hand, such phenomena as the mere exposure eﬀect, provide some evidence that the rules
of correctness might be determined socially  it is the artistic practice of the members of
the artworld which conventionally determines what individual actions and approaches are
correct or complete.
There is no necessary or suﬃcient connection between the aesthetic function
and arthood
As functionalism tries to deﬁne art in a standard way, i.e. by the use of necessary and
suﬃcient conditions, it seems worth testing whether the conditions it oﬀers are in fact
as important as it claims, or simply whether it stands against Weitz's objections to the
classical deﬁnitions.32 The conditions in question are: being (intended to be) capable of
aﬀording aesthetic experiences; or, for Iseminger, promoting aesthetic communication; or,
for Zangwill, being such that there are some aesthetic properties that it should have.
Before I begin, one thing has to be noted. While Beardsley is happy to admit that his
deﬁnition may not capture the common usage of the term `art,' and indeed to claim that
we are often wrong when we call something art (and some authors support him here, e.g.
(Pettersson 2001: 83)), this claim has force mainly when applied to truly controversial pieces
of modern art. It is much less persuasive if it can be shown that the theory would exclude
some of the most revered and established artworks, or include some wildly problematic
objects. As I will argue below, this is sadly the case.
Fulﬁlling the functionalists' conditions is not in fact necessary for an object to count as
art  it seems fair to say that a decent amount of conceptual art or politically involved art
does not have the capability to aﬀord us any aesthetic experiences at all, has no aesthetic
properties, and promotes aesthetic communication no more than a political speech would.33
32This point has been raised though not fully discussed in (Kamber 1998).
33The `expansive, adventurous character of art' has been pointed out by Weitz (Weitz 1956: 32), and
the fact that artists are free to completely disregard whatever we claim the essential property of art should
be has been also commented on by other authors (cf. M. Cohen 1962: 486)
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Figure 1.4: On Kawara, Title, 1965, acrylic on three separate canvases, National Art
Gallery, Washington DC
Moreover, it is quite clear that in many cases the artists do not in fact intend their works
to be in any way related to the aesthetic  they are only interested in expressing a message,
e.g. On Kawara in his works points to links between Hiroshima and Vietnam, consciously
avoiding aestheticising them (Fig. 1.4). One can assume that at least Beardsley would
simply argue that this is reason enough to deny them the status of art, however it is not
entirely clear that we should do so. I shall discuss functionalism's exclusiveness below,
for now let me merely state that were we to admit these artifacts are artworks after all,
it would turn out that performing an aesthetic function is not necessary for something
to be art, and that functionalism would be very close to what Weitz called an `honoriﬁc'
deﬁnition (Weitz 1956: 30).
It is also unclear whether this problem is indeed solved in Iseminger's modiﬁcation
of the functional deﬁnition. While Iseminger claims that his theory is free of the issues
related to necessary and suﬃcient conditions because it is not an essentialist deﬁnition
(Iseminger 2004: 24), it does seem that it saliently requires artworks to perform some sort of
function (be it aesthetic, artistic, or otherwise) which would amount to promoting aesthetic
communication. However, it seems that a fair amount of artworks, notably conceptual and
political art as mentioned above, may not actually present anything that would promote
1.3 Functionalism 65
speciﬁcally aesthetic communication. Once again, the comments made by Weitz about the
ever-changing nature of art are relevant  it might be historically correct, as Iseminger
claims, that Diderot and Batteux did indeed set up the artworld as an aesthetic institution
(ibid.: 106ﬀ.), but that does not mean that the artworld is not free to change its function,
or acquire more than one function.34
The more interesting argument considers suﬃciency. Assuming that art does serve the
function of aﬀording us an aesthetic experience, it seems that it is not the only source of
such experiences.35 Clearly we can have aesthetic experiences by looking at landscapes,
ﬂowers, etc. To avoid this problem, Beardsley limits the sort of objects which should be
taken into account to man-made objects, artifacts. However, even with this qualiﬁcation it
seems that there is a whole host of non-artwork artifacts which serve the function of giving
us aesthetic experiences, and moreover that are created with the very intention of giving us
such experiences. Classical furniture, jewellery, lingerie, interfaces of computer programs,
horses' gait in military parades  some claim that even certain chess moves or mathematical
proofs can be elegant or beautiful. We are aesthetically impressed by all these things, and
yet there seems to be no temptation to include them in the domain of art. Not only can
these things be created with the explicit intention of making them aesthetically pleasing,
they also often belong to a kind which is typically intended to have this exact function
(e.g. most jewellery is there primarily to be aesthetically pleasing). Needless to say, they
do have and should have aesthetic properties to serve their function well. If that is so, it
seems that the deﬁnition once again is unable to capture the diﬀerence between art and
non-art.
A similar objection can be raised against Iseminger's modiﬁcation of the theory. He
claims that his deﬁnition does not mention suﬃcient conditions, however if this is the case
34A similar thought has been expressed by Robert Stecker in his review of The Aesthetic Function of
Art, (Stecker 2007: 116-117), and explored in detail in Stecker's own historical-functional deﬁnition of art,
which cannot be discussed here in detail; (Stecker 1996).
35A similar argument has been presented by Stephen Davies, who points out that there are better means
to the eﬀects Beardsley says art has on us (S. Davies 1991: 57).
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then the charge of indeterminacy against his view is even stronger. If his `aesthetic commu-
nication' is to be understood purely in terms of creating something with the intention of its
being appreciated by others, i.e. if `aesthetic communication' stands for `communication
via aesthetic means', then the above criticism still applies to his theory. An alternative
would be to allow the communication to go beyond creating and aesthetically appreciating,
and to accept a more common understanding of the term, i.e. `aesthetic communication'
could stand for `communication about aesthetic facts' via any means. Then the above
problem might be solved, as the members of the artworld do not typically discuss cav-
alry parades and lingerie.36 But instead it now seems very diﬃcult to tell the diﬀerence
between objects which are artworks and other objects which amount to aesthetic commu-
nication and yet are not artworks, e.g. critical articles on art, photographic reproductions
of paintings, or indeed even Iseminger's own book. The issue is further complicated by
the fact that there can be artworks which are commentaries on other artworks  thus the
escape route through distinguishing the object of aesthetic communication from the tools
of communication is inadequate, as some objects can be both. It is very easy to refer to
the artworld here and say that aesthetic communication within the artworld is such that
it simply distinguishes objects worth appreciating and discussing about. This, however,
would make the deﬁnition lean towards the proceduralist side.
A possible solution to this problem is naturally to agree that all the above-mentioned
practices are in fact art, and so that bracelets and computer programs should be grouped
together with paintings and theatrical performances. Indeed, there are some very good
reasons to believe that the artists of the Art Nouveau movement did actually create jew-
ellery and furniture speciﬁcally intending it to be art, as did the artists of the Bauhaus
movement  Xenakis, too, composed music which represented mathematical equations,
36While Iseminger never explicitly states that the communication must happen between artworld mem-
bers, he writes that it is a `function of the artworld' and `consists in someone designing and making
an artifact with the aim and eﬀect that it be appreciated by someone else,' suggesting that the people
communicating are artists and public, who deﬁnitely are artworld members (Iseminger 2004: 23, 25-6).
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and there could be plenty of modern art found which tries to express aesthetic qualities
through the medium of computer presentations, performances similar to military parades,
or indeed dog shows and the like. Thus maybe the solution is to accept those practices
and their products as art after all?
However, there are numerous problems with such a move. First of all, there is the issue
of counterintuitive over-inclusiveness  while we might agree that Mackintosh's chairs are
art, it is very unintuitive to thereby extend the term art to encompass just about any chair.
It might be argued that Mackintosh's chairs are diﬀerent because, unlike our everyday
chairs, apart from providing a sitting surface they attempt to bring about an aesthetic
experience, and this is why they should be considered art. Iseminger's theory would sort
this problem out easily  clearly normal chairs do not promote aesthetic communication
(assuming that the chair can communicate aesthetic ideas, or that its aesthetic qualities
can be an object of communication). However, the problem is not removed here, but
merely relegated  we may be able to distinguish between Mackintosh's chair and another
chair, but not between Mackintosh's chair and its photo, a book that discusses it, etc. (In
what follows I will focus on criticising Beardsley's deﬁnition, while bearing in mind that
the same criticism can with little modiﬁcation be applied to Iseminger and Zangwill.)
And yet as a matter of fact there are other chairs which are usually regarded as artworks
 e.g. chairs produced after Bauhaus designs  which do not attempt to be particularly
aesthetically pleasing, but merely functional. Arguably they are far less aesthetically pleas-
ing than many Victorian chairs which were made by mere artisans and which, although
appreciated, are not treated as artworks (Fig. 1.5). While it seems possible that Beardsley
might simply say that Bauhaus chairs are treated as art unjustiﬁably, the example shows
an important problem  there is a continuum of how much aesthetic experience certain
objects can give us, and it is very hard to pinpoint the place in which objects of a certain
kind which were not always regarded as art stop being art. Secondly, such pinpointing
would be actually very easy were one to accept Dickie's view  then the reason why some
68 Reconstruction of selected modern theories of classiﬁcation of art
(a) A victorian chair by F. N.
Otremba, ordered by the Hawaii
Promotion Committee for Mark
Twain's new home, `Stormﬁeld',
1908
(b) Charles Rennie Mackintosh,
Ingram Street Tearooms chair,
1900, Kelvingrove Art Gallery
and Museum, Glasgow
(c) Marcel Breuer, Wassily
Chair (Model B3 chair), 1925,
designed in Bauhaus and exhib-
ited e.g. at the The Museum of
Modern Art, New York
Figure 1.5: Art chairs and non-art chairs
chairs are art and others are not is simply because `it just turned out that way'; chair-
making began to count as an artistic genre (or an artworld system) after the Art Nouveau
movement. Such a simple solution is, however, unavailable to the functionalist.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, such an inclusive treatment is in deep disagree-
ment with Beardsley's most basic aims. His theory was thought of speciﬁcally as being
able to exclude some objects from the domain of art, and Beardsley was notably quite
keen on excluding a fair amount of objects produced by modern artists. Yet the above
all-encompassing solution not only allows the inclusion of all of modern art into the do-
main, it actually extends it even further, into regions which even Dickie would hesitate to
1.3 Functionalism 69
accept as art, such as lingerie-making and military parades. It seems quite unlikely that
Beardsley himself would wish to follow that path.
However, if he does not, it seems that the only solution capable of saving his deﬁnition
from vagueness would be to again qualify it by adding that the second of its disjuncts should
include some reference to art history, i.e. to say that the class or type of arrangements typ-
ically intended to have a capacity to cause aesthetic experience should already be somehow
historically established as art. The connection with history or context may be made very
relevant, and the explanation very ﬁne grained, however, in the end such a solution would
betray the essence of functionalism and lean heavily towards proceduralism. What would
be thereby shown is that performing the aesthetic function is not suﬃcient for something
to be art.
Exclusions
One important feature of the functionalist deﬁnition is that it is much more discriminatory
than the proceduralist approaches. Beardsley admits that following his theory leads to
denying the status of art to some things which have been popularly acclaimed as art
(especially readymades), but claims that this is a virtue rather than a fault of his view
(S. Davies 1991: 56, 71-3). While a Weitzian might simply say that one should never try
to close the concept `art' in any manner (Weitz 1956: 32), one could argue that perhaps it
can be closed in at least some respects. Nevertheless, while it is hard to disagree that a
good theory should also provide us with a means of saying that some things are classiﬁed
as art wrongly, I believe that the functionalist's line is drawn in the wrong place, or for
wrong reasons.
Before I proceed, one worry has to be expressed. It seems that the functionalist deﬁni-
tions are heading close to becoming normative, rather than descriptive in nature, i.e. they
attempt to say not what art is, but what art should be  Zangwill's version particularly
is prone to this diﬃculty, accepting as it does its normative aspect quite unashamedly.
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The defenders of the view would certainly claim that there are functional deﬁnitions of
other things, e.g. weapons, which are clearly not normative, and so is the deﬁnition of art.
However, there seems to be a vital diﬀerence here: determining the function of art is more
arbitrary than in the case of weapons. The deﬁnition of `a weapon' requires that objects
called `weapons' are eﬃcient in harming and destroying persons and things, similarly to
how `artworks' are those objects which eﬃciently bring about aesthetic experiences. But
while the deﬁnition of a weapon does include all the objects which are commonly referred
to as weapons, the functional deﬁnition of art does not encompass all things that we call
artworks, notably readymades, conceptual art, etc. It simply seems that the deﬁnition
wrongly recognises the actual function of art, or instead of recognising it tries to impose
one which does not necessarily ﬁt actual artistic practice as well as the deﬁnition of weapons
ﬁts combative practice. There is a ﬁne line between being very discriminatory and simply
being wrong  theories deﬁning art in terms of beauty or expression clearly crossed that
line, and I fear that the functionalists may be following them quite closely.
Let me now focus on the details. The sort of works which functionalism excludes
from the domain of art are those which have been created with no intention of making
them aesthetic (or with the explicit intention of making them anti-aesthetic), or, were
intentionalism dropped, those which have no capacity to aﬀord the audience any aesthetic
experiences (or do not promote aesthetic communication, or are not such that they should
have aesthetic properties). This has several implications: (1) it excludes anti-art which
explicitly tries not to be aesthetic; (2) it excludes readymades, because they were not
initially created as artworks, and an object cannot acquire the status of art `midlife' it
either is art from beginning to end, or it is not art at all; (3) it excludes a lot of conceptual
and politically or socially involved art for which the main aim is to shock or pass on a
message, in which case the aesthetic function may be nonexistent. (Note that only the
last of these points applies to Iseminger's version of the theory. Still, even though it deals
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with some problems Beardsley faces, it is questionable whether it can indeed remove all of
them.)
It might easily be argued that this is in fact the right move to make, as many people
would agree that the status of objects of the above kinds is somewhat dubious. However, it
seems that, if this policy is applied, a fair amount of objects which we usually do not doubt
to deserve the status of art would consequently lose it. Holding (3) leads us to denying that
a large amount of religious, political, or tribal art is art, because it was created to serve
a religious, etc., rather than an aesthetic function, and its ability to promote aesthetic
communication or possession of aesthetic properties is rather contingent or incidental, in
this way quite akin to plastic cutlery or political speeches. The obvious answer here is
that, although secondary or subordinate, the aesthetic function was still present, unlike in
some modern art. However, this rejoinder is misguided and easily falsiﬁed with historical
examples, and likely rests on an unjustiﬁed premise which attributes modern aesthetic
attitudes to the people of the past. Up until the 18th Century (and certainly in Antiquity
and the Middle Ages) art not only served primarily religious, political, social and economic
functions, but also what could be called the `aesthetic' experience the contemporaries had
of it was quite unlike the aesthetic experience a functionalist requires (Shiner 2001: 4, 24-7,
34, etc.). Sculptures, paintings and poems were treated with appreciation, but exactly the
same sort of appreciation that was given to political speeches, athletic competitions and
virtuous persons. There is a great body of evidence showing that the experience of art
prevalent up until the 18th Century was nothing like the modern aesthetic attitude, and
that even if art's function was tied with what we would call its aesthetic properties, this
function was not to elicit the sort of aesthetic response or experience we typically have.
Similarly, a great deal of primitive art completely disregards the aesthetic function  the
sculptures of the Kalabari of southern Nigeria are valued for their capacity to contain
spirits, and `some evidence suggests that as visual objects, [they] tend to evoke not merely
apathy but actual repulsion' (Horton 1965: 12). For another African people, the Lega,
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(a) Kalabari Memorial Screen `Ijaw Duein Fubara',
late 19th century, Minneapolis Institute of Arts
(b) Lega human ﬁgure `Kakulu ka Mpito', private
collection, example from Sotheby's Kuhn Collection
of African Art, 1991 Auction Catalog
Figure 1.6: Sculptures of the African tribes
`carvings are apparently used simply as vehicles for communication and not valued for
their intrinsic form.' Moreover, `if a carving is broken or lost, or taken by an outsider,
most initiates are not unduly worried, replacing it with "something that is functional and
. . . is the semantic equivalent"' (Layton 1991: 10; after Biebuyck 1973: 164) (Fig. 1.6). It is
simply somewhat anachronistic, and smells of Enlightenment universalism, to just assume
that art was always experienced and made to be experienced the way we experience it.
This applies not only to some selected primitive sculptures. Most of the inscriptions,
icons, etc. created within the worlds' greatest religious systems were clearly not intended
as much to please the eye as to pass on some sort of message, or to lead the soul to
God(s). The writers of icons were not concerned about whether their works looked good,
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i.e. that they were aesthetically pleasing to humans or God - instead the colours, shapes,
composition, virtually every aspect of the work, was determined by the religious message
it was to convey. This is why the creation of icons was referred to as `writing' rather than
`painting'. In fact, similarly to many early Christian artworks, they were judged ugly by the
people of the Renaissance precisely because they did not attempt to aesthetically please,
but to express a symbolic meaning, or to focus presumed magical or religious powers. It is
very revealing to read Vasari expressing his disappointment at late Roman works such as
Constantine's Arch, which `entirely lost all [the] perfection of design' of ancient art, and his
disgust for the `Goths and other barbarous and foreign nations who combined to destroy
all the superior arts' (Vasari 1963: vol. 1, pp. 6-7) (Fig. 1.7). It was not until the early
20th Century when similar views were challenged by such art historians as Alois Riegl,
with their idea that one can aesthetically appreciate art diﬀerent from one's contemporary
works.37
Similarly, the religious function of sacred music in the Middle Ages completely trumped
its aesthetic function. To be sure, the Fathers of the Church whose theory determined the
shape of art at the time were fully aware that music could be aesthetically pleasing  they
actually explicitly did what they could to make sure that sacred music is not, because
it was meant to convey meanings and direct the soul to God, not to worldly pleasures.
Knowing full well that music can change one's mood, please and impress (after all, they
read Plato), they speciﬁcally forbade what is merely aesthetically pleasant  thus sacred
music could use no instruments (which can produce beautiful sounds, but are unable to
word a message), could not be composed in the locrian modus (because its root note
together with the root note of its plagal modus did not form a perfect fourth or ﬁfth, but
a tritone, or diabolus in musica), had to be set in a form deﬁned to suit the type of text
expressed, etc. (Harman 1988: 2-21). Boethius in his De institutione musica did not even
37Riegl complains at length about the disregard towards late Roman and early Mediaeval art, which
used to be unstudied and treated with disregard, because `it is simply unclassical ', i.e. not aesthetic in
the classical sense (Riegl 1985: 8).
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Figure 1.7: Constantine's Arch, dedicated in 315, Rome
consider what he called musica instrumentalis (the sounds music makes) as a thing worth
enquiring into, almost entirely focusing on the theological and mathematical theory behind
it  he did not care what music sounded like, just what meanings it embodied (McKinnon
1990: 85). Such an approach is very akin to (1)  modern anti-art, or at least (3)  political
or social art. Especially the latter seems to aim at exactly what St. Basil recommended:
`God blended the delight of melody with doctrines in order that through the pleasantness
and softness of the sound we might unawares receive what was useful in words' (Harman
1988: 2). He clearly conceived of music as simply a form of propaganda, in which the
aesthetic attractiveness is merely a convenient aid to passing on a religious message. All
this was followed by such great composers as Guido of Arezzo, shaping Mediaeval and
inﬂuencing Renaissance music - all of which functionalists would certainly include in their
canon. Yet while we might praise medieval Christian artworks for their aesthetic value,
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they were created with no more thought directed towards it than religious sermons which
could just as well employ aesthetic means to convey their messages.
What are the consequences for a functionalist, given that past attitudes toward paint-
ings, sculptures, music, etc., were not meant, and had no ability, to elicit aesthetic experi-
ences in the modern sense of the word, no more than political speeches, magic rituals and
a person's virtue did? To remain consistent, a functionalist would need to either accept
that all things which elicited aesthetic experiences in the old sense are art, and thereby
become vastly over-inclusive, or if they wish to stick with the modern sense, admit that
old and primitive paintings, sculptures and poems became art mid-life, mostly around the
18th Century.
While functionalism might be right in wanting to exclude some objects popularly
thought of as artworks from the domain of art, the theory itself does not provide tools
good enough to draw the line in the right place. Exclusion of such masterpieces as music
by Guido of Arezzo and much of Romanesque sculpture is simply unacceptable. Once again,
employing historical qualiﬁcations might be helpful, however it would result in modifying
the deﬁnition in a proceduralist fashion.
Intentions again
Similarly to historicism, Beardsley's functionalism heavily depends on the intentions of the
author, and thus it seems that the same sort of criticism is appropriate. Iseminger's view
also seems to face these problems, as it requires the intentional creation of something to
be appreciated.38 However, while Kafka's case seems fatal for historicism, Beardsley leaves
an escape route  simply by employing the second part of his deﬁnition he can say that,
even though we cannot tell if The Trial was intended as an artwork, or possibly even if
38While the fact that Iseminger requires not only the intent for the object to be appreciated, but also
that it actually is appreciated might remove some problems related to the cheapness of intentions, it might
at the same time make the deﬁnition susceptible to the issues related to private art, objects becoming art
`mid-life', and primarily  there being no one left to recognise the value of the work.
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it was intended not to be one, it is a work of a certain kind (a novel) which, especially
considering all its aesthetic qualities, certainly qualiﬁes as a (reasonably) typical member
of a class of things which are normally intended to produce an aesthetic experience.
This solution, however, leaves us in a quite uncomfortable situation, in two ways. We
may be forced to similarly ascribe art-status to artifacts we feel less comfortable with than
Kafka's novels. Say a poem was found which is absolutely horribly written and in fact was
a fake love letter with which Abelard wanted to secretly pass on a message to Heloise 
i.e. it was not intended to impress her aesthetically (and indeed is of such a poor quality
that it does not impress us either), but to inform her of his whereabouts. It seems that
because we cannot be sure of the author's intentions, just in virtue of the fact that it is a
poem, regardless of how badly it is written, we must accept it as a work of art. Even if we
agree that it is a poor work of art, we are still not at liberty to say that it is not a work of
art at all, unless we somehow discover what Abelard's real intentions were (then we would
classify his writing under the kind `secret message' rather than `poem', and not treat it as
a pretender to the status of art).
If this is so, not only does it seem that Beardsley's solution is not adequate  in this case
he himself criticises it, because as in the case of IT he discusses, here an object only becomes
an artwork once it is acclaimed by the public (cf. Beardsley 1982a: 132). In general it seems
that while the ﬁrst part of his deﬁnition leaves us with the same problem of vagueness that
intentionalism is doomed to face, the second part only pretends to solve it, while in fact it
does little explanatory work. Quite probably it could do more explanatory work were it to
elaborate on what determines that a work is of a certain kind, or which kinds are typically
intended to produce aesthetic experiences, but the likelihood is that such an explanation
would require a reference to either the history of art and other artworks, or to the society
in which those artworks are made and judged, and in this case once again it would start
to lean considerably towards proceduralism.
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Davies' objection
Stephen Davies presented an interesting objection designed to show that, while art deﬁn-
itely has an artistic function, it often happens that it is not thanks to this artistic function
that a thing is considered art, but conversely that its artistic function is due to the fact that
it has been classiﬁed as art (S. Davies 1991: 66ﬀ). The argument is based on Danto's claim
that artworks such as the Brillo Boxes have aesthetic properties which identical boxes
that have not been displayed in an artworld context lack. These properties are acquired
by objects purely in virtue of them being called art, with no change made to the object
itself. If this is the case, Davies continues, it seems that through being called art (i.e. a
procedure) an object can attain aesthetic properties, and then in virtue of having those
properties it can serve the function of art. Thus the dependence is inverted in a way which
suggests that it is the procedural approaches which take precedence before anything can
be decided on the basis of the work's function. While a functionalist might try to resist
this conclusion, Davies argues, it seems that he could only do so by assuming functionalism
and facing charges of circularity. Note also that this criticism can be applied to all forms
of functionalism alike.
1.4 The Cluster Account
The theory advanced by Berys Gaut in his `"Art" as a Cluster Concept', unlike the pre-
viously discussed views, does not explicitly try to provide a deﬁnition of art  instead it
is concerned with its adequate `characterisation', or providing an `account' of what art
is, not set in terms of a conjunction of necessary and suﬃcient conditions.39 Gaut tries
39Gaut's is not the ﬁrst attempt to provide a disjunctive deﬁnition, but arguably the most developed and
successful one. The idea of a family-resemblance analysis was discussed since Weitz's and Kennick's anti-
essentialist papers (1956 and 1958), and even some fully formed deﬁnitions have already been oﬀered, (see:
Tatarkiewicz 1971; Kamber 1993; Dutton 2000), and some others have been inspired by Gaut (Longworth
and Scarantino 2010).
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to provide a disjunctive analysis of the term `art', and disjunctive analyses are not what
is usually meant under the term `deﬁnition'  and thus he claims to preserve the anti-
essentialism of Weitz's account (Gaut 2000: 40; cf. Gaut 2005: 284f.), and in fact expand
on Weitz's suggestion that what matters in aesthetics are various criteria used to identify
art (Weitz 1956: 33). While some critics argue that the cluster account is a deﬁnition after
all, I would like to skip over what I think is largely a terminological dispute, because I
take the distinction to be of little importance.40 After all, the institutional theory is not
a `proper deﬁnition' either, and ultimately in my theory the cluster account will not carry
the deﬁnitional burden, so I take this issue to be irrelevant for my purposes.
I reconstruct the account as follows:
The concept `artwork' is properly applied to an object iff this object is an
artifact which has a certain non-arbitrary subset of a set (cluster) of properties
commonly ascribed to art, thus bearing a family resemblance to other artworks.
The theory is based on Wittgensteinian views about family resemblance  one concept
can apply to a number of diverse objects not because they all share a given property,
but because they stand in the relation of resemblance. The basic claim Gaut makes is
that family resemblance does not have to be understood in terms of the resemblance-to
paradigm, but rather that of cluster concepts. On the ﬁrst understanding two objects which
share no relevant properties are both art because they both share their properties with a
paradigmatic instance of art  such a view faces the simple problems of having to arbitrarily
point at paradigmatic instances and dealing with the vagueness of the resemblance relation.
The latter understanding, however, can bypass these issues by presenting a set of properties
independent of any paradigmatic examples, a cluster of properties which are criteria for
the application of a concept. Thus two objects can share no relevant properties and yet
40Elements of the discussion can be found in (Adajian 2003; S. Davies 2004; Gaut 2005; Meskin 2007;
Stecker 2000); in practice Gaut is concerned with answering the question `what is art' which is what
deﬁnitions are concerned with, and thus regardless of its structure it serves the same purpose.
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fall under the same concept, because the relevant properties they have are included in the
cluster.
Let me now focus on particular elements of this account. Firstly, the concept is properly
applied if an object has a subset of the set of properties commonly ascribed to art. This
is the central point of the theory, and Gaut characterises it in three stages: (1) fewer than
all properties belonging to the cluster and instantiated in an object can be suﬃcient to
apply the concept `art' to that object; (2) none of the properties is individually necessary
for the concept to apply; (3) some of the properties are disjunctively necessary for the
concept to apply (Gaut 2000: 27). Thus two objects can both fall under a concept even if
the subsets of criterial properties they have are disjoint, because (1) they need not have
all the properties, (2) there is no one such property that they need to have, and (3) they
can both have a minimum necessary amount or combination of properties included in the
cluster.
Secondly, there is one property which is in fact necessary for an object to qualify as art
 artifactuality. Gaut is happy to accept that transforming an object into an artifact is
something relatively easy  selecting is enough in the cases of found art or readymades 
but he insists that it is `artworks that are involved here', i.e. an action is required to make
something art (ibid.: 29). As in the case of IT this requirement seems to be accepted with
little argument, as obvious (I will devote some more space to this issue in section 2.2.7).
While it is treated as a necessary condition, it does not challenge the disjunctiveness of
the cluster theory, because artifactuality is in no way distinctive of art. Importantly, Gaut
denies that artifact-making must be a part of a cultural practice of any kind  if it were,
objects created outside the society (earlier referred to as `private art') could not be art.
The issue of private art was discussed in section 1.1.2 and I will return to it in section 3.1.
Thirdly, what is included in the cluster are properties commonly ascribed to art or the
criteria41 of arthood. There is no great theory behind selecting the particular properties 
41I use this term in the meaning oﬀered in Gaut's paper.
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they are chosen prima facie as those `properties the presence of which ordinary judgement
counts toward something's being a work of art, and the absence of which counts against
its being art'. The ten criteria Gaut lists as likely candidates are (Gaut 2000: 28):
1. possessing positive aesthetic properties, such as being beautiful, graceful, or elegant
(properties which ground a capacity to give sensuous pleasure);
2. being expressive of emotion;
3. being intellectually challenging (i.e., questioning received views and modes of thought);
4. being formally complex and coherent;
5. having a capacity to convey complex meanings;
6. exhibiting an individual point of view;
7. being an exercise of creative imagination (being original);
8. being an artifact or performance which is the product of a high degree of skill;
9. belonging to an established artistic form (music, painting, ﬁlm, etc.);
10. being the product of an intention to make a work of art
Notably, some of those properties include the words `art', `artwork' or `artist', thereby
making the analysis circular. However, Gaut claims, similarly to Dickie, that circularity
does not have to be fatal for theories (or deﬁnitions) `provided they are informative' (ibid.:
28). The informativeness of the account is thought to be achieved diﬀerently than in IT
(which referred to the `width' of the circle)  the cluster account is informative `because
of the presence of noncircularly speciﬁed properties [and] because there are substantive
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constraints on the application of the circular criteria  we can know whether someone
intends to make a work of art by consulting him'.42
Fourthly, the above set of properties is defeasible. There is no reason why new properties
should not be added to the cluster, or even some of the above properties removed, or
replaced by other, more adequate ones. The theory defended by Gaut holds that `artwork'
is a cluster concept, not that exactly what is included in the cluster is absolutely correct,
and changing the number or composition of the properties included does not challenge the
structure of the theory.
Finally, the subsets of properties in virtue of which an object can fall under the concept
`art' are not completely arbitrary. In other words, not just any subset of properties from
the cluster will be suﬃcient for the concept to apply  otherwise objects such as philosophy
papers (which can be formally complicated, original and intellectually challenging) would
be art. Thus only certain subsets of properties are suﬃcient for the object having them to
fall under the concept.
On top of this, an error theory is used to explain why we are driven towards conjunctive
and simpler deﬁnitions  aesthetic, formalist and other deﬁnitions commit the fallacy of
unjustiﬁably inﬂating one of the criteria included in the cluster to the status of a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for arthood. The cluster account thus not only can explain what
is art, but also why the previous deﬁnitions of art have failed.
1.4.1 Advantages of the cluster account
I take one of the main advantages of the cluster analysis to be somewhat similar to what
I ﬁnd important in the institutional theory  it explicitly tries to account for how art is
42Although I wish best luck to those who want to consult some of the long deceased artists about their
intentions, I will not discuss the failures of intentionalism here  it was partially discussed already and
will be discussed later. I would only like to note that while I am suspicious about the non-circularity of at
least parts of the cluster account, I am happy to accept that its circularity is not fatal in the sense oﬀered
by Dickie.
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actually regarded in our society, both in its content and structure. Gaut follows Wittgen-
stein's advice: `don't think, but look', and selects his proposed criteria after reﬂecting on
`how the concept in question is used in the language' (Gaut 2000: 28; cf. Gaut 2005: 277),
which, as I stressed while discussing Dickie's view (see p. 22), is what forms the basis for
reﬂection on art as a social phenomenon. This might be a somewhat unfair treatment of
Gaut, who agrees that the concept of art can have only developed in a society, human or
alien, but does not think that it has a socially determined extension. However, I do not
think that pointing out this advantage is completely contrary to the spirit of the cluster
theory. This is because ﬁrstly, it remains to be proven that some of the criteria quoted
are indeed culture-dependant  if they were universal then even though including them
in the cluster follows from reﬂection on cultural practices, they are not counterfactually
dependant on those practices, i.e. they can exist in alien worlds. And secondly, the cluster
is expandable and allows for additions or even modiﬁcations of the criteria, and thus by
being derived from our artistic practice does not exclude the possibility of adding criteria
characteristic of other, even alien practices.
On the structural side, the cluster theory also seems more apt for providing an account
of art as a social phenomenon  its basic motivation lies in the observation that art as
it evolved through the centuries is not a uniﬁed phenomenon, and as such is very hard
or perhaps impossible to describe in a simple and neat deﬁnition. Following Weitz, it
recognises that as a human (or alien) dependant phenomenon it is simply somewhat messy
and in places completely arbitrary, and instead of trying to sweep this fact under the
carpet and provide a conjunctive theory which accounts for most of art, it settles for a
disjunctive one which can encompass all of it.43 By the same token, even though it might
be independent of the contingencies of our history of art, it explains them  the reason
43Gaut advances similarly disjunctive theories in other domains as well, including his patchwork theory
of interpretation of art (cf. Gaut 1993).
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why it is messy and uneven is because criteria for arthood were not grouped according to
some deﬁnition, but on the basis of family resemblance (Gaut 2000: 34).
Another related advantage lies in stressing heuristic utility. Gaut is quite happy to
accept that his account may turn out wrong after all, but he recognises what I believe is
one of the most important features of scientiﬁc enquiry at least since Popper and Kuhn
 as long as a view is an improvement on other views and is heuristically more fruitful,
it is to be preferred for methodological reasons (Gaut 2005: 276-7)44. If fruitfulness is to
be obtained at the cost of losing the status of a deﬁnition, so be it, because in scientiﬁc
theories accuracy is more important than simplicity or elegance. In fact, I believe that
in this case it would be more than appropriate to extend the error theory used in the
argument to a meta-level and explain not the content of diﬀerent deﬁnitions of art, but
the very drive to characterise art in terms of a deﬁnition. It could be argued that similarly
to how we are biased towards simplicity and thus unjustiﬁably prefer simple deﬁnitions
to complex disjunctive ones (ibid.: 282), we are, as analytic philosophers, biased towards
explaining concepts in terms of proper deﬁnitions  perhaps because aesthetics is thought
to be required to use the same tools as metaphysics or epistemology, or perhaps because
of unjustiﬁed protectionism against continental philosophy and the social sciences (see
Wolterstorﬀ 1989: for an interesting historical account for that phenomenon). The cluster
account, however, remains indiﬀerent to this sort of bias and tries to search for truth where
it actually is, not where we want it to be.
Apart from the above, there is a number of what can be described as `better oﬀ than'
advantages over other discussed theories. These are important from a methodological point
of view  they ensure that the theory is broader, has greater explanatory power, and is
susceptible to a smaller amount of objections than its rivals, and thus should be preferable
(Gaut 2000: 35-6). In general, by providing multiple criteria for arthood Gaut does not
44Especially: `The point is simple: one should not just assume that there must be a deﬁnition of art;
rather, one should examine actual and counterfactual cases, and see whether a family resemblance view
captures them correctly'
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have to rely on anything as strong as others do  even if it can be shown that a given object
was created with no relevant intentions (which would disqualify it in Levinson's view), or
that it has no aesthetic function (as Beardsley would require), it can still count as art in
virtue of having other properties included in the cluster.
Firstly, the cluster account can explain private art. As mentioned in the discussion
of IT and historicism, the issue of lone artists who are completely disconnected from the
artworld or perhaps any society whatsoever does require some sort of explanation, and
unlike IT, the cluster account can allow for it. While prima facie this seems to be an
advantage of the theory, as I have argued above (see p. 27) it may not ultimately be of
such great importance. The issue will be again discussed in section 3.1.
Secondly, it can also deal with `alien' art which is completely independent from the
history of our art. As discussed on page 46, this could be a serious problem for historicism.
The cluster theory, on the other hand, does refer to some historical relations  `established
genres' are naturally to be explained historically  but does not make them essential.
Thirdly, by stressing the plurality of art's functions, the cluster account avoids the
problems of functionalism  diﬃculties in determining what exactly is the function of art
and denying arthood to objects which do not perform the function, even though they are
commonly recognised as art (e.g. readymades).
Finally, the cluster view does not face perhaps the strongest problem to IT  Wollheim's
dilemma. Instead, Gaut actually provides us with a list of criteria on the basis of which
we commonly take something to be art, thus following the ﬁrst horn of the dilemma and
providing an account which, as Wollheim predicted, does not need to depend on the art-
world. This, perhaps the most inspirational part for my cultural theory, will be discussed
at length in section 2.2.6.
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1.4.2 Objections to the cluster account
Error theory for everyone
The cluster account claims not only to have explained what is art, but also why there are
discussions about the deﬁnition at all. By employing an error theory Gaut explains away
the intuitions of those who follow other theories of art as mistakenly assuming that one
of the criteria for arthood included in the cluster is in fact a necessary condition (Gaut
2000: 36-7). Thomas Adajian challenges this claim as slightly overrated  it is not clear
why Gaut can use the error theory to favour his account and other theories cannot. There
is no reason why those who oﬀer other deﬁnitions couldn't say that Gaut is in error in
treating what is in fact a necessary condition as a mere criterion (Adajian 2003: 383-4).
However, a story can be told of why the cluster account is in a better position to
use error theory after all (Gaut 2005: 282-3). For one, it can explain a wider range of
deﬁnitions. It might be true that a functionalist can claim that the cluster theorist is
in error by reducing the necessary condition of having an aesthetic function to a mere
criterion, but it cannot similarly explain why an expressionist or a formalist are also in
error. The cluster theorist, on the other hand, is welcome to run the same argument
against all of them. The main point, however, is that error theory is based on exposing
biases which cause misjudgements, and it seems that the bias a cluster theorist can appeal
to in order to explain any other deﬁnition is more persuasive. It is a common cognitive
bias to simplify complicated things (e.g. by reducing the number of criteria), while it is
quite an uncommon bias to complicate simple things. Thus a cluster theorist appeals to
something far more likely (and well recognised by other disciplines) than what is available
to those who want to use error theory against him. Ultimately I agree with Gaut that this
criticism merely points out that a certain move is available to both sides of the argument,
while completely ignoring the fact that only one side is actually correct in making it.
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Irrelevant criteria
An interesting objection has been raised by Aaron Meskin in his `The Cluster Account of
Art Reconsidered'. He argues that on Gaut's understanding of how fulﬁlling various criteria
`counts towards' an object being art, any arbitrary property which can be co-instantiated
with the ten criteria oﬀered (e.g. `having been made on a Thursday'), will count as a
criterion as well. This is because such an 11th criterion would be, similarly to the other
ten, not necessary for the application of the concept, added to any suﬃcient subset it
would be a member of a suﬃcient subset, and added to any disjunctively necessary subset
it would also be a member of a disjunctively necessary subset. This is, however, highly
dubious  why should `having been made on a Thursday' count towards something being
an artwork?
Meskin oﬀers some possible solutions to this problem, arguing that neither of them is
really satisfactory. While it has been discussed by other authors,45, it seems that the objec-
tion largely misﬁres. While Meskin mentions that we could recognise which properties are
irrelevant for arthood by Wittgensteinian `looking and seeing' how the concept is used, he
writes that this merely excludes some wildly irrelevant properties while preserving others,
e.g. it is still likely that `hanging on gallery walls' or `having high monetary value' would be
taken by many as criterial, because of how the concept `art' is used. However, this assumes
that what Gaut needs to inspect to ﬁnd out which properties are criterial is particular
objects (in which case the objects are taken with all their other irrelevant properties),
whereas in fact what is required is inspection of particular subsets of criterial properties to
ﬁnd out which of them are suﬃcient (in which case irrelevant properties remain irrelevant,
because the suﬃcient subsets are established regardless of particular objects and all their
non-criterial properties).
45See: (Longworth and Scarantino 2010) for a possible account for how one of Meskin's proposed replies
could be followed to resolve the objection.
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The cultural theory I am about to propose can expand on this issue. I not only agree
that the criterial properties should be inspected by `looking and seeing', I think that they
should be inspected using the methods of the social sciences. What needs to be done, in
fact, is not to look for some universal properties through the contingent characteristics of
people's beliefs about them, but checking precisely for the beliefs people hold about art
and about what makes art, and assigning them the cultural contexts within which they
are held.
Utility and Institutions - a historical dilemma
In the following I will develop an objection which culminates in facing a cluster theorist
with a dilemma: either the cluster account is so complex that it ceases to be useful, or it
is contains an essential institutional element.
Let me start by reevaluating an objection raised by Adajian. Gaut claims that his
theory provides us with good tools for accounting for objects which border on being art,
but are not  the reason why we wonder whether they should be treated as artworks or
not is because they have a large amount of properties included in the cluster (Gaut 2000:
36). However, it seems that this feature actually causes more problems than it is worth, for
how exactly are we to distinguish objects narrowly on either side of the borderline of what
is and is not art? It seems that while jewellery or dinners may be similar to art in virtue
of possessing a number of properties included in the cluster, they may not in fact have any
less cluster properties than some artworks  especially readymades and found art which
often lack quite a few. To follow Adajian, `this means, though, that the cluster view has
no resources for saying, of any given thing with some but not all of the criterial properties,
whether that thing is an artwork, not an artwork, or a borderline case' (Adajian 2003:
382). (Perhaps this point can even be strengthened: because Gaut holds that the cluster
is defeasible, it means that we cannot determine the arthood of objects which have all of
the properties currently included in the cluster, because other properties can be added.)
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If this is the case, the objection follows, the cluster account lacks explanatory power  and
especially for a theory which boasts methodological superiority over its competitors such
a ﬂaw seems fatal.
I think that the answer provided to this objection not only fails to resolve it, but
actually points to the next objection I shall raise.46 In `The Cluster Account of Art
Defended' Gaut ﬁrst notes that it is impossible to determine that e.g. any object which
satisﬁes the minimum of eight criteria is thereby art. It is also impossible to reliably weight
the criteria and say that an object has to satisfy whatever number of criteria provided their
joint weight is suﬃcient. Instead, we should employ `the familiar method of inspection:
that is, consider the particular subset, and consider whether something satisfying it is a
borderline case or not' (Gaut 2005: 280). If it is found that two objects, of which one is
commonly considered art and the other one is not, both satisfy the same criteria, then one
should reconsider the classiﬁcation of either of them and ascribe them the same status.
But let me stop here and innocently ask a softening-up question: just how much of
this Wittgensteinian `looking and seeing' does one have to do before one can actually use
the cluster account? One would assume that a theory which boasts great heuristic utility
should be useful, and easy to use. Yet upon closer inspection, it seems that the amount of
work needed to make it actually work is near inﬁnite. What Gaut requires one to do is to
inspect the properties which can be criteria for art and decide whether they actually are
or not. However, since no regular method for such an inspection is oﬀered, the enterprise
becomes extremely tiresome. One would need to inspect every possible property any object
might have and decide whether this property is a criterion  this includes inspection both
for `is beautiful' and `has been made on a Thursday', or indeed `is located more than 231
metres away from Jupiter'. While this might sound quite ridiculous, it would be necessary
as no indication as to where we should inspect, no proviso which would limit the domain of
46The same applies to Longsworth's and Scarantino's disjunctive theory which may have solved Meskin's
problem, but seems to preserve all issues related to undeﬁned borderlines and vagueness of Gaut's original
theory.
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properties to inspect, is given. It could be argued that such a reductio is unjust  clearly
one has some idea where to look for criteria, after all it is much more intuitive to look
for them among a thing's aesthetic rather than astronomical properties. I do agree that
common intuitions can in this case be a certain guide, however I am sceptical as to whether
or not they are enough. Even if one decides that intuitions are trustworthy (which I think
is far from obvious), they do not seem to be a suﬃciently stringent limitation  they might
suggest that one should look for criteria in one place, but it seems implausible that they
could entirely rule out the need to look elsewhere. In other words, were one to follow one's
intuition and construct a set of criteria from only the intuitive candidate properties, one
could only say that the result is an approximate set of criteria, which could be complete,
but one cannot be entirely certain of that before one inspects the inﬁnity of less intuitive
properties.
At this stage this issue seems no more problematic for a cluster theorist than for anyone
else  after all, if the epistemologists know anything, it is that they never even knew that
their deﬁnition of `knowledge' was missing something until Gettier pointed it out. Surely
similar scepticism could be applied to any deﬁnition, and the cluster account is no worse oﬀ
because of it. Yet one thing seems to complicate things  while other deﬁnitions claim to
provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for falling under a concept, the cluster account
does no such thing, and openly invites modiﬁcations to the set of criteria it proposes.
Finding a new condition falsiﬁes other deﬁnitions (undermining the suﬃciency claim of their
sets of conditions), whereas ﬁnding a new cluster element merely adds to the complexity
of the account. This might seem like a very weak softening-up objection right now, but
it will become more signiﬁcant once combined with other issues which make the account
extremely complicated.
Still, one could think such a solution satisfactory enough. However, this is only the
ﬁrst step of the problem. Given that a set of all criteria has been established, the method
of inspection now has to be used to determine all suﬃcient subsets of the set. Assuming
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that Gaut's set is complete, i.e. that there are only 10 criteria, this requires one to inspect
exactly 210 possible combinations of those properties  exactly 1024 possibilities, each
of which should be inspected threefold, as a clearly suﬃcient, clearly insuﬃcient or a
borderline subset. Every new criterion doubles the number. While it is certainly possible
to do all this, and the cluster theorist may be unperturbed by such minor `computational
diﬃculties', it seems simply awkward that a theory which claims great heuristic utility
requires so much work. Still, this objection can only be treated as a softening-up objection,
one which exposes the limitations of the theory, rather than seriously challenges it.
To overcome these limitations, Gaut could also hold that the `inspection' could be un-
derstood not as the typical philosophical enquiry into our intuitions, but actual empirical
research, e.g. ﬁnding out which properties people actually do treat as criteria and which
subsets of the found set of criteria are suﬃcient. Such treatment would indeed be very help-
ful  there would be no need to inspect inﬁnite amounts of properties or every combination
from the set, one could just collect the ones which are commonly thought of as criteria or
their suﬃcient subsets. I sympathise with this solution, but I think that it merely points
to a much more serious problem  it seems more than likely that such research would show
that people's judgements in this matter are history-dependant and, following that, so is
the cluster. (As will become clear later, this constitutes a step towards my own theory, as
while Gaut would probably hold that inspection allows one to discover the only set and
suﬃcient subsets of criteria that there is, I will claim that there are many such sets and
suﬃcient subsets, and they are relative to the societies inspected.)
Additionally, I think that Gaut's claim about the impossibility of weighting criteria is
too quick. It is indeed awkward to say that being beautiful weighs ﬁve units of arthood
while being intellectually challenging only three. At the same time, however, it seems
quite natural to think that we weight criteria diﬀerently when we discuss art from diﬀerent
times. This, together with the following points I want to make, is from historical change,
and will form my main argument against the cluster account.
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To say that the cluster is history-dependant is to say that such things as how many
and which properties should be included in the cluster, how those properties are weighted
relative to one another, and which subsets of properties are suﬃcient for arthood, can
all change depending on the historical context in which they are considered. In other
words, determining the arthood of objects in diﬀerent historical contexts calls for diﬀer-
ent, adequately indexed criteria. Moreover, showing that criteria and their cluster(s) are
history-relative comes dangerously close to showing that what actually matters in determ-
ining the arthood of objects is not what criteria they satisfy, but what people think are
the criteria they should satisfy at various times in order to be art. This, though, would
lead one towards accepting a form of institutionalism.
Most modern deﬁnitions of art try to determine what `art' means now, rather than what
it meant historically, and the cluster theory is no diﬀerent  so it seems that no historical
arguments could threaten it. There are, however, two understandings of `historical', and
at least one of them can present a true challenge. On one hand, one can ask whether the
composition and relative weighing of criteria in the cluster do not change historically, e.g.
the cluster which we accept now is diﬀerent from the cluster which people from the 16th
Century would use. A cluster theorist could probably discard any objections based on such
understanding and simply admit that his theory was only designed to apply to our current
use.47
On the other hand, however, one can ask whether when judging art from diﬀerent times
now we do not apply diﬀerent clusters to art from diﬀerent times, e.g. do we not judge
medieval art diﬀerently from classical art, and diﬀerently again from modern art? I argue
that we in fact do, and it is this understanding I adopt when speaking of history-relativity
in following paragraphs. For example, when we judge mediaeval religious art, we ascribe a
diﬀerent importance to creativity or originality or imagination (Gaut's criterion (vii)) than
47As I will argue later, while this is not a drawback of a theory, a diﬀerent theory which would be
applicable both in modern and historical cases would enjoy a greater scope and explanatory power and
thus methodological superiority; see section 2.2.3.
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when we judge modern art. For a modern artwork to be ascribed the property `imaginative'
or `creative' it needs to be radically diﬀerent from other works, whereas some mediaeval
works can diﬀer from their contemporary art in minute details and yet still be treated
as very original. The reason naturally lies in the fact that we recognise modern art is
created in a society that is rapidly changing, after the Avantgarde set certain standards,
etc., while mediaeval art was created in a very conservative society and was largely funded
by the conservative state or Church which discouraged `exercising creative imagination'.
In fact, being imaginative was seen as a vice in an artist, and `thinkers as varied as Hobbes,
Descartes, and Pascal declared it liable to fanaticism, madness, or illusion' (Shiner 2001:
66). In such a context it seems natural that we should treat even rather moderate amounts
of creativity with higher esteem than we would in the case of romantic art, where being
creative was most actively encouraged.
Thus either the meaning of the word `creative' is diﬀerent when applied to these two
types of art, and so Gaut's criterion (vii) is in fact at least two separate criteria (perhaps:
`is an exercise in creative-for-the-14th-Century imagination' and `is an exercise in creative-
for-the-21st-Century imagination'), or the amount of creativity required is relative to the
types of art being judged, which are themselves relative to the historical and cultural
contexts in which they were created. Either way, the composition or the weighing of the
elements in the cluster is time-relative. Similar arguments could be run for other criteria
 we require more aesthetic qualities from pre-avantgarde art than from modern art, more
expressiveness from romantic than from classical art, more individuality from post-romantic
than pre-romantic art, etc. Another comprehensive example is provided by Pettersson and
concerns literature  as a matter of fact, the term `literature' is applied to modern texts
diﬀerently than it is to old ones, in particular, it includes only `imaginative literature' with
respect to modern texts, but practically any non-technical texts when applied to ancient
or medieval ones (Pettersson 2001: 87-88; cf. Shiner 2001: 69). Thus while we do recognise
Cicero's speeches as literature, were texts in all relevant respects similar (i.e. fulﬁlling the
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Figure 1.8: Duccio, Maestà, 13081311, Tempera and gold on wood, Museo dell'Opera
Metropolitana del Duomo, Siena
same criteria) written in modern times, they would likely not be literature (and thus not
art).48
It could be objected that it is not in fact the case that originality in the above ex-
ample is weighted diﬀerently  mediaeval art is treated as art simply in virtue of satisfying
diﬀerent subsets of criteria than modern art, even though it is not particularly original.
However, actual practice supports my analysis. Mediaeval artworks often are described as
extremely original, even though their actual innovation consists of something rather minor
by modern standards, e.g. Duccio's Maestà is often described as revolutionary in changing
the iconography of the Virgin from the Byzantine style to a more `worldly', approachable
image (Perrig 1995: 44, 63), but clearly removing some gold from Mary's robe and making
her look more motherly cannot objectively compare with the Avantgarde standards of re-
inventing art completely with every single work (Fig. 1.8). Yet it is common and indeed
48Pettersson argues that this is because the meaning of the term `literature' has changed over time and
`many older texts of kinds that would not now be seen as literary are still called "literature", mainly, I
think, because they were literature according to early nineteenth century usage and have retained that
historically acquired classiﬁcation. As a consequence, histories of literature include almost all and any
texts from early periods, while only imaginative literature qualiﬁes when we come to the twentieth century
sections.' (Pettersson 2001: 87).
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Figure 1.9: Kazimir Malevich, Black square, 1915, Oil on Canvas, State Russian Museum,
St.Petersburg
seems natural to think that it is this originality which partially makes works like Maestà
artworks, i.e. it might be at least in some cases a non-disposable element of many suﬃ-
cient subsets of criteria. But this would also suggest that `creative' as applied in a modern
context means something diﬀerent, more demanding  thus what changes over time is how
much innovation must be introduced in a piece for it to be called original.49
Additionally, if one were to take one artwork and change the historical context in which
one judges it, it seems likely that the weight given to the criteria would change. Consider
Malevich's Black Square  as an avantgarde piece it is an artwork largely in virtue of
its creativity (other criteria might include `being intended as art', `being in the genre of
painting') (Fig. 1.9). However, were an identical object created by Masaccio, it is unlikely
49Whether most modern works actually live up to the high creativity standards is another thing. How-
ever, were a modern work creative in the same way as Duccio's, i.e. took an established iconographic
model and merely changed a couple details, it would likely not be treated as creative at all and if it would
be art, it would be in virtue of satisfying a subset of criteria which would not include (vii).
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that we would call it an artwork, and this is at least partially because in the case of proto-
Renaissance art we do not normally require creativity as much as expressiveness, successful
representation and showing a high degree of skill. What this example shows is that either
the originality criterion has a greater importance when applied to art created in modern
times (where `showing a high degree of skill' is seen as less important in works created now
than before the Avantgarde); or the cluster we use to account for modern objects includes
the criterion `original-as-for-20th-C.', while the one used for proto-Renaissance art includes
`original-as-for-15th-C.'; or the subset of criteria satisﬁed by Black Square is suﬃcient in
the cluster used for modern art, but is insuﬃcient in the one used for proto-Renaissance
art.
A cluster theorist can choose one of two possibilities now: either time-index the prop-
erties in the cluster, or index the clusters. On the ﬁrst option, the cluster of criteria
includes no universal properties such as `being expressive of emotion' or `being an exercise
of creative imagination', but only context-indexed properties such as `being expressive-for-
pre-Romantic-art', `being creative-for-14th-Century-European-art', etc. The alternative is
to index not the properties but the clusters  so we would judge Black Square accord-
ing to the suﬃcient subsets of properties from clusterModernism, and Maestà according to
clusterMediaeval, and while the properties in those clusters might be the same, diﬀerent
combinations of those properties form suﬃcient subsets, and perhaps the same properties
are weighted diﬀerently in diﬀerent clusters. A dilemma follows: either there is one cluster
which includes properties with all possible relevant context-indexes, or there are as many
clusters as there are relevant contexts.
On the ﬁrst horn of this dilemma, the theory becomes impossible to use. To determine
which objects are artworks one needs to ﬁrst know which subsets of criteria are suﬃ-
cient, and the method of ﬁnding out leads through inspection. Above I was trying to
show that this can be a rather demanding venture even if the cluster only included the
ten criteria proposed by Gaut  assuming that one did ﬁlter out all actual criteria from
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the inﬁnite unrelated properties an artwork-to-be might have, there are 1024 candidate
suﬃcient subsets to check. Were one now to add only another ten properties indexed to
art from Maestà's time, the number would increase to 1048576  over a million combin-
ations to check by `looking and seeing'. Following the roughest art-historical divisions
and distinguishing only prehistoric, ancient, Mediaeval, Renaissance, Mannerist, Baroque,
Classicist, Romantic, Modernist and Contemporary art, takes the number to an astronom-
ical 1.2676506×1030. To actually tell whether an object is an artwork, technically a cluster
theorist needs to ﬁrst inspect an insane million trillion trillion potential suﬃcient subsets of
criteria. When introducing ﬁner distinctions, allowing for cultural variations, and allowing
for future contexts, the number seems to grow to inﬁnity.
Some might be tempted to say that this is merely a technical, computational diﬃculty
which does not undermine the validity of the account  especially considering that Gaut is
only interested in defending its structure rather than its content or the particular criteria
involved. However, it seems that particularly in this case the common philosophical disdain
for any practical diﬃculties in actually using the knowledge formulated in theory is rather
out of place. Although it is not uncommon for theories to be rather complex in practice, the
cluster account might be incomparably more complicated than any other theory. Moreover,
Gaut speciﬁcally says that he is (and all theorists should be) `trying to model a real human
capacity (to apply the word `art'), and that requires a ﬁnite list, if the list comprises
variegated criteria' (Gaut 2005: 286). Yet, as the above shows, even if the list is not
inﬁnite, it is deﬁnitely beyond `human capacity' to deal with it. What is more, Gaut's
account has multiple connections to very practical matters and treats those connections
as virtues of the theory  the fact that criteria are found by looking and seeing, the stress
placed on having to explain the concept in a way which will allow for the evolution of
the phenomenon it captures, the need to update the content of the concept with changing
practices, etc. And regardless of the particularities of the cluster account, I truly hope
that even the most condescending theoreticians will agree that when the number of actions
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required to make a theory work passes the million mark, the issue becomes more than that
of mere computational complexity.
On the second horn of the dilemma no such problems arise  it is fairly clear that in
judging Renaissance art we test works against the suﬃcient subsets from clusterRenaissance.
Clearly in this cluster diﬀerent subsets of possibly even exactly the same criteria are suf-
ﬁcient as in clusterModernism. But accepting such diﬀerences must force one to ask for
their origin: what are the variations in the suﬃcient subsets of criteria relative to? Surely
indexing a cluster to a certain time period does not mean indexing it to some abstract
date-shaped numbers, but to the societies, cultures and beliefs of this period  thus a clear
answer is: clusters are relative to historical and cultural contexts. And it makes perfect
explanatory sense  surely the fact that the criterion of creativity plays a much smaller
role when applied to pre-18th Century art is directly related to the historical fact of most
art being sponsored by the conservative Church and nobility.50 We recognise this and treat
works from diﬀerent periods diﬀerently. Thus it seems that while Gaut actively denies
that `art' is a concept of a social practice (Gaut 2000: 29), explaining diﬀerences in the
composition (and possibly relative weighting) of elements in the clusters requires reference
to a social practice by which they are determined.51 Doing this, however, must lead to the
rejection of the cluster account in its present form. While it might be true that we determ-
ine the art-status of objects by testing their properties against sets of criteria provided by
the cluster, those sets of criteria are relative to our social practices or, more to the point,
to the practices of the artworld. In fact, the question which should be immediately asked
after agreeing that certain artistic rules are determined conventionally is: `by whom?' and
the simplest answer must be: `by the members of an artworld'. Thus the cluster account
50Interestingly, such a view might be closer to Wittgenstein's original treatment of cluster concepts
which allowed for the concepts to change their meaning over time, (Wittgenstein 2001).
51Although he has changed his view since, in an earlier paper Gaut suggests that the criteria and
suﬃcient subsets are context-relative: `There are no necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an object to
be a work of art, since what is counted as such is a matter of family resemblance, where the conditions
of resemblance are extremely complex, historically variable, contentious and partly determined by the
persuasive skills of those who have power in these matters' (Gaut 1993: 606).
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would in practice be degraded to the role of an auxiliary theory which ﬁlls in the details
of some form of institutional view.
To sum up, the cluster theorists face a dilemma  agreeing that art has a history, and
that the art of diﬀerent times is treated diﬀerently, means that the cluster account is either
so complicated that it is useless, or it must include an essential institutional element. Even
those who insist on treating practical uselessness as a mere technical detail rather than
a fatal ﬂaw must agree that some of the account's professed aims might now be beyond
reach  it is no longer modelling a real human capacity to apply the word `art', it can no
longer serve as a theory of art identiﬁcation and it may lose a great deal of its heuristic
utility. Choosing the second horn might prove much more fruitful, providing some links
with the actual treatment of art from various periods and our historical knowledge of the
artworlds of those periods. As I will argue in section 2.2.6, developing the cluster account
in this direction is the right thing to do.
Chapter 2
Cultural deﬁnition of art
In the previous chapter I tried to show that none of the major modern theories provides
a satisfactory analysis of the term `art'. Yet at the same time I tried to stress that all of
those theories do in fact capture some of the most important intuitions and common views
we have on art, and are at least partially quite successful. In this chapter I will present
a deﬁnition which is built speciﬁcally to preserve the advantages of all four theories, and
sidestep or deal with the main problems they face. It is not a patchwork deﬁnition, or an
eclectic one  I will not treat elements of all of those theories on equal grounds. Instead,
I will present a form of an institutional deﬁnition, in which only the institutional element
plays a truly critical part, and the other views are subordinate to it. Because the crucial
element of my view concerns relativisation to cultural contexts, I call it: the cultural
deﬁnition of art.
There are several reasons why I choose to present a form of an institutional deﬁnition
which uses its competitors as its elements rather than e.g. adopt the functional deﬁnition
and make IT its part. Firstly, I think that while the problems which I discussed above
are fatal for other deﬁnitions, the issues IT faces can be resolved in a much easier way.
Secondly, I tried to show that solutions to quite a few problems which other theories face
can be resolved relatively easily if one refers to the artworld  but this clearly comes at the
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price of making the institutional aspect important and perhaps essential for those theories.
In basing my deﬁnition on Dickie's I simply follow this route. Finally, I believe that this
solution is methodologically superior to other options, for reasons to be discussed below.
The account I am about to present has one important advantage over other views.
Since most theories say that what they deﬁne is what `art' means now, suggesting that
`art' probably meant something else before, surely one should ask: how and why did we
come about this modern meaning of `art', whatever it is? However, the discussed views
seem to give this question little attention  no explanation is given for how and why `it has
turned out that way', or how and why `ways of regard have changed', etc.1 The cultural
theory developed in this chapter can answer those questions in a rather satisfactory way,
and what is more important, a way compliant with the actual history of art and the concept
of art (see: Shiner 2001). Additionally, as should be expected, answers to the questions:
what is art? and: how did we come about our concept of `art'? are parallel and conﬁrm
one another, producing a more complete theory.2
2.1 Methodological considerations
Apart from being able to solve problems the other theories faced, I will try to show that my
deﬁnition is also superior methodologically. There are some issues I would like to mention
before I move on.
Firstly, a theory of art should have the explanatory power suﬃcient to explain why
any given object is art, is not art, or is a borderline case. The more objects a theory
can account for, and the more deﬁnite answers it can give, the better. All the discussed
1Historical theories try to be applicable to what art was in the past (e.g. Levinson 1993: 412), though
not as closely to the extent that I will develop below.
2Similar strategies are employed by other authors in many situations  being able to show how a certain
concept or theory developed can shed some light on the concept or theory themselves, and either support
or weaken it. Dickie did as much tracing the ancestry of the causal conception of aesthetic experience
(Dickie 1965: 134)
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theories have their limitations in this respect. The institutional deﬁnition cannot account
for private art, and most importantly, can provide little justiﬁcation for why a given object
has been given the status of candidate for appreciation (cf. Wollheim's objection). The
historical deﬁnition cannot account for alien art, suﬀers from vagueness of the notion of
`correct regard', and its use of intentionalism makes it hopelessly vague in determining
the arthood of objects which were not intended to be art. Functionalism, while most
discriminatory of all, similarly depends on intentionalism and cannot properly deﬁne what
a `correct' aesthetic experience is. Finally, the cluster account suﬀers from being ahistorical
and has serious problems in determining the diﬀerence between clear and borderline cases
of art and non-art. The theory I will defend will remove the limitations of the institutional
theory and avoid falling into the diﬃculties of other views.
Explanatory power is often treated by philosophers not only as the power to account for
factual, but also counterfactual cases. In defending my view I will follow a simple principle:
being able to explain counterfactual or just plainly unlikely cases is deﬁnitely a virtue of a
theory, however, it is a lesser virtue than being able to explain actual and common cases.
I believe that a theory which can provide a perfect explanation why e.g. a child raised
by wolves who never had any contact with any society could produce art, and yet cannot
explain why Kafka's novels are art, does not have a great explanatory power at all. In
fact, since most aesthetic theories cannot account for all of actual art, I ﬁnd their boasting
applicability to counterfactual cases of little importance  they seem to strive towards one
ideal of art themselves, being very pretty without being particularly useful.
To follow on this point, thirdly, simplicity and parsimony are often taken as virtues.
While I agree that a theory should indeed be as simple and parsimonious as possible, I
believe that sacriﬁcing explanatory power or the ability to truly account for actual phenom-
ena for the sake of simpliﬁcation is a mistake. I take this point to be especially important
in the context of past theories of art  Weitz's criticism was precisely pointing out that the
traditional theories over-simplify the complex phenomenon art is, and concluding that art
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is perhaps too complex to be deﬁned at all. While the modern theories try to provide more
complex accounts, it seems that they still oversimplify things too much, losing explanatory
power and ability to draw distinctions where one would expect them to be. My deﬁnition
will try to capture the complex and slightly messy phenomenon of art as accurately as
possible, even if this means sacriﬁcing some simplicity; at the same time I will try to keep
my deﬁnition as simple as possible  but no more.3
Fourthly, philosophical theories are judged on the basis of their intuitiveness, or ability
to solve things in an intuitive way. I believe that the general idea behind this aim is
correct  it makes sense to doubt the expressivist deﬁnition of art because it has extremely
counterintuitive consequences: it entails that Bach's fugues and Kandinsky's geometrical
abstractions are not art. Similarly, while we could perhaps agree that conceptual art,
or readymades, or anti-art are not art at all, functionalism also entails that jewellery,
lingerie and military parades are art  and this is a rather counterintuitive conclusion.
However, I also believe that intuitions are often given more attention than they deserve
and are unjustiﬁably equalled with proper evidence or argumentation (cf. Weatherson
2003). Similarly to Gaut, I think that while it is good if a theory conﬁrms our intuitions,
it is even better if it explains them, and notably, explains them either as justiﬁed and
worth following, or biased and untrustworthy (Gaut 2000: 30-1). Importantly, exposing a
bias in our intuitive thinking does not make the theory counterintuitive in the same sense
expressivism might be  only being in clear disagreement with an intuition which is in fact
justiﬁed and worth following might be counted against a theory.
Finally, while this point is rarely picked up in philosophy, I believe that it is important
to note the fruitfulness and heuristic utility of a theory.4 Theories are not only supposed to
3In general, I follow Walton who said that artists can have many acceptable reasons for calling outre
objects `artworks', `but their objectives are not those of philosophers. They do not have our interest in
elegant, comprehensive theory. So it would be naive and foolish of philosophers to accept uncritically their
way of classifying things' (Walton 1977: 100).
4One example of an approach that is interested in the practical use of a theory can be found in Carroll
(1994).
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be clever and elegant, they actually should explain something, help us perceive the world
more accurately. While it might be true that philosophical theories are usually quite far
from having a practical application, surely being more practically applicable than the com-
petition should be seen as an advantage. As I mentioned in discussing the advantages of the
cluster theory (see section 1.4.1), if certain concessions are to be made to make the theory
more fruitful, they are at least worth considering seriously. I agree here with Shusterman
and Ahlberg that this is precisely what analytic aesthetics could learn from pragmatic aes-
thetics (Shusterman 1994; Ahlberg 1995). Thus in defending my view I will not be ashamed
to admit that some things cannot be deﬁned in the analytic way by providing necessary
and suﬃcient conditions, moreover, I will not be ashamed to admit that certain elements
of the deﬁnition are not to be determined philosophically, but rather left to be considered
by social sciences. To those who frown at such an approach, I answer: amica philosophia
analytica, sed magis amica veritas.
2.2 Developing the Cultural Deﬁnition
I take as my starting point Dickie's ﬁrst formulation of the institutional deﬁnition:
IT: x is an art work
def
= x is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has
had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person
or persons acting on behalf of the artworld.
I believe that this deﬁnition is in many respects superior to Dickie's later formulation.
To show that, let me start developing the cultural deﬁnition by considering the objections
which convinced Dickie to amend his view.
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2.2.1 Fixing objections which led to the later formulation of IT
Two issues led Dickie to change his view (see pages 19f.), but they can both be solved
more successfully by introducing the notion of cultural competence. The objection raised
by Beardsley regarded the supposed informal nature of the artworld being in contrast with
the very formal-sounding elements of the deﬁnition  `conferring the status' and `acting
on behalf of' were singled out as particularly problematic. What follows is naturally the
observation that no such formal practices exist. Dickie avoided this problem by abandoning
those notions, and adopting a less legally-sounding phrase: `creating an artefact of a kind
to be presented'. I believe that this solution is too robust  the change made seems to be
much more than just nominal (explanation to follow), whereas really all that is required is
simply stating: you need to understand those phrases in an informal way. Similarly, it could
be said that one can act on behalf of the bikers in conferring the status of cult objects
on Harley Davidsons without assuming that bikers need to form a formal organisation.
While it might be the case that the phrase sounds a little out of place, it is not the ﬁrst
time that philosophers come across an issue which cannot be described in any prima facie
appropriate way, and utilise only relatively appropriate phrases noting that they should be
understood slightly diﬀerently than in common language. There is no reason why Dickie
should not be allowed to do this as well.
The notion of `conferral' itself has been looked at suspiciously  what exactly counts as
conferring a status? But surely this issue is not as problematic as it is portrayed. There are
a number of other practices in which statuses are conferred in formal or informal ways, and
which are unproblematic: knighting, marriages, fashion, creating cult objects, etc. In all
cases, formal or informal, the status conferral proceeds by engaging in certain conventional
and often culture-speciﬁc practices, such as uttering speciﬁc words by a priest, a couple
conducting seven circuits of the Holy Fire, or simply moving in together in case of marriage;
the Queen wearing something, or Vogue writing about something in case of fashion, etc.
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The artworld has its own conventions, and some of those conventions determine which
practices count as status conferrals. Of course, it would take an empirical study to provide
a complete list (see section 2.2.5 for details), but some likely candidates seem quite obvious
 presenting to an artworld public is deﬁnitely one of, if not the most common one, but
giving a title or opus number, or an art magazine writing about some folk-artefacts might
be another.5 All it takes now is that the person who confers the status is culturally
competent, i.e. has the appropriate knowledge of her culture's conventions, and thus is
able to employ them correctly.
Danto's objection considered the requirement for speciﬁcally aesthetic appreciation 
while Dickie explicitly denies the need for it, he has to implicitly assume it to explain how
we know which aspects of the work to focus on and appreciate (Danto 1974). The later
IT completely bypasses the problem by not mentioning appreciation at all and instead
focusing on presenting of a work by the artist.
Again, I think that Dickie throws the baby out with the bathwater. While he may
sidestep the problem, I am not convinced that removing the notion of appreciation alto-
gether is appropriate, and moreover, I believe that shifting the explanatory burden from
those who appreciate or present for appreciation to just the artist is wrong. Similarly, in
the answer to Beardsley's objection, substituting `status conferral' and `acting on behalf
of' with `creating an artifact' strengthens the role of the artist.6 While the artist can be
(and usually is) included in the group of those who present for appreciation or confer the
status, or act on behalf of the artworld, he does not need to  e.g. Byzantine icons were
clearly presented by their authors to an audience, but not an artworld audience, and more
often than not they were presented anonymously (the audience was led to believe that
icons were painted `by the hand of God'); those who later presented them to the artworld
5In fact, it seems that in most of the following discussion the phrase `conferring the status' could be
substituted with `presenting to an artworld public'  although I believe that something would be lost in
this way (as there are other conventional ways of conferral than presentation).
6In some places Dickie explicitly says it is the artist who confers the status (e.g. Dickie 1993).
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audiences were no artists themselves, or at least did not need to be. Unﬁnished works are
common cases of conferring the status by someone else than the artist  Schubert never
completed his 8th Symphony and did not present it to the public, instead it was presented
only 37 years after his death by Anselm Hüttenbrenner and even though unﬁnished, it was
appropriated by the artworld public as a complete artwork.7 Following those examples,
I think that both of Dickie's solutions simply limit the power of the institutional theory
without oﬀering much in return.
In answer to Danto's objection, I propose to bite the bullet and admit that yes, in
appreciation one does indeed need to know which aspects of the work to appreciate, but I
argue that this does not require one to assume aestheticism. Instead, it requires cultural
competence. Firstly, it is not clear at all why one should only appreciate aesthetic prop-
erties or aspects of paintings  its artistic properties seem just as worthy of appreciation,
and it so happens that sometimes people do appreciate properties which are neither artistic
nor aesthetic (for example the fact that a painting was recovered after being stolen last
year, or perhaps even the dreaded property of `being expensive'). As I will argue below,
these are not to be discarded too lightly. Secondly, it seems that the issue can be resolved
really easily: it is a matter of cultural competence of all the members of the artworld to
simply know which aspects of the work are to be appreciated and which are not. It is not
because the front of the painting is more aesthetically pleasing than its back that we know
to appreciate the front, but because in our culture paintings are created in such a way that
fronts of canvasses are their only relevant elements, and anyone with appropriate cultural
competence knows that this is the case.
It might seem that already here my deﬁnition enters a tight circle  for is cultural
competence not to be deﬁned as competence in the matters of art? There are two reasons
why this is not the case. Firstly, similarly as in Levinson's deﬁnition, a given object can
7See (Lamarque 2010: 37f.) for a detailed discussion of unﬁnished works, and see (S. Davies 1991:
89-90) for more on how the audiences can confer the status.
2.2 Developing the Cultural Deﬁnition 107
be judged as an artwork on the basis of cultural competence concerning other, past or
already known artworks, i.e. the reference of `artwork' in the explanandum and explanans
are diﬀerent (a discussion will follow in section 4.1). Secondly the cultural competence
does not only refer to art in this context. One is usually required to have rather vast
extra-artistic knowledge to properly understand any artwork  one needs to know a lot
about Christianity and counter-reformation to understand why Caravaggio's naturalistic
paintings are spiritual, and one needs to know the diﬀerence in density of terracotta and
marble to appreciate the skill of an artist who sculpts in the latter. Let me now skip over
the details of this issue until sections 2.2.5 and 2.2.6, where they will be discussed at length.
In any case, I believe that at this stage introducing cultural competence is not a par-
ticularly signiﬁcant change to the institutional deﬁnition, as Dickie in his later deﬁnition
did in fact refer to something quite similar when talking about creating works `with un-
derstanding' (see p. 20).
The deﬁnition should be thus reformulated as follows:
IT1: x is an art work
def
= x is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which
has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some
culturally competent person or persons acting on behalf of the artworld.
2.2.2 Dealing with intentionalism
The cultural competence can be used to at least partially resolve another issue. While the
institutional theory does not need to refer to artistic intentions, Dickie did mention them
saying that an artwork cannot be a result of an accident, but must be intended (Dickie 1997:
71). I presented some signiﬁcant criticisms of intentionalism (see section 1.2.2) arguing that
it introduces an unbearable vagueness to any theory which employs it, and I believe that
if one can do without referring to intentions, one has an advantage over all those who
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cannot. I do not want to deny that artistic intentions may play a role in art appreciation,
interpretation, and perhaps even classiﬁcation, but I do want to deny them an essential
explanatory role  partially because I want to free the aesthetic discussion of fruitless `what
if the author wanted that' guesswork, but most importantly because my theory will provide
an explanation of why an artist might have had a given intention, i.e. the cultural analysis
I oﬀer has explanatory primacy over intentionalism. Ultimately, I argue that employing
the notion of cultural competence can substitute references to authorial intentions in all
relevant places in the theory.
Dickie's worry about creating artworks `by accident' is an odd one. It seems that
even if one has created something by accident, one is still free to ascribe it the status of
a work  allegedly this is how the ﬁrst abstract painting was created, after all.8 If by
`creating artworks' we understand only the conferral of the status, perhaps the point can
be strengthened  an artist may have made something by accident, but in conferring the
status upon it he should better know what he is doing, i.e. have the appropriate intention.
However, this seems to be a pseudo-problem. While it is easy to imagine a case where
someone creates something by accident, it is harder to see how status could be conferred
in an accidental way. Think of a situation which might illustrate a completely implausible
case of the type beloved by some philosophers (note the use of the word `unbeknownst',
too).9
An artist had an unfortunate bicycle accident in which one of its wheels was
broken. While taking the wheel to a repair shop he stops on the way to ask for
directions in one of the buildings he was passing, and while looking for the jan-
itor he hangs the wheel on a hook conveniently left in the wall. Unbeknownst to
8Kandinsky said he was led to create his ﬁrst abstract paintings by an accident, after having found one
of his ﬁgurative works lying on the side, unable to tell what it represented, but struck by the beauty of its
forms. The ﬁrst abstract works were attempts to recreate those accidental `sideways' forms (Kandinsky
1994: 369-370).
9To paraphrase Terry Pratchett, if something has a million-to-one chance of happening, nine times out
of ten it succeeds to be a subject of a philosophy paper.
2.2 Developing the Cultural Deﬁnition 109
him, this building is actually a gallery in which an exhibition of readymade art
is taking place, and after he comes back with the janitor he ﬁnds an interested
audience discussing the wheel as one of the artworks in the exhibition.
Both the making of the artifact and the fact that it was presented to an artworld public
are accidents completely unintended by the artist, who just wanted to get the wheel ﬁxed.
However, if we do not take intentions into account then according to Dickie's theory, since
the artist has presented an artifact of his making (after all, his accident is responsible for
the shape of the broken wheel) to an artworld public, he should have thereby created an
artwork. This seems like a very counterintuitive conclusion to make.
The solution to this issue is in fact really simple. Remembering the above-mentioned
advantages Dickie's early deﬁnition had over the later one, one is free to say that if the
bicycle wheel has in fact had the status of a candidate for appreciation conferred upon
it, it was not conferred by the artist, but by the public. While it might be the case that
the wheel was not intended as an artwork, and not recognised as one by its maker, it is
recognised by other competent artworld members and thus can gain the art-status.
This might seem like an odd move to make. However, do similar things not happen on
everyday basis? When a piece of Greek mosaic is found by archeologists, even if it is known
that it was not created with an intention to produce art (instead the relevant intention
was e.g. religious) and was not treated as art by the contemporaries  it is still art for
us. Similar issues can be raised with regards to Leonardo's sketchbooks and other works
which were intended as exercise, as well as a host of unﬁnished works, like Schubert's 8th.
However, if an institutional theorist wants to aﬃrm that they are all art for us, he needs to
tell who conferred the status upon them, and because it was not the artist himself it seems
that the obvious choice is: members of the artworld. In fact, we can easily tell why in the
bicycle wheel case they would do that  the artworld members are culturally competent in
the domain of modern art and know that ready made objects can be displayed in a gallery
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and ready-mades can be art; having stumbled upon such an object in a gallery, they are
justiﬁed in treating it as an artwork.
However, there is an obvious point to be made against this sort of reasoning. Clearly
Leonardo's sketchbook and Schubert's 8th are treated as art more legitimately, because
the artworld members have good reasons to confer the status  they have aesthetic value,
are historically grounded, have been created within established art forms, there are similar
objects which are already treated as art, etc. However, while it seems that the bicycle wheel
case is much less legitimate, it is hard to point out exactly why. It can also have some
aesthetic value, readymades are historically grounded and an established art form now.
Still, perhaps it could be argued that the reasons for treating the Unﬁnished Symphony as
art are in fact better, or perhaps whatever the reasons are in the case of the bicycle wheel,
ultimately it is treated as art because of an accident, and this is deﬁnitely no legitimate
reason. However, as will become apparent in section 2.2.6, it can still be an artwork,
though perhaps a poor one, if there was at least one good reason to confer the status.
What does it mean, exactly, that a culturally competent public is allowed to confer
the status whatever the artist's intentions, and how is it that it does seem to care for
those intentions after all and in most cases acts in accordance with them? All this can be
explained by employing the notion of conventions. As Stephen Davies has argued (S. Davies
1987, 1991: 211-18), the intentions of the artist are recognised because in creating their
work artists follow conventions known to the public. The fact that there are conventions
is sustained by the fact that artists intentionally use them when creating their works, but
this only ensures that the public familiar with the conventions is successful in deducing
the intentions of an artist from his work. Similar accounts are oﬀered by Carroll  artists
and audiences learn certain traditions of art making and appreciating, and perhaps modify
them in historically explainable ways (Carroll 1994: 19); and Becker  `the possibility
of artistic experience arises from the existence of a body of conventions that artists and
audiences can refer to in making sense of the work' (Becker 2008: 30). Thus in this sense the
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cultural competence I require entails the knowledge of artistic conventions (or traditions),
the ability to follow them in creating one's work and conferring the status on it, as well as
the ability to deduce the intentions of others from them in conferring the status on their
work.
In the end, I argue, the artist is merely a highly privileged artworld member, one who
is typically doing the conferring and who is ascribed the authorship of the work. She might
inﬂuence the audience to the point in which they change their views on art to include her
works, she might convince them not to confer the status on some objects she does not like,
but ultimately she is just a member of the audience who has a more powerful voice than
others (cf. ibid.: 35).
To sum up this section, the notion of cultural competence can successfully replace ref-
erences to intentions in explaining how status of a candidate for appreciation is conferred.
One need not enquire whether an artist has an appropriate art-intention, because either
in conferring the status he expresses it already in a conventional way which is recognised
by culturally competent members of the artworld (e.g. by displaying his work in a gallery,
giving it a title, creating it in the style of, etc.), or if he does not, competent members of
the artworld can confer the status themselves after having recognised that the work ﬁts
into appropriate conventions (e.g. is a beautiful painting, hangs on a gallery wall at a
ready-made exposition, etc.) and for reasons discussed in section 2.2.6.
2.2.3 History and context
The ahistoricity of the artworld is another issue brought up against the institutional theory.
Summed up by Davies, it amounts to pointing out that Dickie has nothing to say about
the fact that things such as who can be an artist, what types of actions count as conferring
status, who is authorised to confer the status, etc., seem to change over time (S. Davies
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1991: 94). Following that, the artworld seems to be time-relative, and a valid institutional
deﬁnition should account for its changes.
In contrast, Levinson's historical theory explains perfectly how artworks are both inﬂu-
enced by the past and inﬂuence future art, or how history both causes artworks to change
and is itself caused by the changing artworks. The subject is described perhaps even better
by Carroll, who showed how historical narratives can explain not only that something is
an artwork, but also how it developed from past art and society, and how it inﬂuenced the
future (Carroll 1994: 24-6). This is exactly what Davies would like the IT to explain as
well (S. Davies 1991: 93).
By the same token, I begin to answer my second main question: how did we come
about our present concept `art'? By accepting the historicity of the artworld, I can show
that our concept has been changing together with the changing institution  on one hand,
the artworld keeps being inﬂuenced by other human practices (e.g. the two World Wars
may be thought to have destroyed naive aestheticism), and on the other, it keeps changing
under its own inﬂuence (`art' just means something else after Duchamp's Fountain). A
much more detailed story will be provided soon.
It seems indeed quite odd that Dickie should refrain from phrasing IT in time-relative
language. Taken that he allows there to be many artworlds, perhaps even independent of
one another, there is no reason to hold that all those artworlds have to be contemporary.
What is more, Dickie allows for certain artifacts to become artworks `mid-life'. It seems
only natural to think that one of the reasons why certain objects which were not recognised
as art once have been recognised later, is because the artworld  the practices and beliefs
of people involved in production, presentation and reception of art  has changed.
I agree with Davies that instead of talking about the artworld we should talk about
artworld-at-t1, artworld-at-t2, etc. This allows us to say that while at t1 a person with
little skill in painting but a great imagination could not produce an artwork (because the
beliefs and practices of the artworld at that time would entail that such a person is not
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competent enough to produce art), while at t2 they could (because the beliefs and practices
of the artworld at the latter time would entail that such a person is competent enough).
Moreover, I think that the sole temporal index is not entirely suﬃcient  it is unclear why
the distinction between artworld-now from artworld-in-17th Century is any more justiﬁed
than a distinction between artworld-in-Europe and artworld-in-India, or perhaps even high-
culture-artworld and pop-artworld.10 Clearly diﬀerent contemporary cultures can also have
diﬀering requirements regarding who can be an artist, or what type of actions count as
conferring status. In fact, both the time and location indexes can be freely mixed, and
perhaps other relevant ones could be introduced. Because of this I propose to use a wider
notion of context rather than just time.11
Invoking such relativism is not particularly uncommon in established philosophy of art
 it is widely accepted that artworks have aesthetic properties dependant on the context of
their creation, and this context clearly includes the time and place where they were made.
I see no reason why contextualism could not be applied to deﬁning art as well. If one
already agrees that two identical objects produced in diﬀerent contexts can have diﬀering
aesthetic properties (cf. Levinson 1990, 1996; D. Davies 2004; Walton 2008: etc.), there
seems nothing more permissive about saying that of those two objects only one can count
as an artwork (Why such claim does not need to presuppose aestheticism will be discussed
below). In fact, the initial anti-essentialist arguments suggested exactly that `art' should
be understood as always relative to a context, though while some took this to show that no
general deﬁnition of `art' is possible (Kennick 1958: 324), I agree with others who thought
that such relativism can be made part of the deﬁnition (Tatarkiewicz 1971: 147).
10Interestingly, Levinson makes a curious point about this issue when arguing in his `Extending art
historically' that the historical theory can be applied to other times in the Western tradition, but that to
try to account for the concept of art of other cultures would be a folly (1993: 413). Surely the Western
culture in the past was just as diﬀerent from our present culture as many other present cultures are.
11Given his later writings, I believe Davies would agree with me, (see: S. Davies 1997, 2000). Also, I
distance myself here from a diﬀerent indexical interpretation of IT presented by Catherine Lord, who in a
series of unsupported statements claimed that the institutional theory only makes sense if we completely
disregard the possibility that there can be other artworlds than ours (Lord 1987).
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The deﬁnition should be thus reformulated as follows:
IT2: x is an art work in context C
def
= (1) x is an artifact (2) a set of the aspects
of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation
by some culturally competent in C person or persons acting on behalf of the
artworld in C.
What is speciﬁcally worth noting is that the notion of `cultural competence' is likewise
relativised to the context  clearly one's competence is in the cultural context of one's own
artworld.
Introducing the indices requires some more clariﬁcation  in what way should the history
and context relativity of art be understood? There are several options. Firstly, the term
`art' can change reference over time. This, admittedly, is rather uninteresting from a
philosophical point of view, as long as people use diﬀerent terms to cover the same ground.
Secondly, the concept `art' can change its meaning over time, and while in the Renais-
sance it meant `beautiful representative artifacts', now it means e.g. `artifacts capable of
aﬀording aesthetic experiences.' This is far more interesting, and there is evidence that
such changes have indeed taken place (Shiner 2001). The theorists who claim only to cap-
ture the `modern Western understanding of "art"' usually admit that the concept might
have once had a diﬀerent meaning, yet usually they fail to follow the consequences of such a
claim. Surely if the concept changes over time, then most likely the present structure of the
concept is (partially) determined by its past structure, and a theory of this concept could
beneﬁt from taking that into account. Moreover, if the concept changes over time, this is
not simply because some time has passed  it changes under the inﬂuence of other things
which changed at that time, i.e. if the concept `art' changed between the Renaissance and
now, it is because of the cultural, technological, etc. changes. Thus if the modern concept
should be analysed as (partially) determined by the past structure of the concept, and the
concept changes under the inﬂuence of cultural changes, it seems that the modern concept
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of art is partially culturally constructed, and a theory of art can beneﬁt from presenting it
as such, or making the social construction of the concept a part of the theory. Following
this, since the deﬁnition is diﬀerent at diﬀerent times, diﬀerent things may count as art at
diﬀerent times and the same things may count as art at one time but not the other, e.g. if
Leonardo painted Black Square, his contemporaries would not think it was art, because it
would not fall under their deﬁnition.
Thirdly, as I was trying to show when discussing the cluster account (see s. 1.4.2),
people from one time conceptualise art from diﬀerent times diﬀerently, i.e. when we talk
about Renaissance art we select beautiful representative artifacts, and when we talk about
modern art we talk about e.g. artifacts capable of aﬀording aesthetic experiences. Again,
surely if we apply diﬀerent concepts to art from diﬀerent times, such concepts are not just
relative to a generic number  19th Century or between 1680-1750 AD. Instead they are
relative to whatever the world was like at the time, and at least partially to what we think
the people from that time thought was art. I.e. we apply concept α to art from time
t at least partially because we think that the members of the artworld at t would have
determined what is art based on concept α. If so, the concepts we use are relative to what
we think were the artworlds from those times (if Leonardo painted BlackSquare we would
not think it is art because it would not fall under the deﬁnition we apply to Renaissance
art).
Fourthly, not only the concept itself, but also the content of the concept `art' can be
historical. In Levinson's or Carroll's theories the historical aspect is made into an element
of the concept  what is art at t is directly determined by what was art prior to t. Here,
if Leonardo painted BlackSquare it would not be art because at the time when it would
have been created it could not (have been intended to) resemble any artworks prior to it /
there would be no narrative joining it with prior artworks. Such views do not predetermine
whether the concept is historical in the second sense, i.e. whether art is deﬁned historically
only in the modern times while in the Renaissance it was simply beautiful representations.
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However, it seems to exclude the third understanding  we use the same concept for all
art, but because the content (the reference of `prior to t' in the deﬁnitions) changes over
time, things from diﬀerent times qualify diﬀerently.
Finally, here is what the cultural deﬁnition does. It can on one hand allow that the
structure of the concept `art' remain the same at all times (i.e. `art' has the same general
meaning, making the concept continuous), and although the content does not directly refer
to history, it contains history-relative terms and thus does change historically. How is this
possible? Similarly as the content-historical concepts, the concept contains variables which
are indexed to historical and cultural contexts. In Levinson's theory `correct ways of regard
at t' referred to diﬀerent things at diﬀerent times, and a cultural theorist similarly indexes
cultural competence and the reasons for status conferral (which will be discussed in section
2.2.6). Such indexical terms change the extension of the concept they deﬁne depending
on what they are indexed to. But unlike the historicists, I argue that the variables are
not relative to time, but to the state of the artworld at that time, or not relative to what
was art before, but to what were the commonly shared beliefs and practices (including the
beliefs regarding good reasons for status conferral) at any given t (more on this in section
2.2.5. Of course, those beliefs and practices (or the culture) are themselves inﬂuenced by
what the beliefs and practices were like before t, but this is not directly mentioned in
the deﬁnition. Simply, the best way to ﬁnd out what the culture is like at t is to trace its
development, but one need know nothing about the development to consider any particular
given stage of it. In practice, an aesthetician can simply ask historians and anthropologists
what C was like at t, and trust them to have arrived at the description of C in whatever
are the appropriate anthropological means, including tracing the history of C.
On this view the concept of art is not historical at all in the second sense, because the
structure of the concept remains the same at all times. The reason why it seems that it
changes is because reasons for status conferral change over time. Thus if Leonardo painted
BlackSquare, his contemporaries would not think it was art, because at their time the
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criteria it satisﬁes would provide no good reasons to confer the status on it. But this does
not mean that in Leonardo's times there was a diﬀerent deﬁnition of art, it merely means
that at the time the cultural context was such that people of diﬀerent levels of competence
were conferring status for diﬀerent reasons. For the same reasons, neither is `art' historical
in the third of the above understandings. We do not use diﬀerent deﬁnitions for diﬀerent
times, we merely change the indexes in the cultural deﬁnition and, since diﬀerent indexes
pick out diﬀerent contexts with diﬀerent competence requirements and reasons for arthood
conferral, diﬀerent things qualify as art at (and from) diﬀerent times.
Of course, there are many other concepts which have history or are context-sensitive.
`Fashion', for one, seems to be quite like `art' in many respects. Many similar concepts
might diﬀer from `art' merely in what the variables in the deﬁnitions refer to. But this
does not mean that pretty much any concept is culture-relative. `Car', for example, used
to denote `a four-wheeled vehicle' (including what we would call `carts' and `carriages'
today), and now it is `a four-wheeled engine-powered vehicle'  but this concept is merely
historical in the second of the above understandings. It is perfectly possible that there are
actually two concepts with those two meanings under one term, and the intended meaning
is inferred from the historical context in which the term is used. How about `physics'
then? The body of knowledge we call `physics' developed historically, so diﬀerent things
were meant by it at Newton's time and diﬀerent at Bohr's. But `physics' is not a culture-
relative concept the same way `art' is. To use Putnam's distinction, `physics' always meant
`the study of nature', and while our conception of nature has changed a lot through time,
the concept itself did not (Putnam 1975).
Finally, the above discussion allows further expansion of the answer to how we came
about our concept of art. The cultural contexts in which art was produced have been
changing historically, and since what is art is relative to the cultural context, our present
understanding of the concept is a result of the cultural changes happening in our society
over time.
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2.2.4 Authority
I can now solve another issue by employing the notion of cultural competence. Stephen
Davies pointed out that the institutional theory is perhaps too democratic in determining
which members of the artworld are authorised to confer the status of a candidate for
appreciation (S. Davies 1991). It would seem now that my view is even more permissive,
as in the above discussion I not only allow for anyone to be an artist and confer the status,
but also for the status to be conferred by the public (or any members of the artworld who
are not artists).
As I mentioned above (see section 1.1.2), I agree that a person who is conferring the
status on an work has to be authorised to do so. However, I believe that the notion
of authority is entailed by cultural competence  after all, people who are authorised to
confer the status of art are those who are competent enough to do so. What competence
exactly is required to gain authority will be discussed soon, and I will return to this issue
in section 2.2.7. I also agree that the criteria for being authorised change over time, i.e.
are historically dependant on the state of the artworld at a given time  but so do criteria
for being culturally competent. Moreover, `what is regarded as the irreducible core of what
an artist must do . . . changes over time' (Becker 2008: 19). Thus while in the 17th Century
one would not be authorised to confer the status unless one had proven one's competence
by possessing suﬃcient skill to produce a complex work in an established genre, little of
this requirement is left in post-avantgarde art. Davies mentions that perhaps in modern
times when `anything goes', or when the Hegelian prophecy of the `end of art' has been
fulﬁlled, it is true that there are no requirements left whatsoever, and literally anyone is
authorised to produce artworks, i.e. it takes less to be culturally competent enough to
produce art (see section 4.7 for a discussion of ramiﬁcations of this claim). Still, while this
might be the case now, it seems that a good theory of art should account for why at some
point in history it was not.
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Dickie may well discount this challenge by simply claiming that his deﬁnition was only
supposed to be applicable to modern times when indeed the authority to create artworks
is democratic  however, since the same notion of cultural competence which was already
employed can also resolve this problem, I see no reason why I should avoid it.
2.2.5 Cultural context explained12
The above points are highly dependent on what is understood under the notion `cultural
context C'. While Davies also suggested that a similar sort of context should be incor-
porated into the deﬁnition, he limited himself to temporal context and oﬀered little in
terms of explaining how it should be understood. At ﬁrst, it might seem that the simple
temporal index might be easier to justify and explain than the richer and more diﬃcult
cultural context. However, there are some obvious problems with such an approach. One
was mentioned above  if one agrees to notice that in, say, 17th Century the requirements
for being an artist (or having the authority to confer art-status) were diﬀerent than today,
then it is hard to justify why one should overlook the similarly obvious fact that these
requirements were diﬀerent in 17th Century Spain and China. The decision to include the
temporal, but not the cultural index, is (at least within the institutional framework) made
purely ad hoc and cannot be seriously held.13 Secondly, it seems that temporal context
alone is no easier to justify than a wider cultural context. After all, it is not just the
fact that some time has passed that determines the change in what the members of the
artworld require of someone they would authorise as an artist, but (arguably) a certain
shift in their beliefs and related practices which happened in that time. However, diﬀerent
cultural contexts can be described in exactly the same way  as diﬀering in commonly held
12I would like to thank Dr Mark Harris for consultations regarding the anthropological views on culture.
13Social scientists, naturally, agree: `we cannot, as self-respecting anthropologists, assume right from
the start that people the world over utilize the same aesthetic criteria as ourselves' (Layton 1991: 12).
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beliefs and practices  and thus a deﬁnition which refers to them is no more complicated,
while having a wider scope.
How is the cultural context to be deﬁned then? How can we know what are the features
of a given cultural context? The ﬁrst of these questions can be answered by philosophy
of culture, however, the answer to the second belongs to the social sciences. While the
anthropologists themselves are divided as to how `culture' should be deﬁned,14 there seems
to be a wide agreement in the basic components which any deﬁnition should include.
Culture is on the one hand about a system of shared ideas, concepts, values, and rules 
in one word, beliefs of various sort  and on the other, a system of behaviours, activities,
resource exploitations  in short, practices (Goodenough 1966: the latter is often referred
to as `sociocultural system' and the former as `ideational system', or culture proper). Even
though there is a fair bit of disagreement on how exactly the belief systems are related to
the practices, they are rather unimportant for the present enquiry  for the cultural theory
it is enough that such relations exist and can be described in practice, regardless of the
details of their nature. It is also irrelevant for the present enquiry whether the ideational
systems exist in the minds of individual people (i.e. are psychological phenomena) as
Goodenough thought, or are public and transcend individual minds, as argued by Geertz
(Geertz 1973: 12)  as long as beliefs and practices can be commonly shared within a given
social group, and diﬀer between groups.
Similar cultural models of art and artworlds have been used by art historians for some
time now  Shiner, for example, says that art is `a system of ideals, practices, and insti-
tutions', and further comments on their inter-relatedness: `regulative concepts and ideals
of art and social systems of art are reciprocal: concepts and ideals cannot exist without a
14To provide a sample of deﬁnitions: `[Culture is] that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief,
art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society'
(Tylor 1871: 4); `Patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by sym-
bols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts'
(Kroeber and Kluckhohn 2001: 357); `Historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rational,
irrational, and nonrational, which exist at any given time as potential guides for the behavior of man'
(Kluckhohn and Kelly 2007); etc.
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system of practices and institutions' (Shiner 2001: 9,11). Although he follows on to make
some rather ﬁne distinctions in the characteristics of the concepts (beliefs) and practices,
I will limit myself here to the bare minimum the cultural theorists will need, hoping that
thanks to this it will be more universal.
What the cultural theory does require is this: (1) any given culture at least partially
is a set of commonly shared implicit or explicit beliefs and accompanying practices which
follow those beliefs; (2) two cultures are diﬀerent if their beliefs and practices are saliently
diﬀerent; (3) the diﬀerences are marked by diﬀering contexts, e.g. Western and Eastern,
modern and medieval, democratic and totalitarian, etc.; (4) various subdivisions within
cultures are possible  artistic culture subsystem is distinguishable from legal, linguistic,
religious, political and other subsystems; (5) there are relations between beliefs and prac-
tices within any cultural (sub)system, between subsystems and between cultures, such that
at least some beliefs can change practices, practices change beliefs, and practices of one
system can change beliefs of another system, etc.
The cultural deﬁnition incorporates those notions. A `cultural context C' is a context in
which the set of commonly shared beliefs and accompanying practices is markedly diﬀerent
from any other set, e.g. the modern China is diﬀerent from the medieval Europe context,
because there are some signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the beliefs and practices of people living in
those contexts. Importantly, cultural contexts do not have to follow geographic or historical
divisions  it is perfectly intelligible to talk about the context of modern socialists around
the world, or of English conservatives of all times, and perhaps even diﬀerentiate high and
popular culture.
To be `culturally competent in C' can now be analysed as follows: to have an appro-
priate explicit or implicit knowledge and awareness of the various systems of beliefs and
ability to participate in the related practices present within a given social group.
With this analysis it is even clearer why the notion of authority is redundant. To be
`authorised (to confer art-status) in C' means: to possess the knowledge and skill which
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according to the beliefs present in a given social group are suﬃcient for participation in the
social practice of conferring art-status on objects. However, this is a part of what being
culturally competent in the artistic subsystem of C involves.
The main advantage of introducing the notion of context lies in explaining a very
general and basic intuition  it is now easy to say why the artworld was diﬀerent in the
17th Century than it is now, or why it is diﬀerent in Spain and in China, or why people
who are authorised to confer art-status in modern Spain would not have been authorised
to do so in 17th Century China. Simply put, the belief systems and practices characteristic
of particular cultures are diﬀerent, and since who can confer art-status, or what types of
objects are likely to be recognised as art by a competent public is relative to particular
cultures, what is art is also relative to various cultural contexts.
Following this, the answer to how we arrived at our modern concept of art gains another
element: not only do we know that it resulted from cultural changes over time, but we can
trace those changes and analyse them in terms of changing practices and belief systems.
With some proper historical research one could provide a really detailed account of those
changes, though a rough sketch is not hard to think of. Under the inﬂuence of social
movements of the early 19th Century and through emancipation of artists from being
bound by state and church commissions, art changed and could no longer be deﬁned by the
beauty theory  the expression theory matched the Romantic artist much better. The belief
which stressed originality encouraged a more rapid development of styles, and together
with the technological progress which encouraged the use of newly developed materials
and techniques, led to abandoning the expressive function of art and embracing the idea of
art as an experiment, producing the Avantgarde and the belief that art cannot be bound
by a single concept (and following this, various disjunctive analyses). The progressive
destruction of status quo in experiments, bounded with such events as the World Wars,
spawned the belief that the only thing which distinguishes art from other things is in the
way it is made or the function it has (leading to procedural and functional deﬁnitions).
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Such an account ties very well with deﬁning art culturally. Here is why: if the reasons
why we arrived at our modern understanding of art follow from (non-artistic) cultural
changes in beliefs and practices, a valid theory of art should take those culturally relative
beliefs and practices into account. And moreover: if there is a theory which can not
only provide an answer to the question `what is art here and now', but also, through
tracing the development of the concept, answer what `art' means in any given context,
then (assuming that it is sound) it should be preferred to any other theory of a more
limited scope. Naturally, all this does not mean that the other theories are useless  it
does, however, show that the cultural theory is much more broadly applicable, and as such,
an improvement on the other views.
Before I close this section, let me draw the attention to the implications of cultural
relativism I advocate. As mentioned before, the above account only shows how cultural
contexts can be understood. What are the features of any particular cultural context, is
however beyond the scope of philosophical enquiry  ﬁnding out about commonly respected
beliefs, as well as the practices present in a given culture, is a job for a social scientist.
By the same argument, any philosophical deﬁnition of art which refers to such a context,
mine included, is dependant on the sociological data, i.e. it is impossible to tell whether a
given object is art or not within a given cultural context without empirical data about that
context. But while such a limitation may seem very serious from a purely philosophical
point of view, from a wider perspective it ensures that the deﬁnition is much more accurate,
while retaining a great deal of explanatory power.
What is more, these limitations only arise when my deﬁnition is applied to contexts
diﬀerent than that of modern Western culture. The great majority of other deﬁnitions of
art claim nothing more but to explain what art is here and now, simply accepting that were
they to be applied to other contexts, they might prove less successful. Were my view to
be similarly bound to contemporary understanding of `art' only, the empirical limitations
would cease to exist entirely  all that would be needed is a tacit assumption that we are
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culturally competent members of the modern Western culture and judge objects within the
framework of beliefs commonly held within our culture. This seems to be a fairly common
assumption and by sharing it my deﬁnition would be no worse oﬀ than most. However,
while other deﬁnitions are limited to our modern context only, mine has the potential of
providing explanations of what is or could be art in diﬀerent contexts as well. The only
diﬀerence between them is that while we assume that we are culturally competent within
our own cultural setting by default, to gain cultural competence within other cultures we
need to ask the social scientists for data. Seen in this way, my deﬁnition is not a limited
version of IT, but a potentially inﬁnitely expandable one.
Finally, it is worth adding that the relativism I propose is not a subject to the criticism
presented by Paul Crowther in his `Deﬁning Art, Defending the Canon, Contesting Cul-
ture'. Even assuming that his claims concerning the racism of the relativistic treatment of
the concepts `art' and `aesthetic' is correct and the way they are employed indeed imposes
the Western consumer-centred way of thinking, and even assuming that the notion of `ra-
cism' is applicable to aesthetics in the way the author proposes15  the cultural theory
would not be a subject to his criticism. It is hardly necessary for it to assume that all art
should be treated from a consumer-centred perspective  on the contrary, one can easily
accept that in diﬀerent contexts objects have their status conferred by diﬀerent kinds of
competent people, and that diﬀerent contexts attach diﬀerent importance to the making,
presenting and consumption of art.
Moreover, Crowther's argument to the conclusion that there must be something spe-
cial about art which distinguishes it from other human activity, which could subvert the
cultural theory, is insubstantial. His claim that the representative nature of art allows for
`extraordinary bonding  or "at homeness" with the sensible world [, and these] intrinsic-
ally valuable experiences facilitate the belief that representation is the kind of privileged
15Incidentally, it seems odd that the author criticises the racism of relativists, while continuously writing
about the characteristics of `non-Western art', treating it as if it were a uniﬁed undistinguished phenomenon
(e.g. `The example of non-western art shows the centrality of making' (Crowther 2004: 372)).
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activity which can realize metaphysical and religious eﬀects' (Crowther 2004: 369) seems
purely ad hoc. Save for the fact that such a view would not explain the privileged status of
non-representational art, it seems that one can only hold it when completely disregarding
anthropological and psychological theories on the evolutionary usefulness of representa-
tions, their worth as symbols, etc. A cultural theorist can simply not accept that there is
anything metaphysically special about art which would distinguish it from other forms of
cultural activity, and Crowther's paper can hardly force her to.
2.2.6 Wollheim's dilemma and the cluster theory
Probably the most serious challenge presented against the institutional theory is the di-
lemma posed by Wollheim  either the members of the artworld have reasons to confer the
status on a given object, or not. If they do, a valid theory should mention those reasons,
and it seems that if this is done, reference to the institution is superﬂuous; if they do not,
then we have no reason to take their decisions seriously. Either way, any institutional the-
ory must be useless, because it is either redundant or completely uninformative (Wollheim
1980: 157-166, 1987: 13-16).
As I mentioned in section 1.1.2, answering this objection is one of the main motivations
for the cultural theory I develop. I argue that while the members of the institution do have
reasons for status conferral (and these reasons should be mentioned by the theory), this does
not render the references to the institution redundant, because the reasons themselves are
artworld-relative, and providing reasons does not remove the need for the act of conferral.
Thus it is quite possible to sit on both horns of Wollheim's dilemma and yet defend an
informative and useful theory.
Let me start with addressing the ﬁrst horn of the dilemma. Not only do I agree with
Wollheim that the members of the artworld do have reasons to confer the status  I also
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think that these reasons have been quite well explored. In fact, also the way in which
they are applied has been discussed in some detail. I refer here to Berys Gaut's cluster
account, which argues that objects are art in virtue of satisfying a number of disjunctively
suﬃcient criteria. I propose to treat the cluster account as an auxiliary theory within the
institutional deﬁnition, and reformulate it for this purpose in such a way that what Gaut
calls suﬃcient subsets of criteria for arthood are to be treated as reasons the members of
the artworld take into account when conferring the status of a candidate for appreciation
on a given artifact. This, together with the cultural relativisation, is the most important
modiﬁcation of IT I will make, and one of my main claims.
Recall the cluster theory's claims: the term `art' is ascribed to objects which have a
certain non-arbitrary subset of an expandable set (cluster) of properties commonly ascribed
to art. My idea is to rephrase this as follows: members of the artworld confer the art-status
on objects, taking the possession of selected properties included in the cluster of properties
commonly ascribed to art as reasons justifying such conferral (why this does not make the
account circular will be discussed in section 4.1). Similarly as in Gaut's account, none
of these properties are individually necessary, and sets of properties are jointly suﬃcient
for an object to have the status conferred upon it. To rephrase this, the possession of no
single property from the cluster is a reason always ensuring conferral of the status, but
in general properties `count towards' conferring it. In practice, members of the artworld
confer the status on objects satisfying a subset of properties α because they hold the belief:
`satisfying α is a good reason for arthood conferral.'
The modiﬁed deﬁnition could be formulated as follows:
IT3: x is an art work in context C
def
= (1) x is an artifact (2) a set of the aspects
of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation
by some culturally competent in C person or persons acting on behalf of the
artworld in C, (3) for reasons determined by a cluster of criteria for arthood
respected in C.
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This formulation can now be easily linked with what was discussed above  the list of
criteria for arthood is a part of what I described as the practices and beliefs a given social
group has about art. Just as any other beliefs, those regarding criteria for arthood are
relative to a given culture. The changing context determines changes in the practices and
beliefs, and by the same token, in which criteria are included in the cluster and/or which
subsets of criteria are considered suﬃcient. The exact composition of the cluster in C and
sets of suﬃcient criteria in C, similarly as any other facts about beliefs and practices of
a given social group, are discoverable through empirical research by the social sciences.16
This move naturally requires relativisation to cultural context, however, it adds no further
limitations to those already discussed above. What is more, it is perfectly in line with
what the original anti-essentialists argued for  it acknowledges that there is no one reason
or criterion for arthood, instead there are many, and moreover, they can change over time
or be diﬀerent in various contexts (Kennick 1958: 321, 324, 331-333).
It is the case that the members of the artworld have reasons to confer the status of
a candidate for appreciation, but this does not mean that the institution is superﬂuous
and all we need to know is the cluster of reasons  and for two reasons. Firstly, while
the conferral is based on recognizing that a given artefact satisﬁes a suﬃcient subset of
criteria for arthood (which gives one a reason to confer the status), it is impossible to tell
which subsets of criteria for arthood are suﬃcient without referring back to the artworld
(a similar thought has been expressed by Matravers, 2000). It is not a universal truth that
satisfying subset α constitutes a good reason  instead it is merely one of the beliefs that
make up the artworld. In fact, the only reason why satisfying this rather than that subset
of criteria should constitute a good reason, is because it is believed to be so within the
artworld. The institution, or the cultural context is in this way inescapable, because were
16I am in agreement with Richard Kamber who claimed that the only way to ﬁnd out which properties
are treated as necessary or suﬃcient for arthood, one has to engage in proper empirical research (Kamber
1998: 35). However, I would be looking for respected criteria, or suﬃcient subsets of criteria, rather than
essential properties.
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one to ignore it in the ﬁrst instance and refer to the list of reasons it uses only, one would
soon encounter it again when justifying the composition of the list of reasons itself. In
other words, ignoring the institution may allow one to replace the IT with a list of criteria
for arthood, but to justify why one should accept this list and not any other, one has to
refer back to the institution.
The issue can be approached from the other end. Gaut argued that the main method
of ﬁnding out which subsets of criteria are suﬃcient for arthood, is to `look and see', or
ﬁnd out by inspection (Gaut 2000: 28, 2005: 277). I believe that one should do exactly
that: empirically ﬁnd out which subsets of criteria are treated as suﬃcient for status
conferral. But by such looking and seeing one will not ﬁnd out what those criteria are
in a deep metaphysical and human-independent way  instead one will ﬁnd what people
think those criteria are. In fact, were one to look elsewhere than among modern Western
art lovers, one would likely ﬁnd that other people think that the criteria might be slightly
diﬀerent.17 In institutional terms, members of diﬀerent artworlds can diﬀer in what they
believe are suﬃcient subsets of criteria for arthood, and treat satisfying diﬀerent subsets
of those criteria as reasons for status conferral. Following this, again, since what are
reasons for status conferral is determined by artworld members' beliefs, and what is art is
(partially) determined by the reasons, what is art is (partially) determined by the artworld
members' beliefs, i.e. the artworld.
It might seem at ﬁrst that this is not enough to make a deﬁnition institutional  after all,
all sorts of deﬁnitions look at the artistic practice for conﬁrmation of their claims. However,
while other deﬁnitions tend to explain why the society acts in a certain way (e.g. treats
a given object as an artwork) by referring to something outside the society (e.g. because
there are art-relevant properties or relations between objects and the human mind, etc.),
on my view it is the particular social groups that come ﬁrst, i.e. it is because the given
17I believe that though Gaut agrees with this point, he basically, on one hand, wants to defend the
general disjunctive framework of the cluster rather than the particular criteria, and on the other  is really
only interested in applying the account to modern Western notion of art.
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social group treats certain objects as artworks that certain properties and relations become
art-relevant within this group. Thus the institution has an explanatory primacy and as
such cannot be discarded. Moreover, the historical issues discussed above can only really
be given justice by reference to cultural contexts  my theory can not only explain how it
is that what we view as criteria for arthood change over time (as it is the social context
that determines the changes, a reference to this context cannot be omitted), but can also
account for the fact that changes in what is considered art are clearly related to changes
in wider cultural practice (politics, religion, even availability of resources).18
Secondly, the cultural deﬁnition only entails that having reasons is necessary for arthood
 it only becomes suﬃcient together with the conferral itself (in this sense my view may be
treated as a case of weak institutionalism, (see: Matravers 2000)). For Wollheim conferring
was unnecessary once the reasons for it were salient, but one can resist this conclusion
through preserving a part of the arbitrary nature of Dickie's view (the following is akin to
Dickie's own `knighthood' argument  1998: 131). The institutional theory's appeal lies
largely in the fact that it can occasionally simply cut the deﬁnitional Gordian knot by
stating: `it has turned out that way', or `because the artist said so' (Dickie 2000: 100).
Such arbitrariness does not, naturally, seem particularly attractive to many philosophers,
because it denies them the ability to explain things philosophically, oﬀering brute facts
about the (art)world in place of lists of necessary and suﬃcient conditions. Following
Dickie, however, I prefer to provide an account of art as it is actually understood, practised
and treated, and I am more concerned with the theory ﬁtting the real world, not some ideal
for an elegant theory  thus if in the real world it so happens that certain distinctions are
18For a detailed analysis of how the artworld depends on and interacts with other worlds, see (Becker
2008: 34-39, 68-130).
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made arbitrarily, the theory should recognise that.19 Below I will try to show that allowing
for some arbitrariness is not as problematic as one could think.
There are numerous cases in which the actual practice of art is somewhat under-justiﬁed,
and below I discuss two which seem most obvious.
(1) Folk art that has been appropriated by the artworld. Many folk artworks which ﬁll
galleries have had the status conferred upon them by curators, critics, etc., while being
identical to folk craft works which never left their place of origin and are simply used as
utility objects (Shiner 2001: xv). For example, Susan Arrowood's Sacret Bibel is a quilt
displayed in the American Folk Art Museum (Fig. 2.1). For all we know, the artist did
not intend her work to be art  not only was she not an active or perhaps even competent
member of the artworld, but quilts were not even considered an art form at the end of
the 19th Century. Furthermore, one can reasonably assume that the work was intended to
serve decorative and devotional functions. Needless to say, it is in all relevant respects (i.e.
those which are related to the set of criteria for arthood) identical to multiple religious-
themed quilts, like those made by my grandmother  decorated and used as bed throws.
Naturally, there is a reason why Sacret Bibel can be art  it satisﬁes at least one suﬃcient
subset of criteria, and in conferring the status the curators certainly took this into account.
But my grandmother's quilts seem to satisfy the very same criteria! If the conferral were
of no importance, one would have to say that since both objects satisfy the same subsets
of criteria they should either both be art or both not be art. This is, however, not the
case, and I doubt that anyone should ever seriously call my grandmother's decorated bed
throws art.20 What follows is that while satisfying subsets of criteria respected as suﬃcient
19Noël Carroll in a similar context wrote that `there is an underlying philosophical dream such that,
ideally, all the relevant answers [. . . ] should ﬁt into a tidy theoretical package' (Carroll 2009: 7). Needless
to say, I agree that providing answers which are less tidy but actually true is better than dreaming up
ones which would be nice, but are wrong.
20It might be that Sacret Bibel has multiple contextual properties by which it diﬀers from my grand-
mother's quilts, e.g. being selected by an expert in art, being placed in the context of art history, etc. 
however, it clearly had no such properties before the status conferral, at the time when it was chosen, and
while choosing, one could have just as well given the same properties to any other comparable craft work
(S. Davies 1991: 66ﬀ.).
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Figure 2.1: Susan Arrowood, Sacret Bibel, Possibly West Chester, Pennsylvania,
18751895, cotton, silk, wool, and ink with cotton embroidery. American Folk Art Mu-
seum, New York
is important because it gives one reasons to confer the status, someone still has to do the
conferring.
(2) Dog shows. A great number of human practices are in many respects similar to
art and their products are often quite like artworks  and yet are not artworks. In fact, a
modern performance art piece and a dog show or a military parade (or a Mackintosh's Art
Nouveau chair and a carved Victorian chair) can satisfy the very same subsets of criteria
for arthood. Were one to consider the reasons or criteria only, both should be either art or
not art. The only reason why this is not the case is because the status has been conferred
only on the former, not the latter. Indeed, there seems to be little good explanation for
why objects such as classic cars, lingerie, military parades, etc. should not be art, other
than Dickie's `it has turned out that way'. However, if this is accepted, it seems inevitable
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to acknowledge that again, there not only have to be reasons to confer status on an object,
but also someone has to actually do the conferral.21
But here comes the second horn of Wollheim's dilemma  if the artworld's decisions are
arbitrary, is the theory uninformative again? Why, for example, should we trust Duchamp
and agree that Bottle Rack is indeed art, but its twin bottle rack is not?
The answer is: artworld's decisions are not arbitrary enough to make the theory un-
informative. While on one hand one does have to sometimes agree that x may not be
an artwork even though it does satisfy a subset of criteria respected as suﬃcient, simply
because no one has conferred the status upon it, introducing the talk about reasons for
conferral allows one to (1) explain why certain objects are artworks and others are not
(i.e. because only the former satisfy a subset of properties respected as good reasons for
arthood conferral, and got the status conferred upon them); (2) say that were one to confer
status on an object which does not satisfy any subset of criteria respected as suﬃcient (i.e.
there are no good reason to confer the status), the object is not an artwork (or at least
not an artwork within the given artworld) and one was mistaken in conferring the status
or treating the object as art; (3) predict which objects could become artworks were one
to confer the status upon them (i.e. those which satisfy a subset respected as suﬃcient).
This seems to be most if not all that one would expect of a classiﬁcatory theory. In fact, if
anything, I believe that my reformulation makes the institutional theory more informative
than it was in the ﬁrst place, providing it with a way of accounting for mistaken status
attribution, thus giving it the edge it lacked.
Moreover, such modiﬁcation allows one to explain why the original institutional deﬁn-
ition seemed so unattractive to some, including Wollheim. It indeed seems odd that we
should ever need an artworld member to tell us that Mona Lisa is art  surely we can
just see for ourselves. The explanation is simple. At least one of the things which makes
21The arbitrary decisions to exclude some works made by the artworld members in both those examples
will be discussed and supported in section 2.3.
2.2 Developing the Cultural Deﬁnition 133
some artworks so paradigmatic is that they satisfy virtually all criteria accepted within the
artworld. This, in turn, means that they satisfy multiple subsets of criteria respected as
suﬃcient, i.e. there are dozens of good reasons to confer the status onto them. Unsurpris-
ingly, it takes no art-scholar to notice that  it seems blindingly obvious that Mona Lisa
should be art to even marginally competent artworld members. However, this does not
mean that conferral is obsolete, merely that no great competence is required to perform it,
and that were Leonardo to die before he managed to present the painting to anyone, pretty
much any artworld member who found it could have done it. The same is not true of less
obvious and borderline cases, and perhaps it is in here that the workings of the institution
are more apparent.
Finally, a full answer to my second question can be given: how is it that we came about
the concept of art that we have? In fact, we never changed it. It seems that all art at
all times could be deﬁned in exactly the same way  by the cultural deﬁnition (while this
statement may seem rather bold, I will defend it in section 4.5). The continuous changes
in the extension of the concept can be explained by the changing set of reasons for arthood
conferral. I claim that all the confusion in deﬁning art, as well as the changing shape of
art, styles and genres, follows from the culturally determined changes in the composition
of the cluster, relative weighting of the respected criteria in it, and changes in which
subsets of criteria were considered suﬃcient for arthood. Simply put: at diﬀerent times
and in diﬀerent contexts people thought diﬀerent reasons were good for arthood conferral,
and acted accordingly. Thus there never was a development from naive aestheticism to
expression theory to signiﬁcant form to functionalism, etc.  instead ﬁrst people considered
an artifact's beauty as the main reason for arthood conferral (or beauty was weighted very
heavily and was included in virtually all suﬃcient subsets of respected criteria), then,
following a cultural change, its importance diminished in favour of expression of emotion,
signiﬁcant form, widely understood aesthetic function, etc. But through all the changes
in what reasons for arthood conferral people thought good at a given time, the structure
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of the cluster remained the same, and so did the concept `art' as deﬁned by the cultural
theory.
2.2.7 Tidying up
Once all the elements of the deﬁnition are in place, it seems that some of them double in
explaining the same thing, and can be removed for the sake of simplicity.
The notion of `artworld in C' now seems to be obsolete. An artworld is a system of
beliefs and related social practices concerning art, present in a given social group. To be
a member of an artworld one has to have implicit or explicit knowledge of those beliefs
and participate in the practices  but this is just a part of what it is to be a culturally
competent member of a given social group. Thus the artworld seems to be similar to the
notion of authority: while they are both implicitly present in the deﬁnition, they can be
both substituted with more appropriate expressions.
Yet it seems that both `authority' and `artworld' are notions more speciﬁc than the
general cultural competence, and thus substituting them may lead to a signiﬁcant loss
of precision. This is not the case  with the addition of the last part of my deﬁnition,
the reasons for arthood conferral, both notions can be rather well speciﬁed: the authority
required is derived from being competent enough to recognise or employ the respected
reasons for arthood conferral in C and confer the art-status accordingly; similarly the
artworld describes those beliefs and practices which centre around the respected reasons
for arthood conferral in C.
In fact, my theory could be used to deﬁne the artworld in a more precise way. An
artworld is a system of beliefs and practices present in a given context which are related
to art, and a member of the artworld is a person competent in those beliefs and practices.
The cultural deﬁnition preserves the notion of competence and only further speciﬁes which
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beliefs and practices are relevant in conferring art status  those which concern criteria for
arthood respected in C. Using my terms, `artworld' could be re-deﬁned as follows:
Artworld in C
def
= a system of beliefs and related practices present in C, centred
around the reasons for arthood conferral respected in C and artifacts which
satisfy them.
For example, if in C satisfying the following set of criteria: (`having positive aesthetic
properties', `being expressive of emotion', `being set in a traditional art medium') is re-
spected as a reason for arthood conferral, then the artworld in C is likely to include such
beliefs as: `one should pay attention to the aesthetic properties of works', `artists have a
special insight into human emotions', and practices such as: praising the work's beauty
rather than price, hanging paintings on walls rather than ceilings, etc. Because all this is
included in the cultural competence, and thus already a part of the cultural deﬁnition, the
notion of the artworld becomes redundant, and from here on I will use the terms `artworld'
and `institution' mainly for convenience.22
Those who are authorised to confer art-status, on the other hand, could be re-deﬁned
as follows:
S is authorised to confer art-status in C iff S is culturally competent in C,
has suﬃcient knowledge of reasons for arthood conferral respected in C and
suﬃcient proﬁciency in acting according to those reasons.
On the above example, S would have the authority to confer status if she knew which
sets of criteria constitute reasons for conferral in C and knew that to confer the status one
needs to, e.g., display a painting and draw the public attention to its artistic properties,
22Note that this move has two additional advantages: it allows me to remove the phrase `acting on
behalf of' which may still seem too formal to some, and it partially resolves or at least delays the problem
of circularity (e.g. art being deﬁned in terms of a social practice-belief system concerning art)  I will
address this issue separately at length in section 4.1.
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rather than spread some mango chutney on it and call the neighbours for lunch. Import-
antly, in most cases in order to confer the status one does not need to be capable of creating
works which satisfy suﬃcient subsets of criteria oneself (though certainly to confer status
on one's own work, one does). Certainly also, the knowledge and competence required to
gain authority is in some cases greater, and perhaps correlated with the complexity of the
reasons for arthood conferral in C  e.g. it is harder to gain authority in the symbolic art
of the 16th Century or the Avantgarde, than it is in pop art.
Another thing which becomes obsolete is singling out the art-relevant aspects of a work.
While Dickie needed to specify that appreciation should be directed at only particular
elements of the work, e.g. the front of the painting rather than the chemical structure of
the canvas, once it is said that the status is conferred because x satisﬁes some reasons for
arthood, it is clear to any competent member of C that it should be appreciated for the
aspects which correspond to those reasons. In the above example, the status of the object of
appreciation is conferred on the parts of the work which have positive aesthetic properties,
express emotion, and were traditionally seen as important in this particular medium  and
since it is the front of the painting and the shape of the sculpture, etc. which satisfy those
criteria, not their chemical structures, it is clear that appreciation should be directed at
those aspects.
Finally, there is one element of the deﬁnition which seemed obsolete even in the original
institutional theory. Since Dickie thought that an object can become an artifact simply
through being selected by an artist (Dickie 1997: 45)  i.e. having had the status conferred
on it  and taken that for an institutionalist anyone can be an artist, it seems redundant
to mention the artifactuality requirement in the deﬁnition which already requires conferral
of the status. Simply in the moment in which one confers the status on any object, this
object becomes an artifact (object-used-as-an-artistic-medium). This is not to say that
artworks are not required to be artifacts  but since an object's artifactuality is ensured
by status conferral, there is no need to separately mention it in the deﬁnition.
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With all this, I am ready to present the ﬁnal shape of the cultural deﬁnition:
CD: x is an art work in context C
def
= x has had conferred upon it the status
of candidate for appreciation by some person(s) culturally competent in C, for
reasons determined by a cluster of criteria for arthood respected in C.
2.3 Arbitrariness
One more issue, which I ﬁnd extremely important, has to be mentioned before my theory
is fully explained. The institutional theory allows that members of the artworld can confer
or fail to confer the status of a candidate for appreciation arbitrarily (see section 1.1.1).
Now that the cultural theory enables one to identify reasons for conferral, it seems that
one should resign from the arbitrariness and simply state that conferring the status on an
object only makes it an artwork if it is done for good reasons, i.e. reasons respected as
suﬃcient in C. If, on the other hand, someone was calling x an artwork without having
such reasons, or for bad reasons,23 e.g. because he wanted to play a joke on the critics or
she was bribed to display x in a gallery, discovering those reasons could serve as a good
indicator that x is not an artwork after all, and people were mistaken in treating it as one.
All this is essentially right, but the picture is somewhat more complicated than that.
Let me analyse it in detail.
First, one has to distinguish two kinds of arbitrariness. On one hand, one can arbitrarily
confer art-status on an object which does not fulﬁl any subset of criteria respected as
suﬃcient in C (i.e. confer the status even though there are no good reasons to do so). On
the other, one can arbitrarily not confer the status on an object although it does fulﬁl at
least one such subset.
23Note that what I call a `bad reason' might not be that bad at all in some cases. We might think
that conferring the status on a work partially because it has the property `questioning common social
convictions' (i.e. this property is a non-disposable element of the suﬃcient subset of criteria satisﬁed by
the work) is quite good  nevertheless it would not have been in contexts such as 14th Century Europe.
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While the former kind is somewhat problematic, the latter is perfectly consistent with
the cultural theory, and I take it to be its very important part. The fact that x fulﬁls
at least one subset of criteria respected as suﬃcient in C is necessary, but not suﬃcient
for x being art. It is merely a reason for conferring the art-status and becomes suﬃcient
only when coupled with conferral itself. Thus it is perfectly possible that some objects
should be left out simply because no one ever noticed that there are reasons to call them
art, or perhaps even though people did notice, they consciously decide not to confer the
status for completely diﬀerent, art-irrelevant reasons. Arguably, some works which could
easily count as art, never had the status conferred upon them for prudential reasons (e.g.
fancy lingerie, artful pornographic movies), because they are strongly associated with other
cultural practices (e.g. military parades, computer games), or just because they seem to
mundane or vulgar to be art (e.g. dog shows). Neither of those are defeating criteria
for arthood, nor are they somehow essentially incompatible with all suﬃcient subsets of
criteria  they simply obscure the judgement of those who could confer the status on a
work, causing them to arbitrarily exclude it from the domain of art. Occasionally, one such
type of objects can be lifted to the Parnassus by an adventurous artist who questions its
traditional neglect, in this way conﬁrming the arbitrariness of the former exclusion  this
seems to be what Art Nouveau artists did with furniture and interior design.24
In the end, I argue that this type of arbitrariness is simply a feature of our world and a
theory of art need not deny it if it can explain it. The explanation provided by the cultural
theory is much more informative than Dickie's  one can now say why `it has turned out
that way' that dog shows are not art, by tracing good and bad reasons which must have
inﬂuenced the fact that no one ever conferred the art-status onto them. In this way, my
theory remains informative, even though it allows for some degree of arbitrariness.
24The case of pornography and art has been recently discussed in this context, the arguments often
being that the properties which have been taken to be incompatible with arthood, are not really such, and
we are merely refraining from classifying some objects as art for prudential reasons, (Fokt 2012; Kieran
2001; Maes 2011, 2009).
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It is the ﬁrst kind of arbitrariness which seems more problematic. It seems that there
are many cases in which certain objects were called art, and were even appreciated as art
by many people, even though it seems that there were no good reasons to treat them as
such. Moreover, one can identify the bad reasons which caused people to treat something
as art: bribing a gallery owner to display a given object, an upcoming critic wanting to
make a name for himself by `discovering' a simple craftsman as a folk artist, deciding to
confer the status for political gain, etc. How should a cultural theorist treat such cases?
Let me analyse the problem in detail. In terms of the above discussion, art status is
conferred on an object x for good reasons in C if that x satisﬁes at least one of the subsets
α1, . . . , αn of the set of all criteria for arthood α, respected as suﬃcient by culturally
competent persons in C. The status would be conferred on x for bad reasons in C if x
satisﬁes a subset of criteria β such that β /∈ α1, . . . , αn, and an arbitrary property P such
that P /∈ α (it is not even considered as art-relevant in C). This can be expressed by a
counterfactual which may sound quite familiar: if x did not have the property P , it would
not have become an artwork in C merely in virtue of satisfying β  `if the author's uncle
didn't write the review, this would never make it to a gallery', `if this village craftwork
wasn't made during the October Revolution, it would never be singled out as folk art', etc.
The simple answer a cultural theorist can give here is: since the conferral of the status
is not suﬃcient by itself (i.e. good reasons to confer it are necessary), an object which was
called art for bad reasons is not art after all, at least not in C and any other context in
which none of the subsets of criteria it satisﬁes is respected as suﬃcient for arthood con-
ferral. However, this is somewhat complicated by the possibility of changing contexts, and
often what seems like cases of arbitrary conferral might in fact be something else. Below I
will consider a few examples of what seem to be cases of arbitrary conferral to clarify my
position.
140 Cultural deﬁnition of art
Figure 2.2: Fragment of the Papyrus of Ani spelling out the mystical spell 17, which was
believed to help the Egyptian deceased in their afterlife, c. 1250 BC, British Museum,
London
1. A great deal of objects seem to have gained the status simply because they are old.
For example, it seems unlikely (or at least uncommon) that any modern commem-
orative letters, celebratory prayers or funerary texts should be art, yet it is perfectly
normal to treat texts of this kind as art if they have been written by Ancient Egyp-
tians or Greeks (see: Pettersson 2001: 87-88)  the celebrated Egyptian Book of the
dead for one, is essentially an illustrated funerary manual and a list of pieces of advice
for the afterlife (Fig. 2.2). Thus it seems that at least in some cases the main reason
why something is treated as art is because it has the property `is old'  which can
hardly be seriously treated as criterial.
A cultural theorist can easily resolve this issue. Firstly, one should ask historians and
anthropologists which subsets of criteria for arthood were respected as suﬃcient in
x's ancient context, and check whether x satisﬁes them. Secondly, one should check
whether x satisﬁes any subsets of criteria applied by us to ancient art. If the answer
to both questions is positive, x could have been art in antiquity and could be art now
(and if someone conferred the status, it was, or is). If only the ﬁrst answer is positive,
x could have been art, but now is a mere artefact, and as such belongs to a museum,
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not an art gallery. If only the second, x is like the African masks presented by Picasso
 it can only become art mid-life. Finally, if the answer to both is negative, x is not
and was not art.
2. In a number of cases some of an established artist's work was left intentionally un-
published during his lifetime and got published posthumously because it oﬀered some
rewards to the family or publisher. In at least some cases the works published were of
mediocre quality, were speciﬁcally left out by the artist (perhaps because they were
thought of as exercises or were created at a very young age) and even the person
publishing them recognised that they did not satisfy the socially respected standards
for arthood  yet decided to publish them and thereby confer the art-status neverthe-
less. Examples include such famous ﬁgures as Baudelaire whose mother published his
poems after he died to pay oﬀ his debts, Leonardo, who never intended his drawings
and sketches as artworks, or Rubens, who produced a number of painting models for
his disciples to execute in big format, intended to be discarded after use, but now
treated as artworks in their own right. In all those cases one can deﬁnitely say: if
the publisher didn't want to make some money or get famous, those would never be
presented for appreciation as there would be no good reasons to treat them as art in
C.
There are three possible solutions to this issue. Firstly, the artist as well as the
publishers might have actually wrongly recognised the properties of the work or mis-
interpreted the criteria for arthood in their context, or both, and the work does
actually satisfy at least one of α1, . . . , αn. In practice, they may simply have thought
either that the work was worse than it actually was, or that the requirements for
arthood were steeper than they were. In this case after the status is conferred by
the publisher, the work becomes an artwork  though possibly a rather poor one.
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Secondly, the artist might have rightly recognised that there were no reasons to call
his work art (none of α1, . . . , αn was satisﬁed by it in C0), but in time, perhaps even
as a result of his own creations, the criteria have changed and when the publisher
calls it art in C1, the work does satisfy at least one of α1, . . . , αn. In this case the
work was not art at the time when it was created, but became art in the new context.
Arguably this is what happened to such works as Leonardo's sketches. Finally, it is
possible that the work did not satisfy any suﬃcient subset in neither the context of
creation nor conferral, and in this case it is simply not art (at least until the context
changes appropriately).
3. More examples can be given from the ﬁeld of politically engaged art. The communist
regime of USSR has been involved in recovering folk artists and artworks  often
objects which were hardly close to satisfying any suﬃcient set of criteria for arthood
ascription (Fig. 2.3). These objects had subsequently art status conferred upon
them for bad reasons  usually because they somewhat resembled art and had the
property `created by a member of the proletariat' or `expressing love for Stalin', etc.
An extraordinary number of communist poems were acknowledged as art even though
it is more than likely that apart from praising the regime they satisﬁed subsets of
criteria as insuﬃcient as those satisﬁed by pretentious love poems or commercial
slogans. An additional proof for the arbitrary arthood of those works is evident from
how they were treated after the collapse of the regime  largely despised or forgotten,
even though for a number of years they were treated with utmost seriousness.
A cultural theorist can easily account for that phenomenon. It is possible that in
some speciﬁc cultural contexts certain seemingly arbitrary properties become criteria
for arthood  there are cultural `bubbles' in which `expressing the will of the prolet-
ariat', or `being understandable for all members of the working class' are regarded as
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Figure 2.3: Embroidered carpet with portraits of Marx, Engels and Lenin
very important. However, once such properties are included in the cluster of criteria
for arthood and become parts of subsets respected as suﬃcient, they are no longer
arbitrary  instead they simply make for a very speciﬁc cultural context. Thus while
in any other context outside USSR some of Soviet works are not art, they are art
within the regime. Unsurprisingly, once the regime has fallen and the cultural con-
text has changed, they lost the status.
4. A great amount of popular art and music seems to be similar. It is at least doubtful
whether pop stars would have been called `artists' if they were not promoted and
advertised and if their managers did not hope to earn a great deal of money on
their careers. In fact, their music might not satisfy any suﬃcient subsets at all;
moreover, more often than not pop artists do not actually create the music ascribed
to them (i.e. they perform the work of other people), and in many concerts they
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do not even perform it  instead they pretend to be singing while what is heard
is a tape recording. In this case it seems that they are called artists even though
they have done hardly anything to produce an artwork that is ascribed to them.
More importantly, in case of performances while we think that we are dealing with
a performance of a musical work, we are in fact dealing with some sort of mime-
performace. If this is the case, then at least some pop stars are artists even though
there are absolutely no good reasons to call them that  instead there is a host of bad
reasons, e.g. they look good, they are willing to become celebrities, they happen to
embody a certain popular personality model, etc. Neither are there good reasons to
call their performances of their songs artworks  not only do they hardly satisfy any
criteria for arthood we are willing to explicitly accept, but also at least sometimes
(in playback cases) they are not really performances at all, or at least not musical
performances. Instead, they are treated as artworks for bad reasons, partially basing
on the deception of the public.
5. Another example can be provided by paintings and drawings created by modern
celebrities  actors, pop musicians, otherwise famous people (Fig. 2.4). Although
in some cases there might indeed be good reasons to confer the art-status on those
objects, there are a number of works (e.g. paintings by Johnny Deep or Sylvester
Stallone) which are exhibited as artworks in galleries, reproduced and displayed in
books, on the internet, etc., while they hardly merit higher than an average exer-
cise sketch of an art student. In such cases it seems that although a work satisﬁes
subsets of criteria which are as insuﬃcient as those satisﬁed by a poor art student's
sketchbook, it becomes an artwork in virtue of having the property `produced by a
celebrity'.
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Figure 2.4: Johnny Depp, Vanessa Paradis, 2007
The solution here is parallel to the above. While the context of USSR was separated
geographically and had clear time boundaries, a cultural theorist need not limit him-
self to such clear-cut cases. Thus pop songs and the like are in fact art, but only in
speciﬁc contexts, namely contexts of popular culture in which the requirements for
arthood are extremely relaxed (i.e. there are many more sets of criteria which are
considered suﬃcient). What is more, it is perfectly possible that in such contexts
properties such as `created by a celebrity' might be treated as criteria. At the same
time, in the context of high culture, such works do not merit arthood and are not
art. Such contexts need not be geographically or temporally disjoint  they can be
parallel. It is now merely a matter of choosing which context one is interested in and
judging the chosen works accordingly.
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Some of those solutions seem to imply a sort of relativism  if the arthood of objects
can vary depending on the context, what is there to stop us from having to consider every
artwork in an inﬁnite number of ever weirder contexts and conclude that everything is art in
some context? Fortunately, this problem can be avoided. As I will show in section 4.4, we
should classify works not just in any, but in those contexts which for one reason or another
matter to us. Selecting the contexts which matter is also not arbitrary  all a philosopher
needs to do in this case is to ﬁnd out how anthropologists distinguish particular contexts
and what historians have to say about a given work that could determine for which context
it was intended, or in which context it was seen as appropriate, etc. With such data it
seems easy to say that Vanessa Paradis should be considered in the context of modern
pop culture, rather than by the criteria of the Italian Renaissance (which would not be
appropriate given the contextual data) or within the context of Johnny Depp, his pool
cleaner and all the actors in Kurosawa's Seven Samurai (which would hardly matter to
us). Moreover, it seems that even if a cultural theorist were choosing contexts arbitrarily,
she would be no more arbitrary than others  surely the deﬁnitions which are limited to
explaining the concept of art in the modern Western world arbitrarily choose the modern
Western context, likely selecting it precisely because they think that this context matters
most to us. All a cultural theorist does is make a similar choice a few more times, using
the very same criteria for what is important.
The cultural theory is far from being vague or allowing too much arbitrariness. In fact,
one can fairly easily distinguish the cases in which art-status has been conferred for what
we agree are good reasons, for reasons which were good only within a limited context, or
simply for bad reasons. Similarly, it can answer in which contexts people would be right
to call something art, and in which contexts they would be mistaken. Thus the answers
provided by the cultural theory may be relative, but deﬁnitely not arbitrary.
An additional advantage of such treatment is that it can shed light on certain issues
in history of art. Some of the greatest artists have created works which were so visionary,
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that they remained misunderstood for years before they found appreciation. Beethoven's
late string quartets, Michelangelo's late sculptures were so original and diﬀerent from other
works at their time, that most if not all of their contemporaries thought that they were
not art. A cultural theorist may now provide an account on this phenomenon. Beethoven's
opus 133 is a work which satisﬁes a set of properties β such that in the context of 1826
Vienna (C0) β /∈ α1, . . . , αn. At the same time, when his quartet is judged by the standards
of the Great Avantgarde's context (C1), it is clearly a magniﬁcent artwork (i.e. in C1
β ∈ α1, . . . , αn). This is exactly a part of Beethoven's genius  he was able to outrun
everyone in his time and foresee the development of music and wider culture to the point
in which he can be said to have created works which met the standards of C1 while still
living in C0. (Moreover, and considering who is being spoken about this might be quite
appropriate, a cultural theorist could stretch things and say that Beethoven in a way
established a new cultural context, with which the rest of the world only caught up a
hundred years later.)
A similar story could be told about quite a few important breakthroughs in art history:
they can be analysed as cases of an artist creating something which satisﬁes a future
suﬃcient subset of criteria. It can be also added that in some such cases such artists
actively work towards changing their cultural context in accordance with their vision. For
example, it could be said that at the time when Duchamp presented his Fountain (in
C0), there were no good reasons to confer the art-status onto it. And indeed, Duchamp
actually meant his work to be a joke, not art. However, as a result of his act, the context
changed slightly, and soon ready-mades gained some recognition in the artworld  either by
becoming a recognised genre (and thus satisfying the criterion `belonging to an established
artistic form'), or following a relaxation of some other criteria. What this illustrates is that
historically some works turn out to be inﬂuential enough to change the way people think
about art  after their creation the criteria they fulﬁl start to be respected as suﬃcient,
and subsequently they are judged by those criteria.
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2.4 Characteristics and appeal of the cultural deﬁnition
The cultural deﬁnition is not a particularly good one in the sense of being what philo-
sophers usually expect of a deﬁnition. It does not meet Carroll's objection to IT  it is a
contextual deﬁnition, perhaps even more contextual than Dickie's. It is also quite weak,
because instead of deﬁning `art' in a deﬁnite way it relativises the extension of the term
to social practices and convictions regarding criteria relevant for arthood, which are quite
contingent. What is more, these practices are something philosophy can say little about,
however they may be perfectly describable for a social scientist. Additionally, it is not
only the fact that a given object satisﬁes a given set of properties which is respected as
suﬃcient for arthood within a given culture that makes artworks  what is required is an
act of status conferral which can sometimes not happen for arbitrary reasons. I fully realise
the weaknesses of this deﬁnition, however, and this is perhaps the central point of my view,
I hold that this deﬁnition is the best we can get if we are to remain faithful to the actual
artistic practices and artworks.
At the same time I hold that this deﬁnition is a very good one if considered without the
prejudices of analytic philosophy. Speciﬁcally, one needs to lift the requirement for every
deﬁnition to provide answers that are universal and necessary, agree that some things can
and should be context-relative, and mainly, accept that relegating some of the deﬁnitional
burden to empirical social sciences is not a stab in the very heart of Philosophy, but a
rational and scientiﬁc move which tries to use the best tools to do the job. I believe that
neither of those concessions are particularly hard and at least in the case of philosophy of
art, all of them are most appropriate.
Before I proceed to showing how the cultural deﬁnition preserves the advantages and
solves the problems of other theories, I would like to make salient its intuitive appeal.
There are several common ways of thinking about art which it explains, perhaps better
than any of its competitors.
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Art has to do with human practices and beliefs
Art is something people do, and something that is done in a way that reﬂects what people
think, believe in, like, value, admire, etc. There is an obvious connection between the
dominant styles and types of art created, and the changing human beliefs and practices
 religious societies are dominated by spiritual art, art in the time of revolutions is bold
and realist, art of the Enlightment is regular and structured. It is also natural to try and
explain why the history of Chinese art is diﬀerent from the history of European art by
referring to the social settings in which they developed. It might be unclear what type of
connection there is between artworks and the societies that produced them, but it seems
natural to think that there is some connection.
The cultural theory can easily account for such intuitions  after all practices and beliefs
of a given social group is the very centre of my deﬁnition. Dickie's institutional theory
could perhaps refer the reader to the same social context, but my view is better in pointing
out the connections the artistic practice (the artworld) has with other cultural practices
and belief systems which clearly inﬂuence it. Further, the cultural deﬁnition speciﬁes what
are the particular human beliefs and related practices which are connected to art  the
ones expressed as commonly respected reasons for arthood conferral.
What counts as art changes over time
Especially in the post-avantgarde time it seems strikingly obvious that what passes as art
now would have never been accepted as art in the past. It is quite natural to think that
`4'33' would not be an artwork if it were composed by Beethoven rather than Cage, nor
would `Black Square' if it were painted by Botticelli not Malevich.
Most deﬁnitions of art are surprisingly unconcerned about this. Trying to deﬁne what
art is now, they think it absolutely irrelevant that art might have been something diﬀerent
once. In my opinion the fact that what is art changes over time tells one something about
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the nature of the thing one is trying to deﬁne, and turning a blind eye to this fact is rather
odd. Naturally, there are possible interpretations of this fact stemming from each of the
discussed theories  Dickie might simply claim that in a diﬀerent artworld diﬀerent things
are art; Levinson could argue that in the past artists intentionally creating objects to be
regarded as past art was correctly regarded, had a diﬀerent reference for `past art', so no
wonder their art was diﬀerent too. Functionalists and cluster theorists would seem to have
a harder time explaining the changing nature of art, but most importantly, neither of the
theories truly explains why what is art changes, or what is it that causes the changes.
To this, the cultural deﬁnition has a simple answer. In time (and wider  in cultural
contexts) societies change their views on many things, including their beliefs and practices
related to art, and among other things, they change their views on what are the good
reasons for conferring arthood on objects. In other words, the requirements for having the
status of art conferred upon an object change over time (and context), because the people
who do the conferring change their views on what are good reasons to do the conferring.
Not only can my theory fully embrace the intuitive historicity of art, but it can also
explain it by pointing out the mechanisms which cause the change of commonly respected
views on art. As I was trying to show in section 2.2.5, there are simple ways of explaining
the changing nature of art by appealing to the inﬂuences artistic practice has on beliefs
about art and vice versa, as well as to the inﬂuences other cultural practices and belief
systems have on them.
A lot of what passes as art shouldn't really be art
It is not an uncommon to respond to modern art by rolling one's eyes over sighing `I can't
believe what passes as art these days. . . ' A great amount of people feel that although
certain objects make it to the gallery and are treated as art by the critics, they somehow
do not deserve to be art, or are called `art' unjustiﬁably. This is exactly why readymades,
found art, minimalist paintings, junk sculptures, etc. are so controversial  because people
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disagree whether they are art or not. On the other hand, one can ﬁnd critics looking with
disregard at pop artists and amateur painters thinking the same  this should not be art.25
The cultural theory shows that in some cases such judgements are mistaken or vacuous.
One can for example claim that abstract paintings are not art because one is not aware that
being representational is not required of paintings anymore after the Great Avantgarde.
If one tries to say that an abstract painting is not art in Cpost−Avantgarde, one is mistaken
and has insuﬃcient cultural competence to adequately judge the arthood of objects in this
context.
However, the main advantage of the cultural theory lies in being able to explain how
people are mistaken. In particular, one can express the judgement `this should not be
art' while actually meaning: `this would not be art if judged by reasons respected in C1'.
Most likely this is the best explanation for most of our everyday quarrels about art  the
disagreement over Fountain being art or not may be analysed away, because the sides
simply talk about diﬀerent things. On one hand, some say that Fountain is an artwork
and actually mean that it is an artwork because it satisﬁes a set of properties respected
as suﬃcient for arthood conferral in Cpost−Avantgarde, while on the other some say that
Fountain is not an artwork and actually mean that it is not because it does not satisfy
any set of properties respected as suﬃcient in Cpre−Avantgarde. Naturally, there is no logical
contradiction between the two at all.26 In this way it is easy to explain why a great amount
of people has reservations when it comes to accepting the art-status of some of the modern
art  it is simply because they try to judge the arthood of the piece relative to a past
context (most likely relative to the context of the art of Classicism and Romanticism,
because that is what most people are most familiar with).27
25This intuition is captured rather well by the functionalists, see section 1.3.1.
26This does not preclude the possibility of a meaningful discussion on whether Duchamp's piece should
be an artwork  but such a discussion would ﬁrst have to agree on the context in which it is to be judged.
It is still perfectly possible to quarrel whether the work actually does satisfy a set of properties respected
as suﬃcient in the modern times, or whether a certain subset should be suﬃcient.
27A sensible objection to raise at this point would be: surely a theory which allows one to pick any
context one pleases, even the context of my next door neighbour and his two mates, cannot be of much
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People can be mistaken about what is art
Dickie claimed that one cannot err in conferring the art status, rather merely err by confer-
ring it. The cultural theory, however, provides one with tools powerful enough to provide
some conditions in which one can be mistaken after all. Thus on one hand, I want to hold,
after Dickie, that one cannot be mistaken in not conferring the status  it is no one's mis-
take that dog shows and fancy lingerie are not art, it just `turned out that way'. However,
one can still err in calling something `art' which does not deserve the name.
Firstly, one can try to confer art status in C while being culturally incompetent in
C. If one has utterly no clue about art, and one decides to confer the art status on
some object, one will fail (a fact expressed later by the lack of acceptance and mockery
from the competent members of the artworld). Similarly, if one would try to confer the
status of a married couple without being appropriately competent (e.g. being a priest or a
state oﬃcial), one would fail to confer it. Admittedly, this is more and more diﬃcult in the
modern times  as Danto argued, at the time of the end of art the competence requirements
are so minimal it is quite diﬃcult not to meet them, and thus in practice it might almost
never happen that one will fail to confer the status. Still, I believe that this point has an
important historical value  it seems rather reasonable to say that in Leonardo's times a
number of paintings were created which were not considered art, precisely because their
creators were seen as not competent enough in CItalian Rennaissaince to produce art.
Secondly, one can be mistaken in taking an object which is an artwork for a non-
artwork. As mentioned above, this happens most often when one considers it relative to
cultural context C1, while in fact it was created and should be considered relative to some
C2. This is how people used to Classical and Romantic art can be mistaken in thinking
that post-Avantgarde art is not art.
use  we should have a better deﬁnition of cultural contexts than that to work on. This point will be
discussed at length in section 4.4.
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And most interestingly, one can be mistaken in taking an object which is not art, for
art. If one attempts to confer the status on an object even though there are no good
reasons to do so in a given context, it is not art in this context. It is perfectly possible
that the person will fool quite a few people into believing that it is an artwork, but this
only enlarges the number of people being mistaken about it. However, it is still perfectly
possible that it should gain art status once the context changes in such a way that the
object's criterial properties do form a subset respected as suﬃcient, i.e. there are good
reasons to confer the status on it. Moreover, it is also perfectly possible that the change
of context is inﬂuenced by this very object, and all the mistaken people who believe it is
art  arguably this might have been what happened with Duchamp's readymades.
Painting, dance, literature  all arts are diﬀerent, yet they are all art
With all the diﬀerences between the various arts, it is common to think about art as a
single, diverse yet somehow uniﬁed phenomenon. After all, we use one word to refer to all
kinds of art, the same formal institutions are dealing with their matters (e.g. ministries,
foundations). Even though it is common to introduce explicit divisions for practical matters
(e.g. paintings are exhibited in galleries, not concert halls), the divisions between particular
arts are much weaker than the division between arts and non-art (e.g. it is more likely
that a gallery will invite a classical music concert than a bikers night or a goldﬁsh lovers
convention).
It is hard to explain this intuition on the basis of ontology  rather than oﬀer a uniﬁed
view, modern ontology of art leans towards pluralism which diversiﬁes various arts (e.g.
Wollheim 1980; Levinson 1990). While I do not think that the burden of explanation lies
on a classiﬁcatory theory, I do think that it would be an advantage of a theory if it could at
least be compatible with the unifying intuition, and perhaps even hint at its explanation.
The cultural deﬁnition can do both those things. First, by inheriting the Wittgen-
steinian element of the cluster account, it can explain that the reason why various arts
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are brought under the same concept, is because of their family resemblance. In particular,
various arts resemble one another in the following: it takes people with similar competence
to produce and to appreciate works of various arts; similar practices are involved in the
production, presentation and reception of various artworks; similar beliefs are commonly
held with regards to various arts concerning their value and place in the society; various
arts share a similar history, and some were historically treated as a uniﬁed phenomenon;
etc. Thus while it is obvious that art forms diﬀer from one another, they are seen as similar
enough to be treated as one.
Secondly, by inheriting a part of the arbitrary nature of IT, the cultural theory can
explain why certain phenomena are art and others are not, even though there is little
ontological diﬀerence between them. However, where Dickie could only say that `it has
turned out that way', a cultural theorist can point at particular reasons (often bad reasons)
for such unjustiﬁed divisions: perhaps dog shows are not art because at the time when the
main art forms were developing, dogs were thought to be (for religious, cultural, political
reasons) an inappropriate medium for artistic expression; similarly lingerie might not be
an art form simply because for centuries displaying it was seen as indecent. Tracing the
inﬂuences various social practices and beliefs had on the artistic practice and belief system
is likely to provide justiﬁcations for many similar facts.
What is art is objective vs. what is art is subjective
Common sense seems helpless when it comes to deciding whether what is art is a subjective
or an objective matter. The issue has been under philosophical discussion at least since
Hume (although he spoke about the beautiful rather than art, the common deﬁnition of
art was the aesthetic one), but intuitions about the matter seem to be in serious conﬂict.
On the one hand, one is happy to admit that what is art for one man may not be art for
another, e.g. for you this work by Lucio Fontana may be art, but for me it is just a slashed
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Figure 2.5: Lucio Fontana, Concetto spaziale 'Attesa', 1960, Tate Modern, London
canvas. On the other, it is common to argue over the arthood of controversial objects as
if it were an objective matter after all.
Classiﬁcatory theories generally try to argue for the objectivity of arthood, but oﬀer
little explanation of the subjectivity intuition. Perhaps it is enough to simply say that
such intuitions are uninformed by philosophical thought and ignorant, yet it seems that a
theory could at least try to accommodate them somehow (especially if it does not want to
risk being asked why then is it not the opposite intuition, or any other intuition that is
ignorant and untrustworthy).
A cultural theorist can hold that what is art is objective, but relative to a given cultural
context. Thus it is objective that Fontana's Spatial Concept `Waiting' is a work of art in
Cmodern western art, but this does not yet mean that it is a work of art in any other context
as well (Fig. 2.5). It might be, but it might not.
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Using this framework, both intuitions can be explained as follows: that x is an artwork
seems intuitively objective to S, because x is objectively an artwork in the context S lives
in (CS), and most likely CS is the only context S knows or cares about.
28 On the other
hand, x's arthood may seem intuitively subjective to S when x is objectively an artwork in
CY , and S is aware of but does not identify with CY , or at least is aware of the possibility
that in some CZ x would not be an artwork. Whatever it seems, however, x's arthood is
objective, but context-relative.
28To quote Beardsley, the arthood of an object rests on judgements which are accepted so commonly
that they seem to be universal, i.e. objective (Beardsley 1982a: 137).
Chapter 3
Advantages of the Cultural Deﬁnition
The cultural deﬁnition has more than just some intuitive appeal. In this chapter I will
review its advantages to show that it is attractive not only at face value, but also after
somewhat more careful philosophical examination. The main advantage of the cultural
theory is that it can explain virtually everything that any of the other discussed theories
can explain, in most cases it does it in greater detail and with wider scope, and without
falling into the traps which plagued those theories. In the following pages I will discuss how
my view preserves the advantages and solves or sidesteps the problems of other deﬁnitions
(in doing so I try to keep the same structure of enquiry as I did when ﬁrst introducing
them). After this is done, I will show that apart from being an improvement on the existing
theories, the cultural deﬁnition has some speciﬁc advantages of its own.
3.1 Making the best of the institutional theory
Anything goes
As I argued in section 1.1.1, the institutional theory has the advantage of being able to
account for the actual modern practice of art, characterised by the famous quote from
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Andy Warhol: `Art is anything you can get away with' (cf. Dickie 1974: 49). Similarly to
IT, the cultural theory does not dwell on resenting the fact that after dadaism `anything
goes', but accepts it as given and tries to explain it. Perhaps it even makes searching
for the explanation easier, providing terms for analysing art as a social phenomenon. For
example, the Avantgarde changed our thinking about art, and now originality (and related
crossing of boundaries) is commonly respected as perhaps the most important criterion
for arthood, ﬁguring in most subsets respected as suﬃcient, and outweighing possible lack
of aesthetic appeal, not being cast in a traditional medium, etc. The common modern
thinking about art simply encourages artists to do whatever they want, provided what
they do is original.
A cultural theorist has also a ready explanation of why the commonly respected set
of criteria changed at this particular time. With proper data from social sciences one can
draw a complete picture of the cultural impact of the technological jump of the early 20th
Century, the accompanying social change and the World Wars, on artistic culture  they all
encouraged experimenting with new materials and forms, and rejecting the untrustworthy
tradition.1
Arbitrariness
Dickie argued that there is no deep explanation for why some things are not art other than
pointing out that artistic practice, like all social practices, is somewhat messy, unstructured
and arbitrary (Dickie 2000: 100). The institutionalists also allow objects to gain the status
of art in an arbitrary (and unjustiﬁed) way, not because of their actual merit (Dickie 1974:
50).
The cultural theory can preserve a part of those insights, ensuring that at the same time
some arbitrary features of artistic practice are properly accounted for, while the theory as
a whole does not become trivial. Thus on the one hand I agree that some things (e.g.
1It is notable that some theorists have even seen this as a duty of modern art (e.g. Pevsner 1960).
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dog shows, jewellery) could by all standards be art and yet are not, because for arbitrary
reasons no one ever conferred the status onto them. On the other, however, when someone
confers the status even though there are no good reasons for her to do so, a cultural theorist
can stop and deny that the object is art  at least within any context in which it does not
satisfy a subset of criteria respected as suﬃcient. In this way the cultural deﬁnition allows
for exactly as much arbitrariness as is necessary to account for actual practices, without
descending into the triviality of ascribing art status to whatever anyone fancied to call
`art'.
Indistinguishable objects
Since the cultural deﬁnition retains the notion of conferral in its central place, it preserves
the ability to explain indistinguishable objects cases  the main driving force behind the
institutional theory. What is more, it also explains why readymades remain controversial
 while in the contemporary context their criterial properties form subsets respected as
suﬃcient for arthood, in some cases readymades are judged according to the criteria of
past contexts.
There are no institutions
While the institutionalist does not require the institution to be formal, I suggested that
its informality and the fact that anyone can be its member if they just wish to, may
introduce an unbearable vagueness to the theory (see page 25). There are at least two
ways to answer this issue. One is to simply deny the conclusion  a number of other social
practices are completely informal and yet perfectly intelligible, e.g. informal partnership,
fan groups, fashion, etc. The cultural theory allows for specifying this answer. Since an
artworld is described as a social practice and related system of beliefs, it makes absolutely
no diﬀerence whether those practices and beliefs are somehow formalised or not. It may
be easier for a social scientist to learn about them if they are, but studying the common
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beliefs and practices is everything that is required to provide a description of an artworld,
and following that  art.
The second solution concerns the respected reasons for status conferral. It is not the
case that anyone can do anything they want, because a person conferring the status must
be culturally competent and have reasons for conferral, i.e. the given object should satisfy
a subset of criteria for arthood respected as suﬃcient within their artworld. Thus the
cultural theory may allow a lot, but is anything but vague.
Ahistoricity
It has been claimed that IT does not account for historical changes in the artworld and
the characteristics of a person authorised to confer art-status (see page 26). While it is
possible to answer this objection without modifying Dickie's view too much (see S. Davies
1991), the cultural theory can again provide a more detailed reply. Firstly, it explains what
changes over time  the subsets of criteria commonly respected as suﬃcient for arthood.
Secondly, it explains how is it that things which are art now would not have been art in
another place and time  in the context of the present Western culture C1 an object, say
Malevich's Black Square, can have the art-status conferred upon it because it satisﬁes a
subset of criteria α1 which is respected as suﬃcient in C1, while the same object would
not be art in 16th Century China (C2) because even though it still satisﬁes α1, α1 was
not respected as suﬃcient in C2. Finally, the cultural theory can explain why is it that
when we, present day Westerners, tend to judge art from diﬀerent times diﬀerently, i.e.
we would not say Black Square is art if it were painted in 16th Century China. Parallel
to the previous case, in judging objects from diﬀerent contexts, we apply diﬀerent criteria
and while we would judge an object known to be created in C1 according to the criteria
respected in C1, we tend to judge objects created in C2 according to the criteria known to
have been respected in C2.
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Private art
A somewhat more detailed treatment is due to the issue of private art. It seems intuitive for
some to think that a person completely detached from the society and blissfully unaware
of any artistic practices or beliefs present within it, could nevertheless produce artworks.
IT cannot account for that intuition, because it requires the artist to be a member of an
artworld, i.e. a social institution (see pages 27 ﬀ.).
While I do not share the said intuition, the cultural theory does allow for the existence
of lone artists. I do not require an artist to be a member of a society  it is enough that
she acts within a certain cultural context, i.e. respects certain beliefs and follows certain
practices. While such contexts are typically present within societies, it is perfectly possible
that a lone artist could hold beliefs and follow practices of her own, or hold beliefs and
practices that unbeknownst to her are also held by a larger society. In other words, a lone
artist may respect her own reasons for arthood conferral, and if it turns out that those
reasons are somewhat similar to the reasons we respect, it is more than likely that we will
recognise and treat her works as art as well.
In this case, the solution I oﬀer would be fairly similar to the one oﬀered by Levinson:
an object created by a lone artist can be an artwork and be recognised as such by us because
it satisﬁes a subset of reasons for arthood α1 respected as suﬃcient in C1 (in practice  by
its creator, within her own cultural context) such that α1 is also respected as suﬃcient in
C2  our cultural context.
The cultural deﬁnition, however, does not conclude that an object created by a lone
artist is an artwork simpliciter. Instead it concludes that it can be an artwork in any
context in which the properties it has are commonly respected as suﬃcient reasons for
arthood conferral after someone has done the conferring. In fact, I believe that such
treatment conforms exactly with our actual practice. If an object identical to Mona Lisa
were created by a lone artist, it would have been art before it was found by anyone familiar
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with other art (because it would satisfy criteria respected by its creator and because he
conferred the status upon it) as well as after (because it satisﬁes criteria respected by us
and anyone who would ﬁnd it would acknowledge its art-status). The African masks found
by Picasso are deﬁnitely art for us (they satisfy our criteria and had arthood conferred
upon them by Picasso), but it is uncertain whether they were art before (it is unclear
whether their properties were seen as suﬃcient for arthood conferral by their creators, or
whether anyone ever did the conferring). In another case, a text written by a hermit in
Linear A script might have been an artwork for him (it satisﬁed criteria for arthood he
respected and he did the conferral), but it might not be for us (because we cannot read it,
we cannot even tell if it is a poem or a prayer, or whether it satisﬁes our criteria, and at
least until someone will decipher Linear A, it will remain a mere artefact).
Ignoring the artist
IT is said to not give enough attention to what the artists actually do or intend, placing
the stress on the decisions of the artworld members (see page 30). I argued that the
institutional theory should not turn away from the seemingly unwanted conclusion  a host
of works, including objects created as primarily magical or religious artefacts, Leonardo's
sketchbooks, Kafka's novels, are artworks not in virtue of what their creators wanted, but
because the public decided they should be.
The cultural theory provides two motivations for explaining and defending the involve-
ment of the public. Firstly, it does not require that it be the artist who confers the status,
but any person competent in C. While typically this person is the actual creator of the
object, she need not be. Secondly, the cultural theory provides an explanation of why the
public may decide to confer the status  because it recognises that there are good reasons
to confer it even though the artist did not do it, or there were no good reasons for conferral
at her time. Thus it might be the case that old religious or magical artefacts did not satisfy
any subset of criteria commonly respected as suﬃcient in C1, but because now, in C2 they
3.1 Making the best of the institutional theory 163
do, the public may decide to confer the status even though their creator did not intend
it. Leonardo's sketchbooks seem to be similar in this respect. Kafka's novels, on the other
hand, may have in fact satisﬁed a subset respected as suﬃcient in C1 but Kafka may have
been unaware of that (or more plausibly he held somewhat more demanding criteria) and
decided not to confer the status. In this case a public member Max Brod conferred the
status for him, recognising that he did actually have good reasons to do so.
Wollheim's Dilemma
Wollheim argued that either the members of the artworld have reasons for conferring the
status and thus the institutional theory should include those reasons and likely would not
need to refer to the institution, or they do not, in which case the theory is completely
uninformative (see page 36).
The solution, discussed at length in section 2.2.6, is to sit a little on both horns of the
dilemma. The members of the institution do have reasons to confer the status, however,
those reasons are themselves dependant on the institution which determines which subsets
of criteria count as suﬃcient in the ﬁrst place. What is more, it is not suﬃcient that an
object satisﬁes the criteria  someone still has to do the conferring, and failing to do so
might sometimes be quite arbitrary.
Ultimately, the cultural deﬁnition escapes Wollheim's charges, because ﬁrstly, it retains
the institutional character of the deﬁnition by stressing the cultural dependancy of art and
the necessity for the act of conferral; and secondly, it retains a great deal of informativeness,
as it allows one to tell if and why a given object is an artwork in a given context and what
sort of objects could be artworks given the context.
Other problems
The cultural theory does not in any straightforward way solve IT's circularity (see page
31). Dickie argued that it should be regarded more as a feature of the theory than a
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problem, and that even though circular, IT is still informative. However, it seems that the
issue calls for a more careful treatment, which I will present in section 4.1.
Finally, the cultural theory gives substance to rejecting Carroll's objection  the charge
that IT does not meet the open concept challenge, and thus does not tell one anything
about art but merely about how it ﬁts into a social context, or what people think art is
(see page 38). The question posed is simply misplaced  for both institutional and cultural
theorists there is nothing more to the concept of art than what the members of the art-
world say, and the cultural theory allows one to ﬁnd out what do they actually say it is.
Asking an open question in this case is a little like asking: `we all know how people think
a rook can move in chess, but how a chess rook can actually move?' The short answer is
 this is just a silly question, there is no such thing as a chess rook moves in themselves,
because the game of chess is a social practice governed by conventionally established rules,
and if there were no people to play chess, there would be no rules concerning the way
a rook can move. Similarly, there is no point asking what is art independent of human
(or alien) artistic practice, because the concept of art makes no sense outside this practice.2
3.2 Making the best of historicism
Stressing the historical nature of art
In section 1.2.1 I stressed what I believe is the most important point of historicism 
recognising that art has a history and that its current shape (or the shape of art at any
time) is determined by what art was before. While I do not agree that this link is essential
or even necessary for art, I do ﬁnd it extremely important.
2Note that this does not bring about the problem of private art again, as it is perfectly possible that a
lone artist can have her private artistic practice and belief system. On the other hand, this solution neatly
ﬁts the intuition that were there a rock formed by wind and water randomly in a shape exactly the same
as Michelangelo's David, it would not be an artwork  at least not unless an artist would claim it as found
art, by this making it a part of the artistic practice.
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The cultural theory not only recognises the historicity of art, it builds on Levinson's
idea. Firstly it provides a framework within which one can assert that art was something
diﬀerent at a diﬀerent time, and moreover, try to ﬁnd out what it actually was  one can
study the historically commonly respected suﬃcient subsets of criteria for arthood and
determine whether object x, given its properties, is likely to have the art-status conferred
upon it in that context or not. Secondly, the cultural theory stresses the fact that the
importance lies not only in the temporal, but in the wider cultural contexts  not only
was art something else in 17th Century Spain than it is now, it was also diﬀerent in
17th Century Spain and China. Moreover, a cultural theorist may, after receiving some
appropriate data from the social sciences, try to determine why was art diﬀerent once than
it is now.3
Explaining how historical changes are possible
This brings up another great advantage of historicism  it explains how art changes over
time: artworks at t1 are inﬂuenced by artworks at t0, and in turn inﬂuence artworks at t2.
Simply because artists are aware of what is past art to them, intend their artworks to be
regarded as this past art was regarded, and by making them they determine what `past
art' refers to for future artists engaged in the same process.
The cultural theory explains historical change slightly diﬀerently. On my account the
historical change is not explained by the play between the state of art at t and the artist's
intentions, but between the state of art at t (or in C) and the subsets of reasons commonly
respected as suﬃcient for arthood conferral at t (in C), as well as the conventions for art-
making at t (in C). On Levinson's view a new artwork alters what `the state of art at t'
refers to, while on my account it inﬂuences the conventions of art-making and the common
views on the reasons for arthood conferral.
3E.g. one can explain that in 17th Century Spain the subsets of reasons for arthood commonly
respected as suﬃcient were thus and so, because e.g. the Counter-reformation promoted deep spirituality,
opposed the protestant strive towards unaesthetic simplicity, and discouraged any originality.
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In practice, however, the explanatory power of both accounts is similar  in fact thanks
to placing art among other cultural practices, the cultural theory might be a fair bit more
speciﬁc. A detailed story can be told about the inﬂuence of the Counter-reformation and
religion on Baroque art, and similarly in speciﬁc cases, an explanation of how Fountain
changed (our thinking about) what art is can be given.
Private art
For a historicist a lone artist completely detached from any artistic practice can create
an artwork by intending it to be regarded in a way φ such that φ is a way in which past
artworks have been correctly regarded. As I argued above, the cultural theory can allow
for private art, because it is perfectly possible that a lone artist has a system of beliefs and
practices to follow, and it is natural that we would recognise his work as art provided that
his belief-practice system is suﬃciently similar to ours.
Correct regard problem
The historical theory entails that a work has to be intended to be regarded correctly as past
art has been regarded, in order to be art (see page 44) However, it oﬀers little in terms of
explaining what a correct regard is, and with this unsettled, it is at best vague. Levinson's
reply that a correct regard is a relatively complete one, is rather unhelpful  it is now hard
to say what counts as `relatively complete', and the problem is merely postponed.
On the cultural theory the problem ceases to exist  the correct way of regarding
artworks is culturally determined and is known to culturally competent members of the
artworld. Similarly as in the historical theory, the correct ways of regard can change over
time and context.
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Alien art
Currie's alien art thought experiment shows that were alien artefacts looking similar to
our modern art found, the historicist would have to claim, counterintuitively, that they
are not art because they do not bear the signiﬁcant relation to our Ur-art. It seems, thus,
that there can be art which does not stand in any historical relation to past art, i.e. the
historical relations are not an essential feature of artworks (see page 46).
While I ﬁnd it rather odd that we should worry about science ﬁction problems for a
theory which has trouble establishing the arthood of things much more real, e.g. Kafka's
novels, I would like to brieﬂy show that the cultural theorist needs not worry about such
laser-sharp objections. The treatment of alien art is in my case identical to the treatment
of private art  it is possible that objects created in another cultural context, even ex-
traterrestrial, were a product of an artistic practice and related belief system, and if it
so happens that this practice-belief system was suﬃciently similar to ours (i.e. the same
subsets of criteria for arthood were respected as suﬃcient), those objects could be art in
our context as well.
Intentions are cheap
Historicism suﬀers from a host of problems related to intentionalism  because of its vague-
ness, it struggles with establishing which works should be included and which excluded
from the domain of artworks. As I argued on pages 49 ﬀ., this problem may be fatal to
historicism.
The cultural theory, on the other hand, simply does not depend on intentions at all.
All it does is to acknowledge that being intended as an artwork is one of the reasons to
confer the status, but does not give intentions any essential role to play.
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3.3 Making the best of functionalism
Having an edge
Functionalists boast a deﬁnition which is rather discriminative, clearly states what is art
and what is not, and provides clear conditions under which people can err in calling some-
thing an artwork (see page 58). Unlike the procedural deﬁnitions, functionalism is anything
but vague and uninformative.
While I recognise the advantages of drawing sharp distinctions, I believe that it is
not half as important as drawing those distinctions in the right places  here, however,
functionalism fails. The cultural deﬁnition is an attempt to provide as much edge as
possible, while still following the actual artistic practice. On the one hand, it follows the
institutional framework which indeed does not oﬀer much of an edge, but on the other,
it provides one with tools for determining whether there are any good reasons to confer
the art-status. In this way it tries to both provide some distinctions and avoid situations
in which it could be easily falsiﬁed with examples of unjustiﬁed inclusion or exclusion of
particular artefacts, or with the simple fact that artists may in the future decide to do art
diﬀerently. I believe that this is the most fruitful trade-oﬀ between being as informative
as possible, and being simply to crude to be accurate.
Incidentally, if what a functionalist really wants is a distinction between `good old art'
and `modern mumbo-jumbo' or simply popular taste kitch, the cultural theory can also
supply a solution. All that needs to be done is to shift a context  arguably aestheticists
simply judge art according to criteria which were respected before the Avantgarde. In this
case all that is needed is a normative judgement that one context is better than another,
and a decent basis for excluding certain objects is ready.
3.3 Making the best of functionalism 169
Capturing the pre-theoretical meaning of `art'
The functionalists claim to have actually captured the common-sense meaning of the term
`art'. While it might be the case that some gallery owners and high-brow critics say that a
urinal put in a gallery is an artwork, most people simply shake their heads and mourn the
death of art. It may be that the functionalists overestimate this point and are simply too
exclusive, but they certainly capture one thing right  there is indeed a tension on certain
lines, and one speciﬁc one deﬁnitely has aesthetic art on one side and modern art which
often escapes aestheticism on the other.
The cultural deﬁnition can, however, give a solution to this issue which would not be
followed by issues related to unjustiﬁed inclusions and exclusions characteristic of function-
alism. A cultural theorist can simply say that in some cases artworks are judged according
to diﬀerent criteria, and what is referred to as the `common sense criteria' are simply those
which are tacitly accepted as part of the common cultural competence, and in most cases
concern pre-Avantgarde art which indeed was in a great majority aesthetic. In other words,
our artistic common sense is largely shaped by the ideals of Classicism and Romanticism,
and following this we tend to intuitively judge all artworks as if they were a part of the
classical-romantic tradition. The tension can thus be explained as follows: the high-brow
critics accept Fountain as an artwork since it had the status conferred upon it because it
satisﬁes a subset of criteria α1 which is respected as suﬃcient for arthood in C1; at the
same time the common public does not accept Fountain as an artwork because while it
might have had the status conferred upon it, the subset of criteria α1 it satisﬁes is not
respected as suﬃcient for arthood in C2, the common sense classical-romantic context.
The answer to the puzzle is simple  since Fountain is created in C1, it is an artwork, at
least within C1 (and any other context in which α1 is respected as suﬃcient for arthood).
Any further discussion concerning the matter must be normative in nature  i.e. try
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to determine which context is better than the other, and as such is not a matter for a
classiﬁcatory theory.4
Suﬃciency and necessity
As I argued in 1.3.2, the functional theory suﬀers from a very straightforward problem 
there are objects which do not have an aesthetic function and yet might be art, and there
are objects which do have an aesthetic function but are not art.
The solution to this problem is banal to a cultural theorist. Firstly, the aesthetic
function is not an essential one, and thus it is perfectly possible to have non-aesthetic
art. It likely is one of the criteria for arthood which is widely respected in many diverse
contexts  but this only makes it characteristic, or typical of art, not essential. Secondly,
the reason why certain objects are not art even though they do satisfy subsets of criteria
respected as suﬃcient, is because no one has conferred the status on them. Understood
more broadly, there is no reason whatsoever why certain classes of objects, e.g. jewellery
or military parades, are not art, other than the fact that in our cultural context `it turned
out that way'.
Other objections
The cultural theory completely sidesteps two problems  that of correctness of the aesthetic
experience (see page 60), and of intentionalism (75). Neither of those notions play any role
in my deﬁnition.
Similarly, while functionalism may ultimately be overly exclusive (see page 69) and
apart from readymades, found art, anti-art and conceptual art exclude a good deal of
artworks which were created as religious or magical artefacts, the cultural theory does not
4One would be justiﬁed at this point to ask how a cultural theorist can distinguish a case of judging
an object according to two diﬀering contexts, and of simply being wrong about the object's status. This
issue will be discussed in section 4.6.
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entail such counterintuitive consequences. Instead, my deﬁnition allows for the function of
art to change and accepts that objects can become or stop being artworks `midlife'.
Finally, Davies' objection (see p. 77) suggested that functionalism may lose to proced-
uralism simply because it does happen that objects gain their aesthetic properties, and
thus function, only after they are given the art-status in a procedural way. A cultural
theorist needs to do no more than nod and agree.
3.4 Making the best of the cluster account
Giving justice to the actual messy nature of art
In section 1.4.1 I suggested that one of the main advantages of the cluster account lies in
striving to provide an accurate description of what art actually is rather than what one
would like it to be, and acknowledging its somewhat messy and unstructured character.
I completely agree that art as it is now is a messy phenomenon not susceptible to a neat
and straightforward deﬁnition. The cultural theory preserves this insight by acknowledging
that the reasons one can have to confer art-status can be very diverse. Additionally, my
view not only allows one to acknowledge that since art has evolved in a messy way, it is
a messy thing now  it provides one with tools to investigate how exactly it evolved, i.e.
points to the mechanisms of inﬂuences within artistic culture, between artistic cultures and
between artistic and other parts of culture(s). Following this, it not only allows one to say
what is art now, but also what was art in other temporal and cultural contexts.
I also agree that one should ﬁnd out about what art is by `looking and seeing', i.e.
empirical investigation of the society. However, I draw a further, institutional conclusion
from this  what is art is actually dependant on the societies and their cultures. Thanks
to this, the cultural theory can, once again, account for the facts that what is art has been
changing over time (i.e. people of various cultural contexts would ascribe art-status to
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diﬀerent things), and that we judge works from diﬀerent times diﬀerently (i.e. from our
cultural context we ascribe art-status to artefacts from varying contexts diﬀerently).
Accuracy and fruitfulness over elegance and simplicity
The cluster account recognises and values what surprisingly many theories seem to dis-
regard  that rather than being neat and elegant, a theory should actually be useful for
something. Its great advantage is that it does not give in to the general trends in ana-
lytic philosophy and instead of desperately trying to provide a deﬁnition set in terms of
necessary and suﬃcient conditions, it oﬀers a disjunctive account which is simply better
at capturing the phenomenon it is set to describe.
I try to follow the same principle. Thus while the cultural theory is context-relative, not
a proper deﬁnition just as IT, embraces partial arbitrariness of the artworld and inherits
some of the disjunctive nature of the cluster account, it provides as much explanatory
power, accuracy and fruitfulness as possible  and equally importantly, it does not pretend
to provide any more than is possible.
Other advantages
The cultural theory shares all of the `better oﬀ than' advantages of cluster account  ex-
plains private and alien art, allows for art to change its function, does not fall in Wollheim's
trap. Also similarly, it strives not to slavishly follow intuitions about art but rather explain
them, or expose them as biased and thus unreliable.
Error theory for everyone
Gaut uses error theory to explain why other deﬁnitions of art are wrong, it seems, however,
that the very same argument can be turned against him (see page 85). To answer this tu
quoque, Gaut states that it might be that the defenders of other deﬁnitions have less support
to make this move, as it is common to make the mistake of over-simplifying complicated
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things, yet it is rather rare to over-complicate simple things  our intuitions tend to simplify,
not complicate.
Similarly, I hold that the mistake of other theories is to overestimate and treat as a
necessary condition for arthood, what is merely a reason for artworld members to confer
the art-status. I also follow his reply to the objection. What is more, I can run exactly
the same error theory as well as Gaut's own reply to the objection, against him. Thus the
cultural theory entails that Gaut was wrong in treating as universal criteria for arthood
something that are actually reasons for arthood conferral  and merely the reasons relative
to the modern Western culture. Were Gaut to object that it is my theory that is in error,
he would be susceptible to his own reply, as it is the cluster theory that is a simpliﬁcation
of my view  it selects merely one cluster, the modern Western one, whereas the cultural
theory recognises its context-relativity and can account for other cultural contexts as well.
Utility and Institutions - a historical dilemma
In section 1.4.2 I presented a long argument which placed the cluster theorists in front of a
dilemma  if we allow for the fact that art from diﬀerent time periods is classiﬁed according
to diﬀerent criteria, then either the account is insanely complicated and unusable, or one
has to relativise clusters to the said time periods, thus introducing an institutional element.
The cultural theory explores the second of those options, and in this sense it can be
seen as a synthesis which solves the cluster account's historical problems by marrying it
with the institution, and Wollheim's dilemma by marrying the institutional deﬁnition with
the cluster. But the cultural theory does more than that, as through this solution it gains
a very signiﬁcant advantage over practically every other theory of art  it can not only
explain what art is now, but also provide a framework for explaining what art is or was
and perhaps even will be in pretty much any cultural and temporal context.
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3.5 Making new best of's
3.5.1 Accounting for actual artistic practice
The primary aim behind developing the cultural theory is to provide a deﬁnition of art
which would be extensionally adequate, fully capturing the meaning of the term as it is
actually used as accurately as possible. Most theories of art were focused on ﬁrst explaining
what is art in terms of the (contextual) properties of artworks, and then worrying whether
the explanation ﬁts the artistic practice  or at best took the artistic practice into account
when determining the properties of artworks. The cultural deﬁnition, on the other hand,
takes the practice ﬁrst and deﬁnes art in terms of this practice. Broadly, it is the artistic
practice that determines what art is, not some universal nature of art that determines the
practice.
While it could perhaps be shown that the cultural deﬁnition does not fully reach the
ideal of perfectly capturing the meaning of `art' as it is actually used, it seems that it is
much closer to it than any other theory. As such, even though it might not mark the end
of the quest for a deﬁnition of art, it should be treated as an important improvement on
the road to it.
Some speciﬁc practices the cultural theory can explain were described in section 2.4.
The most important points include: allowing modern art, e.g. ready-mades, found objects,
political art, etc., to be art; allowing objects that have not been intended as art, to be art;
allowing objects created with no or a diﬀerent concept of what is art, to be art; allowing
artists to be even extremely original; allowing for the typical characteristics of artworks to
change over time; allowing for the treatment of art from various contexts to be diﬀerent.
3.5 Making new best of's 175
3.5.2 Methodological advantages
Apart from capturing the way the concept `art' is actually used better than other theories,
the cultural deﬁnition is simply more useful and practically applicable. All of the following
issues add to the theoretical and heuristic utility of my view.
Explanatory power
Despite all the limitations of the cultural deﬁnition, it has a great deal of very practical
explanatory power. If a cultural theorist is asked: `is x art?', he needs to do the following:
1. Establish the cultural context C for which to answer the question (e.g. establish that
the question actually means `is x art in modern Western society?').
2. Establish what properties are considered criteria and which subsets of criteria are
considered suﬃcient in C (in one's own context one can simplify things and assume
that one just knows that in virtue of being a competent member of C; in other con-
texts one has to establish relevant facts using methods available to social scientists).
3. Establish whether anyone has conferred the status of a candidate for appreciation on
x.
4. If so, establish whether this person was culturally competent in C.
5. Establish whether among x's properties there are those which are considered criteria
for arthood in C and whether at least one subset of such properties is respected as
suﬃcient for arthood conferral in C (i.e. if there are good reasons to confer the status
in C).
If answers to points (3), (4) and (5) are positive, x is art in C and in any other context
where satisfying the subset of properties which x satisﬁes and which constituted a good
reason for arthood conferral in C, also constitutes a good reason for arthood conferral.
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Additionally, the more subsets of properties respected as suﬃcient in Cx has, the more
central and clear case of art it is.
If all those answers are positive, but x's properties are such that they satisfy a subset
of criteria of which there is some controversy whether it is suﬃcient for arthood conferral
(i.e. it is accepted only by some competent participants in C, or it is considered an unclear
case), x is a borderline case of art.
If any of (3-5) is answered negatively, x is not an artwork in C, although it can be or
become one in another context.
(Very limited) Predictive power
It would be unfair to claim any great predictive power for the cultural theory  or indeed
any other theory of social practices or beliefs. After all, artists want to do unexpected and
original things. It is also quite clear that some other theorists can claim predictive power
for their deﬁnitions  anyone can make educated guesses about the future.
However, for what it is worth, I think that the cultural theory has a small advantage
over the other theories  it can not only be based on educated guesses and intuitions
about the future, it can follow the methods of the social sciences and beneﬁt from their
predictive power. To be sure, this is not to be overrated, as the predictive power of social
sciences is very limited itself  however, it is still better than philosophical guesses and
intuitions. Thus while I do not believe it to be a major advantage, or an important point,
the predictive power of the cultural deﬁnition is at least slightly better than in the case of
other theories.
In practice, one can attempt to plug an expected future state of a given culture gathered
through predictions of social scientists into the above steps (1) and (2), and try to predict
what objects will be artworks in the future. Two questions in particular can be answered in
this way. Firstly, the question about general trends: `if the cultural (non-artistic) context in
year 2050 will be C2050, what sort of objects are likely to be art in C2050?' A cultural theorist
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can try to roughly determine, using the postulated context, which properties are likely to
be considered criteria (i.e. belong to α) and which subsets of criteria {α1, . . . , αn} are likely
to be respected as suﬃcient reasons for arthood conferral in this context. Following that,
he can answer: objects likely to be art in 2050 are those which will satisfy at least one of
{α1, . . . , αn}.
Secondly, one can ask: `if the cultural (non-artistic) context in 2050 will be C2050, is
x likely to be art in C2050?' If after substituting C2050 for C the answer to (5) is positive
(i.e. x satisﬁes any of {α1, . . . , αn}), one can safely say that x could well be art in 2050.
Whether it actually will, will depend on whether someone culturally competent in C2050
will confer the status on it, but since this is purely incidental and cannot be predicted,
one should stop at saying that x is likely to be art in 2050, or that there would be good
reasons for it to be art. Thus the cultural theory can also have some predictive power in
particular cases.
Scope
The cultural deﬁnition has a general ability to explain whether and why certain objects
were or could have been considered art at certain other times and places, actual and, as
will be pointed out in 3.5.4 counterfactual. All that is needed is to ﬁnd out about the
appropriate context from cultural anthropologists or simply making one up (for the sake
of prediction or a thought experiment) and plugging the relevant data into (1) and (2).
This point is perhaps one of the greatest strengths of my account, as hardly any modern
deﬁnition of art can boast applicability to contexts other than the contemporary Western
one. The cultural theory has a much greater scope than any modern theory of art  it can
not only talk about what art is now, but what art was, is elsewhere and what it might be.
Moreover, while being able to account for much more, it does not lose any of the accuracy
required of a deﬁnition, nor does it become less speciﬁc about the most interesting, modern
meaning of `art'. Since the term `art' as it is commonly used is simply analysed as `art
178 Advantages of the Cultural Deﬁnition
in the speaker's contemporary context', it is considered in exactly the same way as in any
other context.
Parsimony
It might seem rather unjustiﬁed to claim parsimony as an advantage of a theory which is
indeed quite complicated. As I wrote in section 2.1, I think that simplicity and parsimony
are far less important than the theory's accuracy and explanatory power, however, I also
believe that one should make one's theory as parsimonious as possible. Thus while the
cultural theory might not be the simplest or most elegant because to simplify it would be
to oversimplify it and sacriﬁce its accuracy, at least in one respect it is very parsimonious
indeed.
My deﬁnition does not need to base itself on a number of notions which play an essential
role in other views, but are inherently vague. The most important ones include: artistic
intentions, aesthetic appreciation, correct regard, correct experience.5 Other theories have
been criticised for being unable to clearly determine what these notions mean, and thus
inheriting their vagueness. Being able to do without depending on any of those is deﬁnitely
parsimonious.
3.5.3 Explaining diversity and continuing unity of art
Most theories of art try to focus on what `art' refers to now, allowing that it might have
meant something diﬀerent once. It might seem that this is a perfectly acceptable strategy,
however, it completely fails to account for a very general truth about art: that it is very
5While those notions can appear as criteria and partially constitute reasons for arthood conferral, they
are not an essential part of the deﬁnition.
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diverse and yet continuous and uniﬁed at the same time. At least some authors (e.g. Tatark-
iewicz 1971: 139; S. Davies 1991: 179) think that a valid deﬁnition should provide an ex-
planation here  after all what good is a theory that strives to encompass and ﬁnd unifying
properties in all contemporary art, including private and even alien works, yet stops short
of searching for similar continuity between what `art' means for us and what it meant in
the past? After all, one would hesitate before saying that there is no such thing as a histor-
ically continuous concept of `art' and that in fact `artpost−Avantgarde', `art19th Century Europe'
and `art17th Century China' are completely separate things, or at least separate enough that
they should be covered by diﬀerent deﬁnitions. If any theory should like to accept such a
conclusion, it seems perfectly reasonable to ask about its domain, and it looks like e.g. an
institutional theorist may have serious problems in saying whether art is deﬁned institu-
tionally since 1917 and Duchamp's Fountain or perhaps already since 1914's Bottle Rack,
and in either case, are such works as Rachmaninoﬀ's perfectly neo-Romantic Rhapsody on
a Theme of Paganini of 1934 to be treated as art on the basis of their place in the artworld,
or still by the old aesthetic criteria.
The cultural theory is, however, perfectly suited to give an exhaustive account for
the diversity of art, both historically and at any point in time, and show that with all
this diversity it is a continuous phenomenon. The diversity is a result of the diﬀerences
in which subsets of criterial properties are considered good reasons for arthood conferral
within particular contexts  naturally various arts are diﬀerent and art is diﬀerent in various
contexts, because all arts and all contexts have their own suﬃcient subsets of criteria. The
continuity holds on two levels: theoretical, as with all the diﬀerences, all contexts can be
researched using the same methods and all cases explained on the same model, the cultural
theory; and practical, as the diﬀerences and changes follow from relations between artistic
practice(s) and belief system(s), and between artistic and other cultural practices and
belief systems (e.g. ready-made art is continuous with Renaissance art, because although
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the reasons for arthood conferral are very diﬀerent in their cases, the evolution of those
reasons can be historically traced).
`Art' as an open concept
The cultural theory actually meets the challenge initially raised by Weitz  I provide a
deﬁnition which does allow `art' to be an open concept, i.e. one that can expand (or even
change) its meaning over time (Weitz 1956: 31-32). Although Weitz might not have given
the most convincing reasons to believe that it must be the case (see: Diﬀey 1973; and
Kamber 1998: 36ﬀ. for reviews of anti-essentialist' arguments), it is quite clear that `art'
did change its extension in the past (the history of those changes is carefully traced by
Shiner 2001), and while it is by no means guaranteed that it will keep changing, there
seems to be little reason why it should not (Kamber 1998: 41). The cultural theory can do
what Weitz thought impossible  it can allow for the concept to be open, i.e. allow that
diﬀerent things will qualify as art in diﬀerent contexts and that the extension of the term
may change in the future, and yet provide a deﬁnition.
It has been argued that the institutional theory itself can easily provide an analysis
of the open concept `art' in virtue of being an implicit deﬁnition (Scholz 1994: 315-7).
The cultural theory, however, can provide a deﬁnition while remaining quite explicit. The
crux of my analysis is this: while what art is in diﬀerent contexts can change, all the
changes are limited to what contextual information is plugged into the deﬁnition, while
the structure of the deﬁnition remains unchanged. It might be that in the 18th Century
`art' referred simply to beautiful crafted objects, but in practice such treatment is merely
a simpliﬁcation of the cultural theory. Instead of saying `X is art if it is crafted and
beautiful', one should say: `X is art in C18 iﬀ someone culturally competent conferred on
it the status of a candidate for appreciation for reasons respected as suﬃcient for arthood
in C18' and add that in C18 virtually all subsets of criteria respected as suﬃcient included
`being crafted' and `being (seen as) beautiful'. Surely what counts as art can change over
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time, but the deﬁnition which picks it out need not change  it merely requires plugging
in the appropriate contextual information.
To relate to Weitz's criticism directly, the cultural deﬁnition is anti-essentialist in con-
tent, allowing the meaning of `art' to change, while remaining essentialist in structure.
The same point provides an answer to some reservations expressed by other authors,
e.g. Nietzsche and Ortega y Gasset, who claimed that concepts which have a history
are undeﬁnable (Diﬀey 1973: 117). Again, the solution is to incorporate the history- and
context-relativism into the deﬁnition.
3.5.4 Aliens and possibilia
While the main aim for the cultural deﬁnition was rather practical  to explain the term
`art' as it is actually used  the theory can provide a good framework for less mundane
enquiries. Firstly, it allows one to determine the status of objects which have never been
seen or have been destroyed, or exist only in possible worlds. All those cases can be
treated using the same explanatory process described above, but counterfactually. Since
the cultural context is a system of beliefs and related practices, one can simply assume any
counterfactual set of beliefs and practices (including commonly held judgments regarding
criteria for arthood and subsets of those criteria commonly respected as good reasons for
status conferral) and plug it into the theory. After establishing the context C1 in which
x is to be art, one needs to counterfactually assume the properties of the object, assume
that someone competent in C1 conferred the status, and ask: `if x's properties were α1,
would x be art in C1?' What is more, this can be asked about both the context in which
the object was created (i.e. a possible world context, or 5th Century BC), but just as well
one can consider it in modern Western context  e.g. ask whether this other-wordly object
with all it's properties would be art for us.
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What about aliens? It would be unfair for a cultural theorist to simply assume that alien
concept of art is a cultural one, since one can certainly conceive of aliens who deﬁne art in,
say, a purely functional way. Still, some answers can be given. Were an alien artifact found
which satisﬁed a subset of criteria suﬃcient in Chumans, and we had contextual reasons to
believe that this artifact was treated as art by the aliens (i.e. someone conferred the status
onto it), or a human would present it as art, it would be art in Chumans. This would not,
however, tell us whether it deﬁnitely was art in Caliens, at least not until some empirical
research would reveal that the alien concept of art is a cultural one and that the artifact
satisﬁed a subset of criteria respected as suﬃcient in Caliens.
Though essentially, a cultural theorist who wants to stay true to the spirit of the theory
would simply not care about cases of alien art  at least not until they are actually found
and can be researched empirically.
Chapter 4
Fixing problems
The cultural theory states that x is an art work in context C iﬀ x has had conferred upon
it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons culturally competent
in C, for reasons determined by a cluster of criteria for arthood respected in C. Several
issues may seem problematic  the deﬁnition may look circular, one might feel that it forces
one to focus on too many unimportant issues, it may seem vague or even trivial. Below I
try to defend the theory against such charges.
4.1 Circularity
In developing the cultural deﬁnition a lot has been done to remove the circularity of Dickie's
original theory  there is now no need to mention the artists, artworld, its systems and
public. However, the cultural theory deﬁnes art by referring to reasons for status conferral,
some of which mention `art', which does indeed seem circular. Moreover, it is assumed
that the cultural competence required to confer the status includes the knowledge and
skills related to art. Surely a deﬁnition which is circular cannot be right?
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There have been various attempts at rescuing the original institutional deﬁnitions from
circularity. Barbara Scholz oﬀered an analysis which could remove it by using Ramsay
sentences and λ-reduction (Scholz 1994: 312-4), while Catherine Lord argued that it can
be avoided if the crucial terms in the deﬁnition are treated as indexicals (Lord 1987).1
However, the cultural deﬁnition will not need to call external forces to the rescue  it is
more than able to stand on its own.
There are two possible circles in the theory, the ﬁrst of which concerns art being deﬁned
in terms of reasons for arthood conferral. The problem surely does not lie with the term
`arthood' which is just a convenient short for `status of a candidate for appreciation'  it
rather lies with the particular criteria of which the reasons for conferral are composed: e.g.
`being intended to be art', or `being set in one of the major art forms'. This, however, should
not worry a cultural theorist any more than it worried Gaut when he was facing the very
same problem presenting his cluster account. Firstly, `there is nothing amiss with circular
accounts [. . . ] provided they are informative' (Gaut 2000: 28), and the informativeness of
the cluster account (and, by proxy, the cultural deﬁnition) is ensured by the limitations
on circularity  in some cases one can ask the author what her intention was, or deduce
the intention from contextual data.2 Secondly, similarly as Gaut, I am not particularly
attached to the speciﬁc criteria listed in the cluster. However, neither am I free to choose
which criteria are included in the cluster, since, as mentioned before, those are determined
not by philosophical discussion, but looking and seeing, or empirical research of the social
sciences. Thus I will remain agnostic as to whether this solution is actually adequate, and
leave this issue open as a point of investigation for experimental philosophy.
1I am somewhat unconvinced that these solutions are even remotely adequate  Scholz's argument
rests on an assumption that "artwork" is a primitive term which, as the author acknowledges, Dickie does
not share; while Lord's indexicality solution assumes that there can be only one artworld and seems purely
ad hoc in its application of the twin earth thought experiment.
2Note that this does not mean that a cultural theorist falls into the vagueness trap of intentionalism
discussed in section 1.2.2, as she is free to refer to the intentions when they are known, but needs not rely
on them when they are not.
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Most importantly, however, the cultural deﬁnition can resolve those particular issues by
using the tools it itself provides. `Being intended to be art' can be analysed away somewhat
similarly to how Levinson has done, as being intended to be similar in relevant respects,
or be regarded similarly, to other objects in the extension of `art' in C (Levinson 1979:
240). The circularity then disappears, as the phrase `art in C' is used diﬀerently in the
deﬁniendum (e.g. x falls under the concept `art' in C) and in the deﬁniens (if, inter alia,
x is intended to be like objects in the extension of `art' in C). The only diﬀerence from
how Levinson employed the same strategy is in replacing references to time and history
with references to cultural (and naturally also historical) contexts. If anything, such a
replacement makes the solution stronger, because it does not obviously entail a regress to
ﬁrst art, which itself must be deﬁned diﬀerently.
`Being set in one of the major art forms' can likewise be analysed away. What a
particular art form (or artworld system) is, is a matter of convention, tradition, or simply
beliefs and practices shared within a cultural context  diﬀerent practices and beliefs relate
to modern and Ancient theatre, and yet diﬀerent to Renaissance painting. Thus whether
something belongs to a certain art form is a matter of whether the beliefs and practices
regarding this object are similar to the beliefs and practices related to other objects which
are considered to be in a certain art form. For example, if it is believed of x that `one
should look at it rather than attach it to the outside wall of one's house and cover with
plasterwork', or that `one should appreciate it for the expressiveness of colour contrast
rather than complain that the depicted persons don't move much', one can reasonably
assume that x (say, Matisse's La Danse) is a painting rather than a house insulation sheet
or a ballet. If this is the case, however, then once again there is no circularity. Belonging to
a certain art form does not mean being an artwork of a certain kind, but being an artifact
about which competent participants in C hold beliefs and engage in related practices, such
that those beliefs and practices are characteristic of other artifacts which are considered to
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be in a certain art form. Since the deﬁniendum deals with the meaning of `art form' and
the deﬁniens with its extension, the deﬁnition is not circular.3
The second possible circle in which a cultural theorist could ﬁnd herself, concerns the
notion of cultural competence, which seems to, among other things, include knowledge and
ability to participate in practices concerning art. However, the problem can be avoided in
ways very similar to the above. Most importantly, cultural competence entails knowledge
related to artworks already known to the competent persons, rather than knowledge of
the meaning of the term, or the particular object the status of which is to be determined.
Thus identically as in the above cases, the term `artwork' has a diﬀerent meaning in the
explanandum and the explanans.
What is more, there is simply much more to cultural competence than judgements con-
cerning art. A great deal of extra-artistic knowledge is required to competently judge art,
for example, to determine whether producing a marble sculpture was `a display of great
skill' one has to know ﬁrst that sculpting in marble is harder than in soap, what sort of
tools the artist had access to, etc. The knowledge which is directly related to art, on the
other hand, will largely be formulated in the same terms as the criteria for status conferral
discussed above  if there was no circularity there, neither is there any here.
4.2 Artist's dinner
One problem which resulted from the institutional theory's circularity concerned the dif-
ﬁculties in distinguishing artworks from other objects presented to an artworld public for
appreciation by an artist  e.g. a dinner which follows an exhibition (see section 1.1.2). Is
3This account is somewhat similar to Walton's reasoning behind categorising artworks based on their
standard, variable and contra-standard properties (Walton 1970: 338). What deﬁnes a category, or art
form, or artworld system, is what properties are standard, etc., for objects in this category  but what
properties are standard, etc., is itself determined by conventions and traditions, or beliefs and practices of
the artworld members.
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the cultural theorist in any better position to resolve this issue? Can she clearly determine
the art-status of paintings presented by an artist to his guests, a dinner cooked by him and
presented to the same guests, and an identical dinner cooked but with an intention for it
to also be art? Moreover, can she provide decent reasons for her conclusions?
I suggested previously that the paintings and the non-art dinner can be distinguished
within the institutional theory, because while painting is an artworld system, cooking is not.
I assumed there that Dickie does not have to present one with reasons why one should be an
artworld system but not the other, simply cutting the discussion with the institutional `it
has turned out that way'. Although I believe that such an answer is perfectly respectable
within the institutional framework, I agree with Walton (1977: 98) that it may be somewhat
unsatisfactory  arbitrary solutions might be sometimes necessary, but when they are not,
they should be avoided. And indeed, the cultural theory can provide a better answer. My
explanation goes along the lines of the second solution oﬀered by Walton and my arguments
regarding negative arbitrariness (see section 2.3). The dinner presented by the artist is not
art, because it is true that in cultural context C1 it is believed that `dinners are not art'
(which is equivalent with saying that dinners are not an artworld system). However, this
is not an entirely arbitrary fact about C1. Instead this is historically traceable to previous
states of this cultural context, in a way very much alike those described by Carroll (1994:
24-26). It might be, for example, explained by a belief shared in C0: `things which do not
last and cannot be repeated, cannot be art', which itself is explained by previous cultural
states, probably down to religious beliefs concerning what things are adequate in expressing
praise for gods, what was successful in raising the social status of those who commissioned
works, and the like. Perhaps the only reasons why dog shows or circus performances are not
art lie in the snobbery of our ancestors  these are nevertheless historically valid reasons.
After all, many agree that the fact that tapestries or needlework were not regarded as art
(or at least as much lower art than painting, sculpture, etc.) from the Renaissance to the
20th Century, is explained by the prevailing sexism of the past centuries  in the newly
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developed family model tapestries were typically made by women, and since nothing made
by women could achieve a particularly high status, tapestry-making never developed into
a full-blown artworld system (Shiner 2001: 7).
Ultimately, the dinner presented by the artist is not art, because he and his guests, all
competent in C1, do not confer the status onto it (although they might perform appreciative
actions which resemble status conferral). Were any of them to confer the status, they would
be considered incompetent in C1, the conferral would be void, and the dinner would still
be a mere dinner.
This might seem somewhat puzzling at ﬁrst  does it mean that the belief that dinners
cannot be art makes `being a dinner' a defeating condition for arthood in C1? Although
I believe that this may be one way of putting it, it is somewhat overcomplicated, as the
same can be explained without the need of referring to defeating conditions. Consider
a parallel. It is only since quite recently that (some of) folk art is given art status 
decorative objects such as quilts, cross-stitches, embroidery, etc., typically served practical
or devotional functions. As such they were hardly ever considered art before the 20th
Century (and deﬁnitely before Romanticism), even though they often easily satisﬁed even
multiple subsets of criteria for arthood considered suﬃcient  thus it could be said that
`being a folk craft work', or perhaps `being a quilt, etc.' was a defeating condition for
arthood. Some of those works, however, are now placed in folk art galleries and museums
and displayed similarly as paintings and sculptures. It does not seem that any substantial
change in how they were made has occurred when galleries decided to display folk artworks,
and indeed a lot of what is displayed dates from long before this increase of interest.
Instead, what has changed was the beliefs  it was now believed that folk art can be art.
While one could say that `being a quilt, etc.' was a defeating condition for arthood before
that change, it seems more in line with the cultural theory (and more parsimonious) to
simply say that were one to confer the status on a folk craft work before that change, one
would have failed on account of not being competent in Cpre−20th C.. Similarly, attempts
4.3 Wollheim Strikes Back (at a meta-level) 189
at status conferral on a dinner are doomed to fail in any context in which it is believed
that dinners cannot be art.
What, however, about the second case  distinguishing a non-art dinner from an art
dinner? This naturally assumes that the above solution is unavailable, since in C1 it
is believed that `dinners can be art' (cooking is in fact an artworld system). Here the
diﬀerence lies in the reasons one would have to confer the status  while a mere dinner
might satisfy a subset β of criteria for arthood respected in C1, the artwork-dinner, in
virtue of its contextual properties, satisﬁes a subset α = {β, `being intended as art', `being
a commentary on other artworks', . . . }. While β is not respected as a good reason for
status conferral in C1, α is. Consequently, conferring the status on a dinner which satisﬁes
merely β will not make it into an artwork (although it might fool some people), while
conferring it on the dinner which satisﬁes α will.
This naturally entails that should the cultural context change in a way which will make
satisfying β a good reason, dinners will start qualifying as art. I believe that this is not
a problem, however  it seems that it is precisely how certain other art forms, such as
happenings or street art, have emerged. There is no reason to think that the future will
not bring food-art.
4.3 Wollheim Strikes Back (at a meta-level)
A defender of Wollheim might still be unconvinced: does providing reasons for status
conferral really solve the problem, or does it merely defer it? After all it seems like the
dilemma can be now restated in exactly the same form, but targeting the reasons: why
is it that members of the artworld have those reasons and not other ones? Once again it
seems that either they are justiﬁed in having those particular reasons (in which case the
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institutional element is obsolete), or the reasons are selected ad hoc (and then the theory
is no more informative than IT was).
However, I believe that this is less problematic than it seems. The response to taking
the dilemma to the meta-level is taking my defence strategy to the meta-level as well 
surely members of the artworld may well have reasons for having speciﬁc reasons. For
example, believing that satisfying the subset of criteria which Duchamp's Bottle Rack
satisﬁes is a good reason, is justiﬁed by beliefs such as `art should look for new media
and means of expression', the somewhat exaggerated post-Romantic status of the artists
who had enough authority to convince the public to almost anything, the historical facts
about Art Nouveau artists who created utility objects such as bottle racks, etc. These are
naturally only some prima facie ideas for what the reasons might be  to ﬁnd out what
they are exactly one would need to once again apply the method of looking and seeing, or
perhaps ask art historians. As long as it is possible to ﬁnd adequate reasons, my analysis
is safe.
Still, one may not be satisﬁed with such a response  why should Wollheim not just
keep asking for reasons for reasons for reasons, etc., thus forcing the cultural theorist into
a regress? But the dangers of such a move should not be exaggerated. Firstly, I think that
the above discussion suﬃciently shows that even if a regress would ensue, it would be a
benign one. At every new meta-level where the dilemma could be stated, an answer can be
given, and while some looking and seeing may be needed to provide it, there is no reason
why at any point one should stop being able to look and see further. Secondly, it seems
that the majority of the reasons which can be provided do not require one to enter new
meta-levels  instead they are historical. What constitutes good reasons in the modern
artworld is justiﬁed largely by what constituted good reasons in the past, and by whatever
other historical developments happened in the meantime. Asking for reasons would then
be nothing else but simply tracing history backwards, explaining the meaning of the cur-
rent concept by referring to its past extension, perhaps as far back as whatever religious,
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magical or social practices art developed from. As mentioned in section 4.1, this is hardly
problematic for a cultural theorist. Finally, even if at some point any part of the explana-
tion found any sort of foundational reason, e.g. somewhere down the line from α, simple
aestheticism may be justiﬁed by the evolutionary advantage of taking pleasure in certain
patterns described as `beautiful', such reasons would be eﬀectively mediated by so many
levels of artworld- and history-dependant factors and changes, that they cease to matter.
After all, no one would seriously explain that Bottle Rack is art because it was important
from the evolutionary perspective that humans could appreciate the contrast between red
and green to ﬁnd fruit  at least not without taking into account all the history in between.
4.4 Why not more artworlds? Reductio objection
The reader's initial response to the cultural theory might be that through its partial re-
lativism it becomes vacuous and uninteresting. If, as I argue, x can be art in, say, liberal
Western post-Avantgarde context, but not in communist China context, what is there to
stop one from starting to break things down further and say that x is art in the cultural
context of all the Scots who still speak Gaelic, or all to 80's pop fans, or just my next door
neighbour an his pals? Surely the fact that my grandmother's cross stitches are treated as
art by her family and friends is of little interest to anyone who wants to give an account
of what `art' means  yet it seems that the cultural theory would require us to consider
exactly such small and unimportant issues. In fact, it seems that anything can be art in
some context, and there are inﬁnitely many contexts in which any object can be placed,
being art in some but not others. If this is the case, then it seems that the deﬁnition
I oﬀered becomes very diluted, gets lost in details instead of providing a comprehensive
picture, and as such is basically quite useless.
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The simple answer to this point is that the fact that accepting my deﬁnition means
that one can consider an object's arthood in pretty much any context one wishes, does not
mean that one should do so, or that doing so will yield any interesting knowledge about the
object. To oﬀer a parable, Einsteinian physics allows one to calculate the motion of Alpha
Centauri relative to my left hand, and do all sorts of completely irrelevant and useless
things  but this does not mean that one actually should go and do them, and even less
go on to complain that modern physics can tell us nothing about Alpha Centauri, because
instead of providing one universal measurement of its motion it provides multiple relative
ones. Instead, what we do in the case of physics is choose those frames of reference which
actually for some reason or another matter to us. The cultural theory is exactly the same,
and cultural contexts are its frames of reference. It is not necessary to determine a work's
arthood in all possible contexts  instead what a cultural theorist should do is determine
its arthood in those contexts which matter, for one reason or another.
One could further argue here that such an approach does not actually solve the issue,
it merely pushes it back a little. For how are we to choose the contexts which matter?
Wouldn't it result in making completely arbitrary choices, or perhaps even biased ones?
Pretty much any context matters to someone and it is unclear how and why we should
choose some over the other. If the choice of contexts that matter is arbitrary, the objection
would go, then either we do need to consider all contexts anyway, just in case they are
important after all (thus coming back to the initial point), or the whole theory is arbitrary
and once again, uninformative.
There are several answers to this issue. Firstly, it seems simply somewhat naive to ﬂag
it as a problem. Most philosophers of art are pretty arbitrary as it is, choosing to only
speak about modern Western understanding of art, and often implicitly assuming their
own cultural context for the basis of their theories.4 There is no reason why one should
not ask institutionalists, or functionalists why they choose to focus on a fraction of what
4This has been pointed out already by Weitz and Margolis, (see: Margolis 1958: 90).
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`art' can mean. The likely answer would be  we choose to focus on what art means for
the modern Western audience because this context is important to us. Yet this is exactly
as arbitrary as any choice a cultural theorist would need to make, the only diﬀerence is
that it is a choice others make once, while a cultural theorist can choose again if they wish
to. It seems that there is no essential diﬀerence in how arbitrary those selections are, and
a theory which allows one to choose again does not introduce a new problem, but simply
repeats the same one. Obtaining a good deal of new information for the price of falling
into a problem one has already fallen into anyway, may not be such a bad thing after all.
Secondly, there are other areas of aesthetics in which exactly the same kind of choices
are called for, which do not suﬀer from similar criticism. It is commonly agreed that
artworks can have diﬀerent properties depending on the context of their creation, or more
broadly, depending on which category of art they fall into (Walton 1970). However, at
least according to Walton's analysis of this issue, a single artwork can legitimately fall
into many categories  one can consider Raphael's The School of Athens in the category
of painting, or the category of Renaissance painting, or Raphael's paintings, or paintings
located in the Apostolic Palace, or all frescoes depicting Socrates, etc. Interpreted in any
of those categories the work will have slightly diﬀerent properties than when interpreted in
any other category. Of course, Walton provides four suggestions for choosing the correct
category, thus limiting the freedom of interpreting works in any context one wishes (ibid.:
357-8). However, (1) he still allows that a work can legitimately be judged in more than
one category (in the above example, `painting' and `Raphael's works' seem both perfectly
appropriate); (2) there is nothing preventing a cultural theorist from applying similar
restrictions: one can say that the arthood of x can be determined for any context, but
should be determined for the contexts of which (we have good reasons to believe) it was
intended, which are recognised as important by the society in which it was produced, etc.
It seems now that the choice of a cultural context is no more arbitrary than a choice of a
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category, and thus if the latter does not present any serious problems to a theory which
requires it, neither should the former.
Thirdly, it is simply not the case that the aesthetician's choice of a context in which
to judge a work is completely arbitrary. In fact, I would like to claim that it is not an
aesthetician's choice at all. Instead of choosing whatever context one thinks is import-
ant, one should ask the anthropologists and sociologists about it. A good part of what
social scientists do is determining the characteristics of various social groups and cultural
contexts, assessing their importance and the importance of various divisions within the
societies. The most important divisions include those based on race, nation, religion, dom-
inating mode of production, social status, or government type, while others may focus on
education, access to and use of media, dominating ideologies, or attitude to environmental
issues (Giddens 2006: 33-43, 295-300, 485-90, 534-6, 608-13, 704-14, 844-50, 939-40). It is
possible to distinguish particular cultural contexts based on such criteria, at least par-
tially, by ﬁnding out whether the beliefs and practices of a given society match the model
of, say, a racially mixed and (largely) unprejudiced, multinational, mostly secular, indus-
trial and democratic society composed of mostly middle and upper classes, reasonably well
educated and environmentally conscious people with mostly liberal views and access to
modern media  i.e., the modern Western art audience.
A philosopher need not guess where to place divisions between various cultural contexts,
or arbitrarily choose the contexts he thinks are important  all he needs to do is to check
the data available from the studies conducted by the cultural anthropologists. Thus it is
simply not the case that a cultural theorist can get lost in the myriads of possibilities,
determining arthood for all possible contexts without being able to tell one from the other.
Instead, all he needs to do is acknowledge the ﬁndings of the cultural anthropologists which
determine the borderlines and distinctive features of various cultural contexts, and point
at contexts which are more important, inﬂuential or interesting than others  and provide
classiﬁcation of works into art and non-art in those contexts.
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4.5 Claiming too much
A reader may be surprised with how much the cultural theory claims to explain, and
sceptical whether it really has as wide a scope. Considering that a cultural theorist tries to,
wherever possible, base on empirical evidence rather than intuitions or a priori reasoning,
why would she just assume that, say, the Medieval concept of art was a cultural one just
as ours is? Surely some empirical research into the use of the concept at the time would
have to be conducted before any such claims could be made, and it is not impossible that
such research would reveal that in the Middle Ages `art' had a purely functional meaning.
If so, perhaps it would soon be found that the cultural deﬁnition is applicable to no more
than what other deﬁnitions already cover, and thus has hardly any advantage over them.
While this may point at a possible limitation of the theory, it can hardly be thought of
as an objection. In fact, it only proves that my theory is valid in a Popperian sense  it is
falsiﬁable (see: Popper 1983: 78f.).
The cultural theory is, as any other methodologically conscious theory, open to falsiﬁc-
ation. I claim nothing more for it than what scientists claim for their theories  I hold that
it is a hypothesis which is corroborated by a great deal of evidence, and as such stands until
falsiﬁed. Of course it is possible that there are some contexts in which `art' is not a cultural
concept in the way I describe  after all we can always come up with some counterfactual
alien culture and just stipulate that for them art is deﬁned functionally. But this is good,
it shows that unlike in case of some theories (Tolstoy's and Collingwood's come to mind),
conditions under which the cultural theory is false can obtain, and thus ensures that the
theory is falsiﬁable, not vacuous or tautologically true. It is a completely diﬀerent question
as to whether such conditions actually do obtain and the theory is falsiﬁed.
I could rest my case here simply stating that unless an opponent of the cultural the-
ory ﬁnds evidence that in a given culture the concept of art was deﬁnitely and without
exceptions non-cultural, and provide a non-cultural deﬁnition which covers all and only
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those objects which were considered artworks in that culture, my theory is safe. But I
can also provide some evidence that such contexts would be at least very rare. Consider
the history of Western art as a piece of evidence. The ways in which art was treated
and deﬁned have been changing continuously over time. Such changes were always related
to broader cultural, religious and political transformations, and were never the result of
someone standing up and saying: `from today all art shall express emotion.' Instead, most
changes in theoretical treatment of art followed from changing practices  the need for the
expression theory arose precisely because the old `beautiful representation' theory did not
cover everything that was considered art. At the point in which the amount of art which
did not ﬁt the old deﬁnition became too obvious to ignore, a change of paradigm ensued.
This suggests that at any given time there were always objects which were art even though
they did not ﬁt the theoretical framework. Considering that there seems to be no culture
which does not develop historically in similar ways, the same should be true of any known
cultural context. Such objects falsify the deﬁnitions held by their contemporaries, and the
criticism provided in chapter 1 suggests that the same applies to modern deﬁnitions. A
cultural theorist on the other hand, accepts them as works which are art because they
satisfy some suﬃcient subsets of criteria, even though such subsets might be much less
popular or less often used than those approximated by whichever essentialist theory people
held at the time.
Nevertheless, a cultural theorist is open to the possibility of there being contexts in
which art is not deﬁned culturally. If evidence for such contexts were found, she can
simply tactically retreat to where she is safe, and claim that even if the scope of the theory
has been hereby diminished so that it does not cover all, but rather covers only 90% of all
cultural contexts, it is still better oﬀ than other theories which merely cover one or two.
Ultimately, similarly to the scientists, I do not claim that the cultural theory provides
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the deﬁnite one and only true answer  I am quite happy if it can be seen as a substan-
tial improvement on other theories, and I am open to the possibility of improving it further.
4.6 Mistaken beliefs
The cultural theory was designed to be mainly a descriptive rather than a normative theory,
one which would tell us what art actually is rather than what it should be, and mainly one
which could not be easily falsiﬁed by future artistic practice or even present objects which
I might not think are art, but others do. However, I have argued that it is not completely
deprived of any normative edge  after all, one would expect a theory to be able to tell
when people mistakenly believe that something is art (see sections 3.3 and 3.5.2). Thus
according to the cultural deﬁnition x is not art even though some people might think that
it is, if it had the status conferred upon it by an incompetent person (e.g. a Playboy photo
does not become a ready-made artwork when Smith tells Jones that he totally thinks it is
a piece of art), or if the status was conferred even though there were no good reasons to
confer it.
However, one could take the lacking-an-edge objection to a higher level and argue the
following: whether there are good reasons to confer the status depends on the beliefs
regarding suﬃcient subsets of criteria shared by competent participants in cultural context
C. One can be certainly mistaken if one thinks that x is art in C, while at the same time
sharing beliefs regarding subsets of criteria respected as suﬃcient in C and when x does
not actually satisfy any of those subsets. However, what if one believes that x is art in
C because it satisﬁes a subset β, even though β is not actually respected as suﬃcient in
C? In other words  can one be mistaken in thinking that something is a good reason for
arthood conferral in C while in fact it is not? If one is allowed to be mistaken, i.e. not
share some of the beliefs commonly respected in C, in virtue of what exactly is one still
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a participant in C? How many beliefs is one allowed to get wrong before one becomes
incompetent? If there is no perfect belief convergence required, how large a percentage of
people participating in C have to hold a certain belief to make it the right one? It seems
like the theory suﬀers from serious vagueness and perhaps even indeterminacy.
The problem, although it looks serious, can be solved rather easily. Several of the
claims I made before can help here. Firstly, any person can be a member of more than one
cultural context, and more than one artworld. Secondly, in the great majority of cases one
becomes a member of a context or artworld by self-appointment (e.g. one just needs to
want to be a punk to join the punk-culture), and in cases in which such self-appointment
is not suﬃcient, there are clear and often formal social appointment rituals in place (e.g.
although one cannot become a Christian just by wanting to, one can be christened)  and
so it is never unclear whether one is a member of a context or not. There might also
be impossible cases: no matter how much I want to be a citizen of the Roman Empire,
I cannot become one simply because it does not exist anymore; I can, however, appoint
myself a Ancient Rome fan and have all the knowledge and beliefs Ancient Romans had,
but not engage in all their practices. Thirdly, acts of status conferral are conventional and
the conventions they follow are relative to speciﬁc contexts  and thus it is never unclear
in which context a person wishes to confer the status, i.e. the employment of conventions
characteristic of C1 means the person thinks x is an artwork in C1, not C2.
If S appoints herself a member of C1 and holds all the relevant beliefs and participates
in all the relevant practices of C1, then S is a competent member of C1. Importantly, she is
allowed to diﬀer hugely from other members of C1 in all her beliefs which are not relevant
to this context, without becoming incompetent  e.g. while being a competent punk does
require sharing certain beliefs regarding politics, punks are allowed to think whatever they
wish about art, astrology and ontology of numbers. However, if S appoints herself a
member, but holds a belief contrary or incompatible to the set of beliefs making up C1,
she is by the same an incompetent member, and the more beliefs she gets wrong, the more
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incompetent she is. Still, the fact that she is generally somewhat incompetent does not
mean that she cannot be relevantly competent in some cases (and thus some of her actions,
such as status conferral, may be successful), because not all of her actions and judgements
depend on all the shared beliefs. For example, even though believing that slavery is good
makes one an incompetent modern liberal, one can be relevantly competent when passing
judgements promoting legalisation of gay marriage, simply because such judgements are
in no way related to the views on slavery, or the set of beliefs informing this particular
judgement does not contain any beliefs that are wrong in the context of modern liberalism.
Imagine now that a person S tries to confer the status of a candidate for appreciation
on x in C1 because it satisﬁes a subset of criteria β, even though β is not a good reason for
conferral in C1. A cultural theorist would solve the situation in several steps. (1) Enquire
whether S is a member of C1. If she is not, then the problem vanishes  perhaps she
was trying to confer the status in some C2 but mistook it for C1. If she is a member of
C1, the cultural theorist needs to (2) acknowledge that by thinking that satisfying β is a
suﬃcient reason for status conferral in C1, S exposes herself as an incompetent member
of C1. Moreover, (3) this belief is clearly relevant to the action S wants to perform, and
thus she is relevantly incompetent. Following this, (4) S's conferral is unsuccessful and x
is not art in C1. At the same time, (5) since S is allowed to belong to multiple contexts,
she is allowed to successfully confer the status on x in a diﬀerent context, say C2 of which
S might even be a sole member, in which β is a suﬃcient subset. Thus x is art in C2, but
not C1  but the fact that it is art in some obscure private context needs not worry us,
simply because we are not obliged to care the least for such contexts. (6) It is also perfectly
possible that in time people who participate in C1 will start changing beliefs and in eﬀect
the context will change in such a way that β will become a suﬃcient subset  perhaps this
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can even happen under the inﬂuence of S. If so, x will be an artwork in the resulting C1′
as well.5
To sum up, a person can be mistaken about some beliefs which make up a cultural con-
text they appointed themselves a member of, and thereby be a more or less incompetent
member. If holding such mistaken beliefs impacts one's judgement about art classiﬁcation,
one is relevantly incompetent in those matters and thus one's acts of status conferral will
be unsuccessful. One is still, however, allowed to get some beliefs wrong and successfully
confer the status, provided the status conferral is not actually informed by those beliefs
(e.g. a modern artist can successfully confer the status on their abstract painting even
if they ﬁrmly believe that Macbeth was written by Diderot and that one ought to sing
along the orchestra in a concert hall). Also, with some luck and persuasive power, one
can convince other members of a context that even though one's work does not merit art
status in that context on its current rules, perhaps the rules should be changed so that it
does.
4.7 Triviality
It seems that one issue underlying many objections against the institutional theory is that
it trivialises the question `what is art?', or that if one accepted it, pretty much anything
can be art. The cultural theory improves on this point  while for Dickie all decisions of
the artworld members are pretty much arbitrary (or at least not explainable within the
theory), a cultural theorist can explain why they made them, i.e. point at the reasons for
status conferral. However, one can be justiﬁably sceptical about the practical usefulness
of such a solution. Assuming for the sake of simplicity, that the ten criteria listed by
5Becker provides an interesting analysis: artists who create things which are unlikely to be accepted
by an institution because they do not comply with the standards of the common art distribution systems
within an artworld (e.g. are too big to ﬁt in a gallery), can become nuclei of a new artworld in which
diﬀerent distribution systems develop, allowing their works to gain art status (Becker 2008: 129).
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Gaut are the actual ones the modern Westerners respect, it would be instructive to ask
how demanding we actually are in choosing the subsets of those criteria which are good
reasons for us. It seems that we are in fact extremely relaxed, to the point where satisfying
a subset consisting of merely one criterion might be a good reason. Assuming that A.
LivLaing Bradford's An I for an eye (Fig. 4.1) is indeed art, it seems that it is art pretty
much because the artist intended it to be art and because it is a painting (i.e. it satisﬁes
Gaut's criteria 9 and 10). While the author might have wanted it to have a capacity to
convey complex meanings, or positive aesthetic properties, or hoped it would exhibit an
individual point of view and be intellectually challenging, the work can hardly be said
to actually have any of those properties. Thus, if it is art, it is art simply because it was
intended to be one, and it belongs to a genre  which is not a particularly hard requirement
to meet. If we are so relaxed about what gives us good reason for status conferral, then
pretty much anything can be a good reason, and once again  pretty much anything can be
art and the theory is trivial. What is more, it seems that we are similarly quite relaxed in
what is required of a culturally competent person  while in the past it took an artist or a
very knowledgeable person to confer the status, now it can be done by almost anyone. This
is only made worse by the fact that many objects are not art even though they certainly
satisfy suﬃcient subsets of criteria: jewellery, classic cars, dog shows. If they are not art
just because no one ever conferred the status onto them, and it is not at all impossible that
someone will actually do that in the future, then once again  it seems that they also can
be art and the borderline between them and art is very weak, and a theory which claims
that they, and pretty much anything, could be art, is rather trivial.
I will not even attempt to challenge this objection. I bite the bullet. I simply think that
this is a very valid point of criticism, but it is not a criticism of my theory, but of modern
artistic practice. The fact that the cultural theory correctly recognises that modern artistic
practice is very indiscriminative and, frankly, often quite disappointing in what it chooses
as worthy of status conferral, hardly makes the theory false. Perhaps Danto was right in his
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Figure 4.1: A. LivLaing Bradford, An I for an eye, 2001, acrylic on canvas, Museum of
Bad Art
`The End of Art', or perhaps modern humans just lost the ability to set clear boundaries 
whatever the reason, it simply is the case that it doesn't take much these days to make an
artwork. However, this does not make the cultural theory trivial. It makes it a non-trivial
theory which explains what turns out to be a fairly trivial phenomenon.
Two further points support this analysis. For one, the cultural theory does not only
deﬁne what is art here and now, it also provides ways of deﬁning what is or was art in
other, past and possibly more demanding contexts. If in those other contexts the triviality
problem does not arise (because the good reasons are more sparse and involve more criteria,
and because adequate cultural competence is harder to achieve), then it seems clear that
the problem is not with the theory  it is with the modern Western context. In fact, it
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does indeed seem that the cultural theory can provide one with as much edge as one could
wish for if, for example, 18th Century art is considered. Arguably, in C18th C. virtually
every suﬃcient subset of criteria had to include `possessing positive aesthetic properties'
and `belonging to an established artistic form', while `being expressive of emotion' and `a
product of a high degree of skill' were not far behind in popularity. Since the cultural
theory is applicable in exactly the same way to art in the 18th Century and modern
Western contexts, and it seems that it can be used unproblematically in the former, there
is no reason why it should not be used in the latter case.
Most importantly, however, I believe that the cultural theory may not be what one
would want a theory to be, but it is nevertheless the best one can get. We may wish that
art were deﬁnable in better ways which would not entail that, at least in some contexts,
pretty much anything can be art. Theories, however, are not about hopeful wishes, they
are about what in fact is the case. It seems that the great majority of other theories of
art have this in common  they are more likely to tell one what things their authors think
should be art, not what actually is art. While there may not be anything wrong with
thinking that the author, through sound argumentation, can arrive at a better picture of
what actually is art than however many members of the artworld, it seems that no theory
actually manages to exclude all unwanted borderline cases without thereby also targeting
some of the most canonical works (e.g. see sections 1.2.2 and 1.3.2). Surely a theory
which can exclude some dubious cases only at the cost of entailing that Kafka's novels
or Byzantine icons are not art, is hardly satisfactory. The cultural theory does not have
this problem and, as mentioned above, it is very successful in determining the arthood of
works from less artistically promiscuous cultural contexts than ours, thus not leading to
any unwanted exclusions.
The question is: is being overly exclusive really worse than being overly inclusive? Since
I want to claim that the cultural theory might not be what we want, but is the best we can
get, then I should show that it is indeed better than its exclusive competitors. And indeed,
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save for all the reasons listed in chapter 3, I think that there is one reason in particular
why the cultural theory is better.
Following an over-exclusive deﬁnition means that some works are simply lost to us and
nothing can be done with them  some things are excluded from the domain of art and
that is it. But accepting an overly inclusive theory of art does not necessitate a similarly
irrecoverable loss of the ability to orient ourselves in the world of art. I am perfectly happy
to accept that the question: what is art? is somewhat trivial in the modern western context
 but this is ﬁne as long as we can tell what is good art. It might be that the cultural
theory entails that many objects which one would think cannot be art, could be or are art,
but it at the same time allows that they are simply really bad art. In fact, it is in this
respect quite similar to many anti-essentialist views which claim that art cannot be deﬁned
and we should rather spend our time on determining what is good art. The cultural theory
not only is sympathetic to such views, but actually suggests how one can deal with their
evaluation, and is compatible with other successful theories on this subject (see section 5.1
for details).
The ultimate answer to the charge of triviality then, is this. It is true that the cultural
theory makes the matter of what is art in the modern world somewhat trivial at points,
and is very relaxed in accepting objects under the domain. The fact that pretty much
anything can be art, however, is simply a characteristic of modern artworld, not a fault in
the theory  while other contexts were much more restrictive, the modern artworld did in
fact lose a lot of its past edge and exclusivity. It is, therefore, a fact correctly recognised
by the cultural theory that in the modern Western context pretty much anything can be
art. The conclusion one should draw from this is that while explaining the concept of art
is fascinating, the actual classifying is fairly trivial (and somewhat boring), and that we
should perhaps focus on distinguishing what is good art.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
My enquiry started with a review of the most prominent modern deﬁnitions of art, showing
that none of them is fully adequate and successful in capturing the phenomenon in all
its complexity and diversity (see Chapter 1). In their critical evaluation I found that
a great deal of problems result from the lack of context-sensitivity of those theories 
the ahistoricity of the institutional theory (1.1.2), functionalism (1.3.2) and the cluster
account (1.4.2), or the reliance on intentions rather than conventions in historicism (1.2.2,
1.2.2). Trying to provide universal, non-context-relative deﬁnitions those theories end up
being overly general and vague  the institutionalists cannot explain why certain things
get status conferred upon them (1.1.2), functionalists and historicists rely on `correct'
aesthetic experience or type of regard (1.3.2, 1.2.2), cluster theorists may be unable to
say which properties are actually criteria for arthood and which subsets of criteria are
suﬃcient (1.4.2). Following this, the classiﬁcations provided by those theories are simply
inaccurate and do not conform to the actual artistic practice  they are either too exclusive
(e.g. institutionalists have problems with private art (1.1.2), historicists with alien and
unintended art (1.2.2, 1.2.2), functionalists with a great deal of modern and non-aesthetic
art (1.3.2)), or too inclusive (institutionalists may be unable to tell artworks from dinners
(1.1.2), historicists may have to take broken crockery as art (1.2.2), functionalists have a
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hard time excluding classic cars, jewellery and military parades (1.3.2)), or, as the cluster
account, simply struggle to actually spell out on what basis something should be included
or excluded (1.4.2).
One thing which drew my attention in the course of this enquiry was the fact that a
great deal of the problems which the theories face could be easily solved by simply admit-
ting that certain rules and criteria in art classiﬁcation are not written in time-independent
universal metaphysical stone, but are conventional, determined by people who are actually
involved in art making and appreciating, and inﬂuenced by multiple historical and contex-
tual factors. This led me to believe that, although very vague in detail, the institutional
theory did in fact capture the essence of the phenomenon  what is art is dependent on
certain social beliefs and practices, the artworld. However, as it stands, institutionalism
suﬀers from all the negative sides of relying on a social institution: arbitrariness, vagueness
and arguably limited explanatory power.
In Chapter 2 I argued that relying on an institution does not have to lead to those
problems and most of the vagueness and arbitrariness can be avoided. The cultural deﬁn-
ition I developed preserves the essential institutional element thanks to which most of the
problems of other theories can be averted. At the same time it avoids the traps of insti-
tutionalism, thanks to the context-sensitivity (2.2.3), increased precision in determining
what an artworld actually is (2.2.5), and by providing reasons for classifying objects as art
(2.2.6). Ultimately, I argue that the cultural theory retains just enough of the institution-
alism's arbitrariness to remain ﬂexible (i.e. not overly exclusive or inclusive, or likely to
be out of date a day after it is published), but not enough to make it uninformative and
useless (2.3).
Simultaneously, I tried to address a separate yet related (and for some reason often
forgotten) question: why is it that we have the concept of art we have? Once again, since
in all likelihood the concept `art' has not been given to humans by Apollo or Saraswati,
but simply developed historically together with other concepts such as `law', `fashion', etc.,
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it seems reasonable to think that its content is determined by whatever had inﬂuence on
its development. Since it was shaped by various cultural inﬂuences throughout history
and in all likelihood had a diﬀerent meaning in diﬀerent cultures, it only makes sense to
accept its culture-relative nature. I argued that answering the questions `what is art?' and
`where did our concept of art come from?' together reinforces my theory  the fact that
`art' developed in various cultures suggests that it is a culture-relative concept, while being
culture-relative explains why it could develop the way it did.
The main reasons why I believe that the cultural theory is really attractive (see Chapter
3), are the following: (1) it retains virtually every advantage of all the other deﬁnitions
discussed before, while not falling for any of their problems  it basically does the same
job, but better (3.13.4); (2) it is much better connected with the actual practice of art
 it explains what art really is, not what it should or could or what we would like it to be
(3.5.1); and (3) it succeeds in explaining both why art can be so incredibly diverse, and how
all those diverse things are nevertheless the same  art (3.5.3). In addition, it can boast
some methodological advantages, being heuristically useful and being complementary with
other academic disciplines, notably anthropology and art history, and being able to account
for alien, future, possible, and whatever other kind of art the philosophers of science ﬁction
thought experiments can come up with.
It might initially seem that the deﬁnition, although solving multiple problems of other
accounts, is itself plagued with irresolvable issues. However, as I argued in Chapter 4, these
are merely apparent diﬃculties. The three problems which the cultural deﬁnition could
have inherited from institutionalism are in fact easily solvable. Although I would be happy
to accept the circularity of my deﬁnition on similar grounds as Dickie, it seems that the
cultural deﬁnition can avoid it altogether  thanks to the history- and context-sensitivity
it is apparent that the term `art' present in the deﬁniens is used diﬀerently than the same
term present in various elements of the deﬁniendum (4.1). Likewise, while institutionalists
might have had problems distinguishing artworks from other objects made by artists for a
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public, e.g. dinners, the context-sensitivity and stressing the reasons for status conferral
central to the cultural theory prevents any confusion (4.2). Finally, while it seems that
Wollheim's dilemma which my deﬁnition purported to escape can be simply restated at a
meta-level (i.e. asking whether the members of the artworld have reasons to have those
particular reasons for arthood conferral), it can be equally easily escaped again, and again
if needed (4.3).
I also discussed and rejected some speciﬁc objections which seem to arise because of
the context-relative nature of the deﬁnition. Firstly, it may seem that my account dilutes
the question `what is art?' by making the term relative to multiple (also completely
arbitrary and uninteresting) contexts. I argued that this can hardly be seen as a problem
or limitation  one can surely choose and focus on the contexts which matter to one (just
as all other deﬁnitions in fact do), and such a choice, if properly informed by appropriate
reﬂection and empirical data gathered by social scientists, would be far from arbitrary
(4.4). Secondly, I showed that the fact that there can be some contexts in which `art' is
not a cultural concept, is either not a problem at all (not until such contexts are actually
found), or is a minor issue which might expose a slight limitation of the theory without
seriously damaging it (4.5). Thirdly, one could doubt whether a cultural theorist can draw
a clear line between cases of being mistaken with regards to some beliefs which make up
an artworld A but yet being its member (though perhaps not a very competent one), and
holding the same beliefs and because of that being a member of a separate artworld B. I
argued that it is in fact not at all diﬃcult to determine whether one is relevantly competent
in their cultural context, and following this, whether one's status conferrals are successful,
or in which contexts they are successful (4.6). Finally, given the state of the modern culture
in which `anything goes', the cultural theory seems rather trivial  if in the modern context
the criteria for arthood and competence requirements are extremely relaxed, then pretty
much anyone can make anything into art. Here, I bite the bullet and argue that while this
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is true, such criticism should be directed at the permissive artistic practice, not a theory
which simply correctly recognises its existence (4.7).
5.1 Evaluation
There are several general implications and wider consequences of the cultural theory which
are worth mentioning.
Although throughout this thesis I followed the principle which distinguishes the clas-
siﬁcatory and evaluative meanings of `art', I also generally believe that the answers to
classiﬁcatory questions should be related to, or at least not clearly at odds with, theor-
ies of evaluation. The cultural theory is designed to work well with all sorts of pluralist
theories of artistic and aesthetic value.
Before I proceed, here is what the cultural deﬁnition does not require one to believe
about evaluation. A cultural theorist is not compelled to think that all matters of eval-
uation are culture-relative as classiﬁcation is. It is perfectly possible that some (or all,
though I ﬁnd that unlikely) criteria of evaluation are not dependant on contexts (for ex-
ample, the success value of a work, as described by Carroll (2009: 53f.)), or at least are
dependant only in their details, not general form (e.g. a work's originality value always
means being inventive and diﬀerent from other works, even though from what works and
what sort of diﬀerences are required may change depending on the context). Following this,
even if it is indeed the case that in the modern permissive society matters of classiﬁcation
are fairly trivial (see: 4.7), this does not mean that so are matters of evaluation. In fact,
that is perhaps one major conclusion of this thesis: given the current state of the artworld,
determining what is art is a fairly uninteresting venture  we should instead focus on de-
termining what is good art. To take some edge oﬀ the triviality objection, while it is true
that aesthetics may have no means of stopping pretty much anything from becoming art,
it can still separate the sheep from the goats on the next level  while a generic pop song
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may enjoy art status similarly as Beethoven's 9th, we may still have ways of clearly stating
that the Symphony is startlingly magniﬁcent, while a generic pop song is just pretty bad
art.
Similarly as with pluralist theories of evaluation, the cultural theory holds that there are
multiple reasons and criteria for classiﬁcation. While I do not believe that the same criteria
which are used in classiﬁcation should now be re-used, I do think that there might be a
great deal of overlap. Following pluralists, a cultural theorist could say that a work's value
is indeed measured on several separate scales, and some of those scales are: the number
of suﬃcient subsets of criteria for arthood conferral satisﬁed; the number of contexts in
which the subsets satisﬁed are suﬃcient; and the degree to which some of the criteria are
satisﬁed.1
Firstly, some of the properties included in the cluster of criteria can clearly be used
in an evaluative sense. Objects not only `possess positive aesthetic properties', but also
possess them to a lesser or greater degree, they are not only `original', but less or more
original. Thus while the criterial properties used by the cultural theorist to classify works
cannot be just straightforwardly transferred and used for the purposes of evaluation, there
seems to be at least a signiﬁcant correlation between the kinds of things that matter in
both cases.
Secondly, one could risk a larger leap (for the moment warranted only by intuition)
and claim that a part of what matters, or perhaps is just strongly correlated with what
matters in evaluation of works, is how many suﬃcient subsets of criteria for status conferral
a given piece satisﬁes, how many reasons there are to confer the status (in a given context).
Thus if, say, Mona Lisa satisﬁes a subset of criteria γ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} (i.e.
all criteria) and Fountain satisﬁes a subset δ = {3, 5, 6, 7}, both of which are suﬃcient
1Importantly, while what I present below is somewhat similar to Graves' claim that artistic value is
`the ability of a work of art to satisfy value criteria of Artworld systems intra-systematically and inter-
systematically' ((Graves 1997: 63-4)), I do not wish to make as strong a claim as he does. I at best believe
that the following is a part of, or contributes to, or perhaps is merely a guide to a work's value.
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for status conferral, then if δ ( γ and (γ ) {η, θ, . . .}) & (δ + {η, θ, . . .}) such that
{η, θ, . . .} are suﬃcient subsets (i.e. satisfying γ means satisfying more suﬃcient subsets
than satisfying δ does), then Mona Lisa is, at least in this respect, a better artwork than
Fountain. Simply put, since there are more reasons to think that Mona Lisa is art in the
ﬁrst place, or perhaps there are more `ways' in which it is art, it is in that respect better
than any other work which is less endowed.
This might initially seem like a very crude and ad-hoc stipulation  why should one
follow it? While I will not try to defend this proposal in detail here (and I admit that it is
indeed rather crude and in need of development), it seems that there is at least one reason
to think that satisfying more subsets makes a better work. It is often said that a work's
value is found in the test of time. While some ﬁnd this notion to be rather vague and
simply unhelpful in determining the value of works now, before centuries will test them,
it does seem to point at something that is indeed valuable: being appreciated by so many
diverse people at so many diverse times gives some measure of a work's universality. I
believe that this is precisely what follows from satisfying multiple suﬃcient subsets. A
work which satisﬁes more suﬃcient subsets will be recognised as art in more contexts and
even if over time some contexts will change in such a way that some of the subsets this
work satisﬁes will no longer be suﬃcient, it will still be recognised as art in virtue of
satisfying multiple other subsets. Satisfying more subsets means having more to oﬀer in
more diverse contexts, being appreciated by diﬀerent people for diﬀerent things i.e. being
more universal. Conversely, a work which satisﬁes less subsets might ﬁnd itself falling out
of grace as cultures change (as e.g. some socialist realist works had), thus failing the test
of time.
Thirdly, a related point regards satisfying a subset of criteria which is considered suﬃ-
cient in more contexts. Universality in the above sense depended on the number of subsets
 by satisfying a hundred the work in a way ensures one or two hits everywhere. But
a work can be universal even if it satisﬁes only one subset, provided that this subset is
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considered suﬃcient in all (or most) contexts. Thus a part of a work's value might reside
in the fact that its particular properties provide a good reason to confer the status onto it
for competent members of a great number of cultural contexts.
Finally, a part of a work's value may lie in the degree to which it satisﬁes one or more of
the criteria. Thus while Fountain might not match Mona Lisa in the number of suﬃcient
subsets, it is probably much more original (after all, Leonardo's work does not establish a
new genre nor is it really that diﬀerent from his earlier paintings) and is more intellectually
challenging (while Mona Lisa does require intellectual interpretation, it hardly questions
received views and modes of thought). If this is the case, then although Fountain may not
be good at everything, it is at least really great at some things, and therein lies a part of
its value.
5.2 History and contextuality
Other general implications of the cultural theory follow from its speciﬁc context-relative
nature. One relates to the historicity of art. Analytic aesthetics has been said to be re-
markably uninterested in the fact that art has a history, and to have adopted a universalist
approach to it, behaving as if art popped into existence just before the Great Avantgarde 
Richard Shusterman announced ahistoricity to be a distinctive feature of analytic aesthet-
ics (Shusterman 1989: 11) and Pierre Bourdieu commented on the futility of ahistorical
approaches (Bourdieu 1987: 202). A lot has been done to change this, and the work of
Danto, Wollheim, Carroll and Levinson should be mentioned here. Yet it seems that aes-
theticians still treat history- and context-relativity with a great deal of suspicion, and are at
best inconsistent in applying it in various branches of aesthetics. In my arguments against
other theories I tried to show that ahistorical treatment can lead to serious problems or
limitations, while by presenting the cultural theory I hope to have proven that taking art's
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history seriously can be quite fruitful. In particular, I think that there are four issues which
need to be addressed by any theory of art:
1. Both the practice and the concept of art must have originated somewhere.
2. Art evolves over time, styles and forms come and go, later artworks are inﬂuenced
be their predecessors, etc.
3. People's views on art change and what is likely to be treated as art at one time might
not be treated as such at another time.
4. The evolution of styles, forms, etc. is correlated with, and likely inﬂuences and is
inﬂuenced by wider cultural beliefs  art history is parallel to histories of religion,
politics, economy, etc.2
Most of these points are either not addressed by art theories at all, or are addressed par-
tially or unsuccessfully. It is rather remarkable that even the historical deﬁnition struggles
with the origins of art, and most deﬁnitions treat it as if it were completely detached from
all other human activity.
Similarly, while most theorists agree that art is shaped by other practices (e.g. Baroque
art was motivated by Counter Reformation, futurism by fascism and technological advance-
ments), they fail to reﬂect on the possibility that those practices may shape not only the
form and content of artworks at various times, but the very understanding of what art is.
Yet it seems rather reasonable to say that if not for the shaping of modern gender-divided
domestic family model, embroidery would have been art alongside painting and architec-
ture, if not for democratisation of the societies, a large part of folk art would not be seen as
art, if not for commercialisation, pop art would not be art. Even more strikingly, it seems
2I take those claims to be rather unproblematic  they do not require arguments to back their truth,
they are simply facts about our world. As Larry Shiner put it, treating the concept `art' as historical
is `more faithful to the evidence and more illuminating for the present than traditional narratives of
continuity and inevitability. It is up to those who believe in the universality or ancient origins of the ideals
and institutions of ﬁne art to [prove `art' to be ahistorical]' (Shiner 2001: 15).
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that the very reason we give when explaining why functionalist and minimalist art became
possible in the 20th rather than 17th Century, is because it could only arise in a society
which was amazed with machine-like shapes and functions, while the Counter Reformation
policies of the Church would have abhorred its plainness and lack of spirituality. Surely
this suggests the modern understanding of `art' is diﬀerent from the past because over time
it was inﬂuenced by multiple other practices and cultures?
In section 2.2.3 I presented the cultural theorist's understanding of the historical nature
of the concept `art'  relativising the concept to the cultural contexts in given times is done
by applying appropriate indexicals to its deﬁnition. Thanks to this, although the deﬁnition
remains the same for art of and from all times, diﬀerent indices applied to diﬀerent contexts
allow for diﬀerent objects to qualify as art in those contexts. Thus while the extension
of the concept might change over time, the concept remains the same. Since the indices
refer to the state of cultures in given contexts, the relation between what is art and the
political, religious, economical, etc. climate of the given time is obvious  those things are
just elements of the cultural context of which art is a part as well.
Such treatment allows a cultural theorist to answer questions not only about the devel-
opment, but also the origins of art. She can hold that both the concept and practice of art
evolved from other cultural practices  since the artworld is just one among many social
systems all of which constantly inﬂuence one another, it is perfectly acceptable that it
developed from other systems, just as psychology developed from philosophy. Moreover, it
allows that separate artworlds could develop independently and only later merge. Further,
the changes in the practice of art and people's beliefs about it, are the very centre of the
cultural theory which stresses that art is something diﬀerent in diﬀerent contexts, depends
on and shapes both art-related and non-art-related beliefs present in those contexts, and
allows that those contexts evolve from and inﬂuence one another.
To sum up, one of the main things this thesis underlines is that art is not a lone island
on top of an ivory tower  it is instead one of many interrelated systems such as politics,
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religion and commerce, all of which constantly inﬂuence one another and change over time.
Consequently, any theory which seeks to deﬁne art as if it was completely detached from
other human practices, simply misses the point and provides at best an incomplete image.
Although my thesis does not establish this directly, the same can probably be said about
theories of art evaluation, interpretation, aesthetic properties, and many other ﬁelds in
aesthetics.
5.3 Methodology
I suspect that one of the reasons why many philosophers shun away from including cultural
and historical dependance to their concepts, is because by doing so they open the door for
historians and social scientists who have more to say about history and cultures than they
do  and philosophers don't like to be told that they need anyone to solve their problems.
Although there are naturally some genuine concerns about the usefulness of the solutions of
other disciplines for philosophical purposes, it seems that the lack of will for cooperation is
largely irrational. The practical issues related to the situation of arts and social sciences in
the modern world only make such quarrels more puzzling  surely in a world in which those
disciplines have to struggle for survival, it is focusing on the connections and possibilities
for cooperation rather than pointless quarrels that are going to win humanities more credit
and increase the public perception of their legitimacy.
One of the reasons why I believe that a large part of the `philosophical separatists' con-
cerns are irrational, is the resistance I expect to see against the cultural theory I presented.
I am certain that the major accusation against it will concern its history- and context-
relativity, since for many philosophers to say that something is relative is the same as to
say `I give up'. The irrationality of such concerns regards two points. Firstly, the cultural
theory is relative to history and context in exactly the same way as any other modern
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deﬁnition of art  the only diﬀerence is, most of the other theories relate to the modern
Western understanding of `art' only.3 If this is all one is interested in, the cultural theorist
can cover exactly the same ground without being any more relativist. While I am sure
that the diﬃculties the cultural theory might have in establishing the exact boundaries of
particular cultural contexts will be pointed out, it is curious that no one ever asks what the
other theorists actually mean when they say that their deﬁnitions account for the `mod-
ern Western' understanding of art. Does `modern' start in 1917 with Fountain? Or in
1907 with Les Demoiselles d'Avignon? Does it include art created by the Amish? Does
`Western' include Russia? Or the Chinese immigrants in Europe?
It seems thus that criticising relativism is a double-sided blade. In fact, I believe
that doing so only points out the advantage the view I propose yields  while the other
theorists can answer the above questions with some informed guesses at best, the cultural
theory's approach which encourages listening to what anthropologists and historians have
to say may actually give one some historical or sociological reason justifying placing the
boundaries here rather than there.
Secondly, being suspicious about the relativism I advocate is irrational because the
external help needed is simply much more limited than it seems. All that the histor-
ical and social sciences are required to contribute, is to provide a cultural theorist with
raw idiographic data concerning (a) which contexts are worth exploring, (b) what are the
characteristic beliefs and practices of people participating in those contexts, and (c) what
properties are considered criterial for arthood and which subsets of criteria are considered
suﬃcient by those people. Essentially, the connection with historians and anthropologists
the cultural theory calls for is restricted to asking them to provide solid data obtained
3Some notable exceptions include Stephen Davies and Dennis Dutton, who studied and tried to accom-
modate the understanding of `art' of other cultures (S. Davies 2000; Dutton 2000), however, they remain
exceptions to the general modern-Western-centrism.
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through legitimate and sound research, to be used by philosophers in place of their intu-
itions and limited art-historical knowledge. Surely asking for help can only be a good thing
if it allows to substitute somewhat naive and incomplete guesses with genuine research?
In a wider perspective, the cultural theory calls for establishing a practice of co-
operation with history and social sciences. Since art is a historical phenomenon embedded
in a wide spectrum of other social practices, it only makes sense to explain it by referring
to history and those practices; since history and social practices are researched by histor-
ians and social scientists, there is no need for philosophers to use their intuitions and, by
necessity, incomplete knowledge of art's and civilisation's history  we can simply ask those
who deal with these things professionally. While it is true that any information they might
provide will not be as unshakeable as laws of logic, surely it will be more reliable than
our intuitions and limited knowledge (which, incidentally, are usually derived from books
written by historians and sociologists of art anyway). With this I hope to encourage the
rise of experimental philosophy of art, a discipline which will not assume the universality
of our intuitions regarding social facts, but simply test them.
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